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
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STUDIES IN ENGLISH

VOL. I

JOSEPH GLANVILL

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JOSEPH GLANVILL

A STUDY IN
ENGLISH THOUGHT AND LETTERS OF
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

BY
FERRIS GREENSLET, PH.D.
FELLOW IN ENGLISH IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY



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PREFACE

THIS study of Glanvill was undertaken as a part of the work leading to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been carried out under the direction of Professor Thomas R. Price, to whom I am greatly indebted for careful and kindly criticism. The plan and aim of the essay will, I trust, be sufficiently apparent without discussion here. In the numerous quotations from Glanvill's writings I have followed his peculiar spelling, capitalization, and punctuation. It has not, however, been possible to preserve his archaic typography. His books are set in three kinds of type, — Roman, italic, and black-letter, — with no evident system save that the opprobrious epithets applied to opponents are usually in black-letter.

It is not possible to give, within reasonable limits, a complete list of all the works consulted in the research; nor, indeed, is it desirable, since the *Dictionary of National Biography* has made readily accessible, full and accurate bibliographies. Besides the usual sources of bibliographical and historical information, the most useful propædeutics have been Lecky's *Rise of Rationalism*, Tulloch's *Rational Theology in England in the Seventeenth Century*, and Remusat's *Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'à Locke*. James Crossley's edition of *Worthington's Diary* for the Chetham Society is a mine of biographical lore. To all of these my obligation is considerable. Other references are given in foot-notes. In the appendix I have added a chronological list of Glanvill's books, a bibliography of the more important critical references to his work, and a list of such of the writings of the Cambridge Platonists as have been accessible to me.

For the portrait which serves as a frontispiece to this volume, I am indebted to the kindness of Sidney Colvin, Esq., Keeper of the

Prints in the British Museum. I would also express my hearty thanks to Professor George Edward Woodberry for the suggestion which brought Glanvill to my notice, and to Dr. Edward Eggleston of Joshua's Rock, Lake George, N.Y., for the use of his library, rich in seventeenth century material.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
NEW YORK CITY, March, 1900.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| SKETCH OF ENGLISH THOUGHT, 1579-1660 . . . | 1 |

CHAPTER II

| | |
|----------------------------------|----|
| THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS | 17 |
| 1. Whichcote | 23 |
| 2. Culverwell | 25 |
| 3. Smith | 29 |
| 4. Cudworth | 37 |
| 5. More | 40 |

CHAPTER III

| | |
|---|----|
| GLANVILL'S LIFE AND THE ORDER OF HIS WRITINGS | 51 |
|---|----|

CHAPTER IV

| | |
|---|-----|
| THE PHILOSOPHY OF GLANVILL | 89 |
| 1. The Revolt against Aristotelianism . . . | 90 |
| 2. Scepticism | 95 |
| 3. Constructive Theorizing | 111 |

CHAPTER V

| | PAGE |
|-----------------------------------|------|
| LATITUDINARIAN THEOLOGY | 124 |
| 1. Rationalism | 127 |
| 2. Science and Religion | 131 |
| 3. Practical Piety | 139 |

CHAPTER VI

| | |
|---|-----|
| GHOST STORIES AND WITCHCRAFT | 144 |
| 1. Historical Considerations | 146 |
| 2. Investigation of Psychic Phenomena | 155 |
| 3. Theorizing thereupon | 159 |
| 4. Resulting Controversies | 167 |

CHAPTER VII

| | |
|--|-----|
| GLANVILL AS A MAN OF LETTERS | 177 |
| 1. Sketch of English Prose in the Seventeenth Century | 178 |
| 2. Glanvill's Critical Theories | 185 |
| 3. Analysis of his Style | 192 |

APPENDICES

| | |
|---|-----|
| a. CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF GLANVILL'S PUBLI- CATIONS | 223 |
|---|-----|

CONTENTS

xi

| | PAGE |
|--|------|
| <i>b.</i> PRINCIPAL CRITICAL NOTICES OF GLANVILL . | 227 |
| <i>c.</i> WRITINGS OF THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS . | 231 |
| <hr/> | |
| INDEX | 233 |

JOSEPH GLANVILL

CHAPTER I

THE TENDENCIES OF ENGLISH THOUGHT 1579-1660

IN the third quarter of the seventeenth century, Joseph Glanvill was a person of considerable distinction in English thoughts and letters, but now, so passes the glory of the world, to most readers he is an empty name, or, perhaps, the author of the old book which gave Matthew Arnold the story of *The Scholar Gypsy*. The student of literature or philosophy has met him in footnotes or in some scattering pages of criticism, yet few scholars, it is safe to say, know anything of his life, or have ever seen one of his many works. This almost total neglect is hard to understand, for it is wholly unmerited. Quite apart from the interest of his personality and the literary charm of much

of his writing, he is a very significant figure in that most complex transitional century. His work, indeed, has points of contact with all the intellectual activities of his time, and the study of it should help to explain certain crucial moments in the history of theology, science, philosophy, and literature.

Before attempting an account of Glanvill's life and an examination of his work, two preparatory steps are necessary: we must sketch in outline the progress of English thought, from the accession of Elizabeth to the restoration of the Stuarts; and we must study more carefully the character and culture of the little group of Cambridge Platonists, so called, who, we shall see, were perhaps the most important influence in determining the direction of Glanvill's work.

For the most part, English philosophy, before Locke, was not the purely speculative science which Continental philosophy had come to be; it was, rather, applied philosophy, and chiefly concerned itself with the more practical problems of æsthetics, ethics, politics, or education. It followed from this that English thought was conservative, and very suspicious of new sys-

tems. Long after the humanistic revolt led by Pletho, Marsilius Ficinus, Pico Mirandola, and Ramus had banished the scholastic nominalism which passed for Aristotelianism in the schools of the Continent, it held undiminished sway at Oxford and Cambridge. Even to the end of the sixteenth century —

“Authority . . . stalked about,
Like some old giant’s more gigantic ghost.”¹

This authority suffered no great loss in England until the Platonists, who had contended only against the metaphysics of the schoolmen, allied themselves with the men of science, and attacked the existing systems of physics and astronomy. The discoveries of Magellan, Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler showed conclusively that the earth was not the centre of a series of crystalline spheres, and the Aristotelian hypothesis, which had come to be a Catholic dogma, of a God dwelling apart from nature, was made thereby to seem to many minds childishly anthropomorphic. There were, moreover, certain men who, upon a vivid imaginative real-

¹ Cowley, *Ode to the Royal Society*.

ization of the infinity of force and space which the new astronomical system implied, founded a philosophy which, despite its visionary pantheism, has proved to be the forerunner of our modern monism. Chief of these was Giordano Bruno, a protagonist in the tragic conflict between free philosophy and the established order of dogmatic theology. In 1583, Bruno was in England and lectured at Oxford; although his lectures were coldly received, and stopped ere long, seeds were sown which soon quickened into new movements in English philosophy. On the Continent, the metaphysics of the schools had been attacked first, but in England the earliest sally was directed against the physics and logic, and it was not until the time of Glanvill that there was anything like a formal and concerted opposition to the metaphysics. But, all the while, influences were at work toward its final overthrow.

From 1600 to 1660 English thought flowed in two well-defined currents, each with a distinct subsidiary stream of its own. On the one hand is the Baconian inductive empiricism, which in some minds takes the form of dogmatic materialism; on the other, is a less

clearly marked, though perhaps more influential, development of an imaginative Platonism which later took sides with Cartesian rationalism. Organically connected with these are certain movements in theology, science, and literature.

The story of the rise of the Baconian philosophy is too familiar to be retold here, but a few points must be here noted because of their bearing on the subject of this essay. The philosophy of Bacon was a "free," "experimental" philosophy. It was grounded upon a criticism of the previous systems, but it owed allegiance to none. Bacon mentions approvingly, as men who had been independent and eager in the pursuit of the experimental philosophy, Telesio, Cardan, and Gilbert, but though he uses their positive results, he is little indebted to their theories. His own system, if system it may be called, came into being only because "*Franciscus de Verulamio sic cogitavit.*" His contribution to philosophy was twofold; he corrected the method and determined the end, or, rather, pointed out a new subsidiary end.

Bacon did not, as is sometimes said, correct the method of philosophical research by invent-

ing the art of inductive reasoning. That art was quite well known to Aristotle, and Bacon himself refers the invention of it to Plato. His significance lies rather in his insistence upon the need of verification, thus combating the vicious tendency utterly to distrust the eye, even as a help, in the search for truth, which had come to be characteristic of the scholastic systems. He gave currency to that habit of mind which carefully observes particular phenomena before inferring universal principles, and which, in its building of general ideas, examines and excludes a sufficient number of negatives before concluding an affirmative.

But perhaps a greater service was done the world by Bacon's temporary shifting of the end of philosophy. Devastated by the logomachies of the schools, the fields of thought had become barren of visible good. Bacon wished not only to understand Nature, but to enchain her, so to make her better serve the needs of men. It was this in Bacon which stirred the enthusiasm of his followers. Macaulay, at the end of his well-known comparison of Plato and Bacon, says: "To sum up the whole,

we should say that the aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt man into a god; the aim of the Baconian philosophy was to provide man with what he requires while he continues to be man. . . . The former aim was noble, but the latter was attainable." This is, of course, a characteristic over-statement, for there was not a little of the utilitarian in the writer of the *Republic*, and little less of the seeker of shy and gracious *siccum lumen* in Bacon; it is, however, a fair account of the superficial and apparent tendencies of the two schools, and it was quite the opinion of the seventeenth century. In this phase the Baconian system gained ground slowly and steadily among the scientific men of that century. Finally, in 1662, Bacon's ideal Atlantean dream of Solomon's House came true; the Royal Society was chartered, and the experimental philosophy became almost the official philosophy of England. It won laurels through the work of Boyle and Wallis, it was patronized by the king, applauded by many of the clergy, and Cowley flung praises of it abroad through the sounding brass of the Pindaric ode.

Hobbes, for a time Bacon's private secretary, drew perhaps from him inspiration for a new inductive system of philosophy. This system, with its materialistic metaphysics, monarchical politics, and implicit agnosticism, all presented with notable cleverness and clearness, had a great vogue. It blended easily with the scepticism of Montaigne, with the atomic Epicureanism of Gassendi, and with a strain of literary Epicureanism to be heard in the poets of the period.¹ The urbane eclectic philosophy thus resulting flourished precisely because it appealed convincingly to the men of the world, men of alert, well-informed minds, but indolent and given over to the delights of "settled sweet Epicurean life." A partial reaction from this tendency is to be seen in the dogmatic thaumaturgy of the famous Sir Kenelm Digby. A partial reaction is likewise to be seen in the constructive deism of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, whose notion of the common human reason and feeling as the ground for our knowledge of reality proved a

¹ See for example, Drummond of Hawthornden, *Life's a Bubble*; Francis Beaumont, *Like to the Falling of a Star*; *On the Tombs in Westminster Abbey*; Francis Bacon, *The World*. The burden of all is πάντα χωρεῖ, πάντα ῥεῖ.

fruitful germ in the speculations of some later writers. But the most active and complete opposition to Hobbes came out of the Platonic and neo-Platonic school of thought.

Since the time of Plato a kind of Platonism has always existed in the more imaginative minds among men of letters and religious leaders. The two forces of Platonism, love of truth and zeal for human improvement, exerted their influence over minds otherwise so dissimilar as Cicero and Plotinus, Augustine, Abelard, and Montaigne. But with the founding of the Platonic Academy at Florence in 1440 a new and formal Platonism begins. This Platonism, tinged with Eastern elements from the earlier revival at Alexandria in the third and fourth centuries, is grounded, not so much upon the cautious reasoning of the *Republic* and the *Theætetus*, as upon the more visionary philosophy of the *Symposium* and the *Phædrus*. Something of the carefully sceptical, Socratic side of Platonism did indeed appear in Montaigne, and later in Descartes ; but it is not here that we shall find the most characteristic development. The typical philosopher is rarely a Platonist, for that implies on the one side some-

thing of the dreamer and poet, and on the other something of the man of the world, the actual friend and lover. In England some Platonic influence is obvious in the early humanistic prose writers of the sixteenth century,—More, Ascham, Elyot, and North. A more important and beautiful strain, however, flows through a line of English poets from Spenser and Sidney to Vaughn, and even to Denham and Cowley. Here we shall find that love of intellectual beauty,—*bellezza intelligibile*,—as Pico has it,—which has always informed all truly Platonic writing; and here we shall likewise find the dualism inherent in formal Platonism, corrected by a poetic tendency to see in the lower a stepping stone to the higher, and in a lover of sublunary beauty a lover of the eternal Unity.

Spenser's early poems, the *Hymns to Love and Beauty*, are little else than a metrical version of certain parts of the *Symposium*, or, perhaps, an expansion of the similar hymn of Benivieni. In all the work of the Spenser group, Sidney, Greville, and the men influenced by them, there is an increasing fondness for this kind of writing. In Shakespeare's *Sonnets* we find Platonic ideals of friendship, and in *Hamlet* the doctrine of

the relativity of evil.¹ Ben Jonson gives frequent expression to the Platonic idea of "the one." Thus in the *Hymenaïæ* it is said of Truth that, —

"Eternal unity behind her shines
That fire and water, earth and air, combines.

That pretentious poem, the *Nosce Teipsum* of Sir John Davies, contains a theory of the soul strangely blended from Platonic reveries and Aristotelian ratiocination. The soul is not united to the body as a man in a tent, or a pilot in a ship, or a spider in a web, or the image in the wax, or as water in the vessel, or as one liquid mingled with another, or as heat in the fire, or as a voice through the air, —

"But as the fair and cheerful morning light
Doth here and there her silver beams impart,
And in one instant doth herself unite
To the transparent air in every part:
* * * * *
So doth the piercing soul the body fill
Being all in all and all in part diffused."²

¹ For an interesting and all but convincing discussion of Shakespeare's indebtedness to the philosophy of Bruno, see Tschischwitz: *Shakespeare's Hamlet in seinem Verhältniss zur Gesamtbildung namentlich zur Theologie und Philosophie der Elisabeth-zeit.* Halle, 1867.

² In Chalmers' *English Poets*, Vol. V., p. 89.

And his arguments for the immortality of the soul are, in substance, the familiar ones of the *Phædo* and the *Republic*. Even in the minor writers we find many indications of the growth of this Platonic temper. Take Sir Thomas Overbury, for example. Is not —

“Good is a fairer attribute than white,
’Tis the mind’s beauty keeps the other sweet,”

almost the core of Platonic teaching? And see the Socratic theory of Virtue in,

“They are most firmly good who best know why.”¹

There even appears to have been a considerable cult of so-called Platonic love. Habington’s *Castara* is the best direct expression of it; but its spread is, however, better realized by observing the opposition and ridicule it aroused, as in Francis Beaumont’s “*Anti-Platonic*,” Cartwright’s “*No Platonic Love*,” or Brome’s “*Fie! Fie! Platonics*.”

Toward the middle of the century a still more explicit and conscious Platonism began to appear in the poetry of Henry Vaughn, Joseph

¹ “The Wife,” in *Works* of Sir Thomas Overbury, ed. Rimbault.

Beaumont, and Henry More. The last two of these were directly connected with the Cambridge Platonist group and will be studied with it. The first, Henry Vaughn, is a very interesting figure. In his verse the Pythagorean element in Platonism became for the first time prominent. In his well-known poem *The Retreat*, the homiletic simile of life as an exile from Heaven is fused with Pythagoras' dream of pre-existence and Plato's doctrine of knowledge by reminiscence. This fusion will become very familiar, ere we are through with Henry More and Glanvill. It is worth while noting as a suggestive phenomenon in genetic psychology, which likewise throws light upon the temper of the time, that Thomas Vaughn, Henry's twin brother, dabbled in the Paracelsian pseudoscience and tried to find, and prove alchemically, the secret unity of nature.¹

By 1650 the Platonic movement had spread to the prose writers. In Milton, in Jeremy Taylor, in Sir Thomas Browne, in Izaak Walton, here and there, we find the characteristic point of view. The clearest expression of it,

¹ See *The Magical Writings of Thomas Vaughn*, ed. A. E. White. London, 1888.

among independent writers, is in the work of Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, cousin and adopted son of Fulke Greville. His *Nature of Truth* is remarkable for its very real sense of the unity of phenomena and of the relativity of evil; and significant, as we shall see, for its critique of causation.¹

By this time, too, the new Cartesian philosophy had been brought to the universities and was beginning to exert its influence on English thought. It appealed most strongly at first to men of a Platonic turn of mind, to whom it seemed to meet Hobbes on his own ground and defeat him, through its reassertion of the unity of the visible world with itself and with the mind of man. Sainte-Beuve says: "*Descartes a contribué plus que personne a faire de l'esprit humaine un instrument de precision et cela mène loin.*"² It is for this that English philosophy owes most to Descartes; few of his specific doctrines endured, but his ideals of truth and his method persisted. Leaving aside Newton's obligations to the new algebra, and confining

¹ See Freudenthal in *Archiv fur Gesch. der Phil.*, VI., p. 386.

² *Port Royal*, t. V., p. 354 (cinq. ed., Paris, 1888).

ourselves to purely metaphysical speculations, we find that the rules for reflection of the *Discours sur la Methode* were of great benefit to nearly all the thinkers of the Glanvill circle. The fundamental principle that "truth requires a clear and distinct conception of the object, excluding all doubt," and that the human reason, if rightly managed, can arrive at such conceptions, was the necessary postulate of the many pleas for "reason" in philosophy, theology, literature, and life which we shall find between 1650 and 1680. To be more specific, take the case of literature, where in this period we find a movement toward restrained correctness of form, seen for example in the changing ideals of the pentameter couplet. This was partly the result of the rise of Aristotelian canons of criticism, but it was more the outcome of a widespread and subtle reactionary movement toward a well-bred precision and reasonableness in manners, in thought, and in literary expression. Cartesianism was at once the offspring of this movement and the cause of its further growth.

I have tried in this section to show that despite the chaos of thought in the early years of

the seventeenth century, and despite the continued authority of Aristotle, certain tendencies were constantly becoming more definite. These were: Baconian inductive research, materialistic scepticism, imaginative Platonism, and Cartesian rationalism. In the Cambridge Platonists we shall see a partial synthesis of the last two, and then in the work of Joseph Glanvill, a man of amazingly clever and receptive mind, an attempted harmonizing and reconciliation of all.

CHAPTER II

THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS

IT is hard to write of the Cambridge Platonists, the famous "latitude men" of the seventeenth century, in a coldly critical temper. In the writings of these men there is everywhere a glow of imaginative feeling, informed by sweet and sane reflection, which is likely to beguile our judgment. In the days of their greatest influence they were all young men in love with wisdom, yet very human withal. There was not a prig in the group, for "they hated the humour of those learned men that were stately and imposing." We cannot better begin the study of them, than with the account given by Glanvill in his *Anti-Fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy, in Continuation of the New Atlantis*. In this essay the governor of Bensalem is made to tell of a band of university divines, by whom the Cambridge Platonists are clearly intended.

The governor first speaks of their training and general aim. Their learning was broad and solid; they were well grounded in Aristotle, but they read all philosophers with judgment reserved. They conversed most with Plato, "that divine philosopher," but they likewise gave attention to all natural philosophy. They had the felicity of clear and distinct thinking, and they had large compass in their thoughts. By reading they rendered their understandings full, and by meditation kept that fulness from being disorderly or confused. Their chief aim was to reconstruct theology upon a rational and historic basis, by studying the church fathers, and, even, all the contentions of all sects, but especially by observing the passions and inclinations of men. They strove to deliver their minds from all prepossessions and implicit dependence upon any authority other than God's and that of their own faculties. They urged upon all modesty, reticence, and caution, especially in affirming truth out of season.

In affairs of religion they tried to check extravagance. "As Socrates of old first began the reformation of his Age and reduced men

from wildness of Fancy and enthusiastick Fegaries (*sic*) with which they were overgrown, by pleading for Reason and by showing the Religion and Necessity there is in hearkening to its dictates, so they to the cure of the madness of their age were zealous to make men sensible." They next proceeded to show the unreasonableness of certain contemporary systems of doctrine, and especially of Calvinism. To that end they defined "saving faith" as that highest form of faith which directs the affections and guides the will, so including "good works." Thus they furthered morality which enthusiastic persons had sometimes slighted, being themselves sour, morose, and censorious. But the latitudinarians taught charity, for "the principles which are necessary to salvation are very few and plain and generally acknowledged among Christians." From this they deducted several corollaries:—

"Fluency and pathetic-eloquence in sudden prayer may proceed, and doth many times, from excited passion and warm imagination, from a peculiar temper and heated melancholy."

"Zeal is only good as its objects are good."

“Orthodoxy of doctrine is not sure a test of saintship as charity, humility, and reverence.”

Their manner of preaching was plain, without obscurity or affectation ; they made their learning appear only by the judgment, strength, reason, and clearness with which they spoke. Their sermons were methodical but not formal, practical and affectionate. It took some time for the people, whose ears were dinned with the “fantastical, rhapsodical manner of preaching,” to relish this.

The attitude of the Platonists to the various parts of learning is next told. In logic they thought the Aristotelian syllogism to be good training for youth, “but many of them more approved of the logic of Plato . . . a method of reasoning more quick and close, and much less subject to fallacies and wanderings than the way of syllogism ; and,” says Glanvill, “to move the propositions from which a man would infer his conclusions by the modest Socratical way of question, is, in my judgment, a very good and advantageous method.” In physiology and cosmology they respect Aristotle, but they do not worship him. They lean toward the atomic theories of Gassendi and Descartes,

but they incline to supplement the purely mechanical principles of the latter by the vital Platonic principles of the *anima mundi* and *λόγοι σπερματικοί*. In moral philosophy they think with Cicero that disputing ethics is *ostentatio scientiæ* rather than *lex vitæ*. In metaphysics there is some division among them. Some hold that the only business of metaphysics is the explication of general terms ; others hold that this belongs to logic, and make the end of metaphysics the knowledge of the spiritual and immaterial world. Of the latter class some think with Plato that spirits are extended, penetrable, indiscerptible, self-motive substances; others with Descartes made spirits consist in modes of thought. Few went to the extremes of either Platonism or Cartesianism. All, however, were inclined to believe in the preëxistence of souls. Like Plato, and like Descartes, they esteemed mathematics the best education of youth, and indispensable to sound reasoning. Here the governor of Bensalem is interrupted by some persons of quality come to speak with him.

The above account of the Cambridge Platonists, mainly from the theological point of view,

is excellent, so far as it goes, but it needs to be supplemented by a more minute study of the historical development, personal characters, and writings of the group.

The rationalistic movement in the English church, in so far as it can be referred to a definite origin, began not at Cambridge but at Oxford. It is especially connected with the work of Lord Falkland, John Hales, William Chillingworth, and perhaps we may add, Jeremy Taylor, who, although educated at Cambridge, became an Oxford fellow in 1636. This movement, as seen in its two great literary movements, Chillingworth's *The Religion of Protestants* (1637), and Taylor's *The Liberty of Prophesying* (1647), cleared the theological atmosphere within the church by furthering the ideas of toleration and reason ; but it lacked the scholarly breadth, and, except in Taylor, the literary inspiration of the Cambridge men. It was never, moreover, so consciously philosophical. We know from Suckling's *Session of the Poets* that the first three were honorary members of the tribe of Ben, and from Dryden that Hales was one of the most appreciative of the early admirers

of Shakespeare ; but though their own writing was very direct and forcible, it lacked the feeling for form which we shall find in Smith and Culverwell.

The literary character of Cambridge latitudinarianism must be, in part at least, ascribed to the influence of Spenser. The first manifesto of the movement, Henry More's *Psychodia* or *Platonical Song of the Soul* (1641), is in the Spenserian stanza, and in unconcealed imitation of Spenser's manner, even to his archaisms. Furthermore, in the dedication to his father of the *Philosophical Poems* (1647), More refers the poetic and philosophical bent of his own mind to the fact that his father used to read the *Faerie Queene* to him in the long winter evenings ; "a poem as richly fraught with divine morality as fansy."

But, leaving these earlier, formative influences aside, the formal beginning of Cambridge Platonism may best be referred to the year 1644, when Benjamin Whichcote began a course of afternoon lectures. These lectures were eagerly heard by large numbers of the undergraduates and younger masters of arts, among whom Whichcote had a great following.

Soon the intellectual atmosphere of Cambridge, and particularly of Emmanuel College, came to be not unlike that of Oxford in the present century, when young Matthew Arnold heard the mighty voices there. No better account of Whichcote's work can be given than that contained in Burnet's character of him.¹

“Whichcote was a man of rare temper, very mild and obliging. He was much for liberty of conscience, and being disgusted with the dry, systematical way of those times, he strove to raise those who conversed with him to a nobler set of thoughts and to consider religion as a seed of deiform nature (to use one of his own phrases). In order to do this he set young students much on reading the ancient philosophers, chiefly Plato, Tully, and Plotin, and to considering the Christian religion as a doctrine sent from God both to elevate and sweeten humane nature, in which he was a great example as well as a wise and kind instructor.”

Whichcote seems to have had little literary ambition. Volumes of *Aphorisms* and of *Ser-*

¹ *History of his Own Times*. London, 1724. 2 Vols. Vol. I., p. 187.

mons were published after his death ; but in his lifetime his influence was wholly oral, personal, and immediate. He was not at all concerned with the great contemporary movements of thought centring around the names of Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes. His teaching had little to do with the more ambitious speculations of metaphysics. Its significance and its influence lay in its unfaltering insistence on reason and toleration.

These germinal ideas of Whichcote's teaching came to a literary fruition with the fewest engrafted branches in the work of two young men, John Smith and Nathaniel Culverwell. Both were fellows of Cambridge, both were quickened by Whichcote, and both died in the same year, 1652, Culverwell at the age of thirty-seven, and Smith only thirty-four. The likeness in the external courses of their lives is more than equalled by their affinity in character and genius. Culverwell, indeed, was a Calvinist, but there is little in his writing to indicate that his systematic theology is in any way different from that of the other members of the group.

The Light of Nature, Culverwell's one book,

appeared after his death, but in the same year. It was accompanied by an introduction from the pen of his brother, Richard Culverwell, which implies that Nathaniel had died in circumstances of peculiar sadness, possibly after some darkening of his faculties through much study. The first ten chapters of *The Light of Nature* deal with the problem of truth. After a just but sympathetic critique of Herbert of Cherbury and Lord Brooke, Culverwell concludes, agreeing with them in the main, that the ground of our knowledge of reality is to be sought in the *consensus gentium*, and in the common human reason, thus effecting, in his own mind, a synthesis between sensationalism and rationalism, a synthesis which Locke and the later English empiricists might have pondered to advantage. This ends the dialectic portion of the book. Five chapters of expository writing follow: the light of reason is a diminutive and derivative light, it discovers present not future things, yet, in so far, it is a certain and directive light. The book then closes with three chapters of imaginative writing, mounting at times almost to that height of philosophic vision which Socrates made the

end of wisdom. The seventeenth century can show little finer or more beautiful prose writing than these three chapters: "The Light of Reason is Calm and Peaceful," "The Light of Reason is a Pleasant Light," and "The Light of Reason is an Ascendant Light." The salient features of Culverwell's style are smooth grace of sentence structure, bright beauty of imagery, and skilful, unpedantic use of classical quotation, notably from Plato, Virgil, Horace, and Lucretius. Some taste of his quality may not be amiss. First, then, an invocation to "holy light, offspring of Heaven first-born," which, written twenty years before Milton's famous lines in the third book of *Paradise Lost*, could scarcely have been unknown to him.

"Who will not welcome so lovely a beauty with a *Xaîpe φῶς*! Welcome thou first-born of corporeal beings, thou Lady and Queen of sensitive beauties, thou clarifier and refiner of chaos, thou unspotted beauty of the universe. Let him be condemned to a perpetual night, to a fatal, disconsolate grave, that is not enamoured of thy brightness. . . . That learned knight (Digby) in his discourse of bodies tells us of one totally blind, who yet knew when a

candle came into the room only by the quickening and reviving of his spirits.”¹

Next a passage to illustrate the continuity of our mental life and its control over phenomena : “For does not memory, which therefore Plato calls *Αἰσθησέων σωτηρία*, does it not reprint and repeat former pleasure ? And what is hope but pleasure in the bud ? Does it not antedate and prepossess future delight ? Nay, by virtue of an intellectual percolation the waters of Marah and Meribah will become sweet and delicious. The mind can extract honey out of the bitterest object when it is past ; how else can you construe the poet’s words,—

“Haec olim meminisse juvabit”?²

Finally, a passage of that almost passionate mysticism found in Crashaw and the other poets of the Catholic reaction but rare among Calvinists : —

“Yet could I show you a more excellent way ; for the pleasures of natural reason are but husks in comparison of those gospel delights, those mysterious pleasures which lie

¹ *The Light of Nature*, p. 237 seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 244 seq.

hid in the bosom of Christ, those rosebuds that were in the blood of a Saviour, who took himself the thorns and left you the roses.”¹

Culverwell, to conclude, is a Platonist in his ethics and in his attitude of mind rather than in his metaphysics. Like Plato he lays the basis of mortality in the constitution of the divine nature,² but he rejects absolutely the Platonic doctrine of innate ideas through reminiscence of preëxistence. He criticises Lord Brooke’s presentation of that doctrine very acutely. Is a blind man a judge of color because of his innate ideas? So far he anticipates Locke, but he transcends him, and darkly anticipates Leibniz by a theory of “connate ideas.” Unfortunately, however, his distinction between these and “innate ideas” is only vague and implicit.

John Smith’s *Select Discourses*, published after his death by his friend Worthington, constitute a more systematic and complete exposition of the ideas of the Cambridge men than any book we have hitherto encountered. Smith had been tutored by Whichcote, and initiated by him into the Platonic way of thought. His

¹ *The Light of Nature*, p. 257.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 50-54.

education, however, differed from that of Whichcote and Culverwell in that he was more thoroughly grounded in mathematics, and had been for some time mathematical reader in Queen's College. This similarity of training would naturally have connected him with Descartes and his philosophy had it not been for a fundamental dissimilarity in constitution of mind. Smith was the Saint John of the Cambridge circle. His intellect and character aroused not only the enthusiastic admiration, but also the ardent love, of his friends. Worthington speaks of his mind as "that plentiful and ever-bubbling fountain";¹ and Simon Patrick in the funeral sermon affixed to the *Select Discourses* tells of his character with loving detail.²

"He had incorporated, shall I say, or ensouled all principles of justice and righteousness, and made them one with himself."

¹ *Select Discourses*, Pref.

² *Ibid.*, p. 496 *seq.* Patrick was an offspring of the Cambridge school who spread its influence but added little to the sum of its thinking. He obtained preferment in the church, rising in time to the episcopacy. This funeral sermon, preached while he was still a very young man, breathes a spirit of gentle mysticism, which is characteristic of all his writing.

“I cannot tell you how his soul was universalized, how tenderly he embraced all God’s creatures in his arms.”

He was one of those men “whose souls come into the world (as the Chaldee Oracle speaks) clothed with a great deal of mind, more impregnated than others with divine notions, and more teeming wombs to enrich the world with the fruit of them.”

“I have never got so much good among all my books by a whole day’s plodding in a study as I have by an hour’s discourse with him.”

The *Select Discourses* are : —

Of the True Way and Method of Attaining to
Divine Knowledge.

Of Superstition.

Of Atheism.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

Of the Existence and Nature of God.

Of Prophetie.

Of the Difference between Legal and Evangelical Righteousness.

Of the Shortness and Vanity of a Pharasaick
Righteousness.

Of the Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion.

Of a Christian's Conflicts with and Conquests over Satan.

The first thing which arrests the attention of the reader is the fusion of his Platonism with explicit, and even dogmatic, neo-Platonism. Plato seems to have largely influenced the form and literary quality of Smith's work; there is in each the same tendency to patch with purple, and Smith makes frequent use of striking Platonic similes, adapting them to his own purposes.¹ But for content of thought he is as much or more indebted to Plotinus. The latter is quoted on nearly every page, and his Eastern doctrine of emanation is everywhere implicitly present. Thus in the chapter on divine knowledge we are told that divine things are to be understood by a spiritual sensation rather than by verbal reasoning, or by speculation, that this knowledge is furthered by purity of life, and yet that it is the clearest in infancy when the soul is less idly at ease in

¹ *E.g.* on p. 4 we have Plato's "Cave." *Republic* (514).

the earthly body. The most characteristic part of this section is his treatment of the divine love. He holds that we attain to our knowledge of the divine love through the spark of it glowing in human love. It is here that the essentially Platonic and Johannine bent of Smith's thinking becomes most apparent.

The chapter on the immortality of the soul contains substantially the doctrines held on that point by all the "latitude men." After acutely criticising Aristotle and showing his system to contain a virtual negation of *personal* immortality, he considers the argument, against a belief in immortality, founded upon "its close sympathy" of our souls and bodies. He answers this by affirming the necessity of that sympathy for the development of the soul through its direction of the body, thus, like most modern metaphysicians, making the essence of the soul apart from its sensations to lie in will. Postulating then that the soul is a substance, distinct from the body, self-motive, and indiscerptible, he adduces the usual Platonic arguments for its immortality, *plus* the argument from free-will. His most convincing argument is grounded upon the neo-Platonic notion of a

νόησις ἀμετάβατος, or naked intuition “which fills the whole horizon of the soul with a mild and gentle light.” By this a good man is conscious that he is immortal.¹

With the chapter on prophecy the argument of the *Discourses* leaves the sphere of natural religion for that of revelation. The treatment here is at once philosophical toward the principle and reverent toward the letter, but it is to be noted that he asserts that the Scriptures are frequently “accommodated to vulgar understandings, and are not intended to teach philosophy.”

“The Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion,” which displays Smith’s classical style at its most eloquent pitch, contains his theory of ethics. This is identical with Culverwell’s connecting conscience and morality with the supremacy of the divine over the human will, relieving the weariness of unchartered freedom and lightening the weight of chance desires.

¹ Smith refers this doctrine to Plotinus, but it is, too, substantially, the last resort of Plato (*Timæus* 41, *Republic* 609) after he came to see the truth that Melancthon later expressed concerning the arguments of the *Phædo*: *Hæc argumenta cogitare prodest, sed tamen sciamus patefactiones divinas intuendas esse.*

The writings of Smith and Culverwell were the most immediately effective put forth by their school, but they failed of permanent influence through a disregard of contemporary scientific movements, and because of the dualism resulting from a too active distrust of sensible phenomena. With Cudworth and More, however, the case is different; each of them touched the thought of the age at more points than Culverwell and Smith together.

By the middle of the century, and still more in the years immediately following the restoration, there were influences in the air of Cambridge quite other than Platonic. Bacon's exceedingly cautious temper of mind and his partial divorce of reason and religion did not predispose the Cambridge men favorably toward him; moreover, the contemporary exponent of the Baconian system was Hobbes, their dearest foe. They saw, however, the importance of Bacon's critique of the imagination and its eidola, and made frequent use of it in combating the melancholic extravagances of some of the Puritans.¹

¹ See for example H. More's *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus* (in his *Several Philosophical Writings*), *passim*.

Descartes, on the other hand, had begun to exercise a powerful influence over Cambridge thought. In 1648, More was in correspondence with him, and writes in the temper of an enthusiastic disciple: *In methodo tuo, lusorio quodam, sed eleganti lane (sic; qy. sane?) modestiæ genere, talem te exhibes virum ut nihil indole genioque tuo suavius et amabilius, nihil excelsius et generosius vel fingi possit vel expeti.*¹ Though he asks many acute questions, and in the end reacts away from the supposed mechanical implication of Descartes' philosophy and especially from his doctrine of the non-extension of spirit, yet he everywhere makes it evident that the Cartesian method is in high favor with the more thoughtful sort of men at Cambridge.²

Finally, the most powerful animating force in the later work of the Cambridge Platonists was opposition to Hobbes. His materialistic

¹ *Opus cit.*, p. 61, Part II.

² It is customary to say that Cartesianism was introduced into England by Antoine Le Grand; but there is no record of his having published anything concerning it, before his *Philosophia Veterum e mente Renati Descartes* (London, 1671); whereas, as I have just tried to show, Cartesianism was influential at Cambridge twenty years earlier.

metaphysics seemed to them dangerously atheistic, and they held his utilitarian and fatalistic ethics to be subversive of all national freedom and morality. Burnet, who as a pupil of the Cambridge school may fairly be taken as voicing its opinions, writes of "a very wicked book, with a very strange name, *The Leviathan*. His [Hobbes'] main principles were that all men acted under an absolute necessity, in which he seemed protected by the received doctrine of absolute decrees. He seemed to think that the universe was God and that souls were material, thought being only subtle and imperceptible motion. He thought interest and fear were the chief principles of society, and he put all morality in the following that which was our own private will or advantage. He thought religion had no other basis than the laws of the land; and he put all law in the will of the prince, or of the people."¹

It was this opposition to Hobbes which begot the best-known and most important systematic treatise of the Cambridge school, Ralph Cudworth's *True Intellectual System of the Universe, Wherein all the Reason and Philosophy of Athe-*

¹ Burnet, *Hist. of his Own Times*, Vol. I., p. 106.

ism is Confuted and its Impossibility Demonstrated. Cudworth differs from the men previously studied in two important respects. According to Burnet, "He was a great observer and promoter of experimental philosophy, which was then a new thing, and much looked after." He was, furthermore, on the authority of Birch, interested in affairs, and several times gave advice to Cromwell through Thurloe, his secretary. On March 31, 1647, he preached before the House of Commons, and had the courage to plead for toleration and universal charity. Cudworth's life at Cambridge as Hebrew professor and master of Christ's is otherwise sufficiently uneventful to be passed over without detail. It is, however, interesting to notice his direct personal connection with the best thought of a younger generation, through his pupil, Sir William Temple, and his daughter, Lady Masham, the friend of Locke and Newton.

As originally projected, *The True Intellectual System* was to have been complete in three parts, treating respectively of materialistic, stoical, and theological atheism; but only the first part was ever finished, and that not until

1678. The body of this part is taken up with an elaborate confutation of the mechanical hypothesis of Democritus, under which name, of course, Hobbes is but thinly veiled.¹ The bearing of the book upon the contemporary theorizing of Glanvill is confined to a very few points. In the first place, it is important to note that to Cudworth the theories of Hobbes and Descartes (like that of Darwin in some minds at the present time) seemed to exclude God from the phenomenal world. He therefore formulated the theory of a "plastic nature" intermediate between spirit and inanimate nature, by means of which divine law might work itself out. This is of course only a restatement of the Platonic *anima mundi*.² In the second place he reverses the order of Descartes' reasoning to prove the existence of Deity. Cudworth reasons from the idea of divine existence to the idea of perfection, and maintains, with Glanvill, that Descartes in following the opposite order comes out by that

¹ Cudworth considered Democritus a corrupter of the true atomic philosophy. The latter as derived by the Greeks from Moses he thought more friendly to theism than to atheism.

² See *True Int. System*, Chs. III., XXXVII.

same door wherein he went. In the third place, having to his satisfaction proved God to be all-wise and all-powerful, he appeals to Plato, St. John, and the Cabbala to prove him all-loving. Finally, the ultimate argument Cudworth makes for the existence of God is that the human reason, which transcends sense, can only proceed from an infinite and eternal reason; grounding this upon the supposed unity of the Platonic and Christian conceptions of the *Logos*. Here, however, he seems strangely unaware that he is in practical agreement with Descartes' fundamental tenet that to be conscious of a limit is to transcend it; or, as Descartes himself puts it, Our recognition of sorrow, evil, and imperfection as such, must prove the existence, somewhere, of a happy, good, and perfect being.¹

The most important of the Cambridge circle in respect to influence upon Glanvill was Henry More. He was likewise the most attractive personally, and the most baffling and inconsistent in his published opinions. He was born in 1614. His parents were Calvinists, but he

¹ See *Discours de la Methode*, p. 82, ed. Charpentier (1895).

could never "swallow that hard doctrine." He went from Eton to Christ's College, Cambridge, where he became A.B. in 1635, and A.M. four years later; upon which he was elected to a fellowship. Up to this time More's university life seems to have been a period of storm and stress. Aristotle and the schoolman had failed to satisfy his subtle and inquiring mind, and his Platonism was not yet matured. In these years he read voraciously in philosophy, and especially in out-of-the-way neo-Platonic and cabbalistic literature; but his most nourishing intellectual food seems to have been Spenser and the Latin poets. He fell under the spell of Horace and knew the mood of that ode which is built around the phrase *pulvis et umbra sumus*.¹ This somewhat Epicurean tendency was in part corrected by the loving study of Virgil, whom he quotes frequently and calls "the prince of poets and a great Platonist."² It is safe to conjecture that it was at this time that

¹ See the preface to "Psychathanasia" in *Psychodia*, Part II. The 12th stanza of the 4th canto of the 3d book of this poem is a tolerably close translation from Horace, *Odes*, III., 3, Stanzas 1 and 2.

² Epistle in Glanvill's *Saducismus Triumphatus*, p. 108 (ed. of 1726).

he began to read the writings of Count Pico of Mirandola, who remained a great favorite with him throughout his life. This poetical period of More's life produced two volumes of verse, *Psychodia* (1642) and *Philosophical Poems* (1647). These are little else than traditional Platonism and neo-Platonism very hardly compressed into Spenserian stanzas. The reasoning is subtle and often profound, but not original. The imagery is sometimes sensuous, but the treatment is neither simple nor passionate. The versification is awkward and uneven. Yet the final effect of More's verse, if we read it honestly, is pleasant. He has worked out of his period of doubt, and the positive ideas he has attained, though vague, are not feeble.

In 1648, as we have already seen, More came under the influence of Descartes, but the draughts of intellectual day which he drew from the Cartesian rationalism did not long satisfy him. Like all the Cambridge men, he joined in the hue and cry after reason, and moderation, and sanity; but he did not always exhibit these qualities in himself. Occasionally in dispute he would allow himself to use lan-

guage more creditable to the power of his indignation than to the coolness of his reason. Leaving this aside as a minor foible, and one characteristic of the age, perhaps the best conception of More's temperament may be obtained by comparing it with that of Emerson. Both fancied they were rationalistic philosophers, yet both were essentially mystics. More believed himself to have seen in his youth a vision of an old man who gave to him two keys, the one of silver, the other of gold. On the former was written, *Claude fenestras ut luceat domus*; and on the latter, *Amor Dei lux animæ*. These two sentences were the core of all his thinking. He considered himself *illuminatus*, and like Socrates had an attendant daemon. But these vagaries of an intensely religious imagination did not, as sometimes happens, make him a difficult person to get along with. On the contrary he was, among his friends, the most genial of the Cambridge group. He had no worldly ambition, and was content to remain a university fellow all his life. Here he became the centre of a circle of high-bred and thoughtful youth, from which his influence spread. One of More's pupils, however, was in some

matters his teacher. This was his "heroine pupil," Lady Conway. Her eager, subtle mind, in a frail, yet pleasant body, had a great charm for him. He spent much of his time with her at Ragley, and did there some of his best work at her bidding and inspiration.

More's prose writing is so bulky in mass and so heterogeneous in content that it is difficult to give a concise account of his philosophical position. For the purposes of the present essay only three points need be noted: his treatment of reason, of nature, and of spirit.

Like all the latitudinarian thinkers, More thought that truth was to be attained through reason, "the light within us." This he works out most convincingly in his *Antidote for Atheism* and in his *Enthusiasmus Triumphatus*, and most succinctly in the elaborate preface to his *Collection of Several Philosophical Writings*. Here, as usual in the seventeenth century, the argument centres around a quotation: "The image of God is the Royal and Divine *Logos*, the impassible man, but the image of this image is the human intellect."¹ It is important to

¹ Pref., p. v. Εἰκὼν μὲν γὰρ θεοῦ Λόγος θεῖος καὶ Βασιλικός . . . εἰκωνδε εἰκόνας ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς. Clem. Alex. Strom., Lib. V., Ch. 14 (Tulloch).

see, however, that More here advocates a belief in a certain "divine sagacity"; something "more noble and inward than reason itself, and without which reason would falter, or at least reach but to mean and frivolous things." This "divine sagacity" which transcends the pure reason we shall find in Glanvill called by another name.

More's attitude toward the objective world combines strangely, yet considering his century, significantly, the points of view of poetical nature-love, visionary pantheism, and inductive science. He appears at times to have been not unlike Shelley in his very personal feeling for natural objects. "Walking abroad after his studies, his sallies toward Nature would be often inexpressibly ravishing, beyond what he could convey to others." But this mood was not so habitual to him as was a kind of imaginative realization of the cosmic growth of nature. In the transition to modern philosophy, there seems to have been common a pseudo-scientific physical philosophy blended with neo-Platonic and theosophic elements. This is especially connected with the names of Paracelsus and Jacob Böhme. More was influenced by both

of these, especially the latter. He never went to the imaginative extreme of thinking the universe to be the body of God, the stars the organs, and their orbits the arteries; he did, however, conceive very vividly the plastic sweep of the divine spirit over chaos, and he could never quite put that wonderful image out of his mind. Connected with this was his theory of the universe which was dependent upon a belief in *rationes seminales*, which was merely a neo-Platonic formula for the Platonic "mind of the world," and Cudworth's "plastic nature." Alongside of this theosophic science we find attempts to assimilate the results of the Baconian experimental science. Baron Van Helmont, the famous physician who was to heal Lady Conway of her nervous disorders, knew More intimately and gave him much minute though not always accurate physiological information. Besides this, More was a fellow of the Royal Society and took a deep interest in all the scientific discoveries of the day. The most significant result of this is his continual use of diagrams drawn from optics or physiology to illustrate his metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul, or for its pre-

existence. In other words, More, like Glanvill, had a vague vision of the possibilities of experimental psychology.

It is in his doctrine of spirit that the older More diverges most widely from the Cartesian position of his younger days. Descartes' reduction of spirit to thought and of matter to extension came to seem to him alarmingly atheistical. He therefore tries to confute "the nullubists whose prince is that pleasant wit, Renatus des Cartes, who by his jocular metaphysical meditations has so luxated and distorted the rational faculties of some otherwise sober and quick-witted persons."¹ To this end More makes substance the genus, and matter and spirit the two species under it, and concludes that spirit is extended, indiscerptible, incorporeal substance. In short, More was one of those persons in whom the conceptions of the spiritual imagination are so subtly interfused through the seeming realities of sensuous perception that the former come to have something of the objective, tangible, substantial existence of the latter. To such minds the notion of spirit as a mere entelechy of ma-

¹ *Sad. Tri.*, p. 56 *seq.*

terial functions is always flat and unprofitable. It was this part of his system which led More's mind into the mazes of psychic phenomena. Spirits having a substantial existence, ghost stories, and relations of witchcraft became more credible ; and he came to think that all belief in spirit must stand or fall with a belief in such supernatural occurrences.

More's extravagances have discredited his standing in the annals of philosophy ; a man who could find Cartesianism in Genesis, and trace the stream of true philosophy from Moses through Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, and Pico Mirandola to himself, was not likely to be regarded with much favor in the cool-headed, unemotional eighteenth century. But though his influence did not persist long after his death, it was very potent in his lifetime. He was, to be sure, a dreamer, but many of his dreams were of reason. He was a realist in the strict philosophic sense, and walked familiarly with the ideal forms of Beauty and Good. This it was which made him so powerfully attractive to men like John Norris of Bemerton and Glanvill.

This hasty sketch of the Cambridge Platonists should show that they were at once the most amiable and the most intellectually ambitious group of men in the history of English thought. It should also suggest the reason of their failure to influence the course of that thought clearly and permanently. They did correct in part the materialistic tendencies of the Baconian philosophy, and so through Glanvill, Norris, Shaftesbury, and Berkeley they helped to prepare the way for the more spiritual philosophy of Kant and Coleridge. But as the latter makes clear concerning them, in his *Notes on the English Divines*, they failed to leave a deep and individual impress on thought, because they could not make that criticism of the pure reason for which philosophy was waiting. They extolled the power and beauty of reason and yet were ever ready to soar into a rapt mysticism which should logically have ended, as it did in Blake's case, in the utter distrust of reason. They likewise lost in influence with general readers through their scholarly retirement and too shy aloofness from the stirring political and social events of their time; the result of the

perennial opposition between the man of thought and the man of action. It was, however, in the luminous if somewhat hazy atmosphere which they spread around them that Glanvill mostly lived.

CHAPTER III

GLANVILL'S LIFE AND THE ORDER OF HIS WRITINGS

THE family of which the subject of this essay was a member, was one of the most ancient and honorable in England. Ranulph de Glanville came to England in the train of William the Conqueror, and became the founder of an Anglo-Norman house, which soon rose to wealth and influence. A Hervey de Glanville was chamberlain to King Stephen, and Ranulph de Glanville, who flourished about 1150, was a jurist of ability and reputation, and lord chief justice of England. For five centuries the main line of the Glanvilles continued one of the first English families. The eldest sons were earls of Suffolk, and allied by marriage to such distinguished families as the Greys and the Ferrers. The name became particularly famous in the annals of the bar and bench. To Ranulph de Glanville succeeded a long

line of lawyers, judges, and barons of the exchequer, ending only with that Sir John Glanville who, in the time of Charles I., was speaker of the House of Commons.¹

The branch of the family with which we have especially to do was derived from a younger son and contains fewer distinguished names. In 1380 a John Glanville, who had served under the Black Prince, settled in Devon. These Devonshire Glanvilles were mostly merchants, country gentlemen of moderate means, or clergymen. Tobias Glanville, who flourished in the latter half of the sixteenth century, had, by his wife Frances Wadham, a son and a daughter. Nicholas, the son and heir, married a Joan, and by her had issue of three sons, John, Benjamin, and Joseph.²

Joseph Glanvill was born at Plymouth in 1636.³ Of his boyhood to the age of sixteen

¹ The genealogical matter in this chapter is drawn from Glanville-Richards, *Records of the Anglo-Norman House of Glanville*. London, 1882.

² Joseph seems to have been the first to leave off the final "e" of the name. He invariably signs himself without it. Contemporary references to him spell his name variously, Glanvill, Glanvil, or Glanville. Other members of the family are always Glanville.

³ Mr. Glanville-Richards has 1630, erroneously. 1636 is

we know absolutely nothing. He matriculated at Exeter College, Oxford, April 2, 1652, and was made B.A. October 11, 1655. On June 29, 1658, he proceeded M.A. from Lincoln College. Anthony à Wood reports that Glanvill used to lament that he had not gone to Cambridge, for so he might have been associated with the Platonic movement sooner and more intimately. But whether he was himself aware of it or not, Oxford gave to him two things which imparted to his work much of its interest and individuality. These were a sound and solid training in classics and logic, and a keen personal interest in the method and problems of natural science. In the Cambridge of that decade he might have fared worse in both these matters. In Glanvill's day the master of Exeter was John Conant, of whom it is related that "he used to visit the chambers and studies of the young scholars, and if he found any reading a modern book would send him to Tully." Moreover Glanvill's tutor was

the date given by Anthony à Wood, and by the author of the life prefixed to the third and fourth editions of the *Saducismus Triumphatus*. In the preface to the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* (1661), Glanvill refers to himself as "still some years before his fourth climacteric."

Samuel Conant, celebrated as a stern disciplinarian in prosody and the syllogism. The scientific influence can be referred to John Wilkins and Wallis. In our author's time, the former was warden of Wadham College, and in his rooms were held the weekly meetings of the scientific men, which were the nucleus of the Royal Society; the latter was professor of astronomy. Glanvill's two most intimate friends at the university appear to have been Francis Willoughby and Samuel Parker; both were interested in experimental philosophy. Willoughby, to whom Glanvill dedicated his *Lux Orientalis*, became a learned authority upon birds and fishes, and both Willoughby and Parker were to be fellows of the Royal Society.

Immediately after taking his M.A. in 1658, Glanvill became chaplain to Francis Rous, and went to live with him at Acton. Rous died in 1659, but in the meantime he exercised, it is likely, no slight influence over the mind of his young chaplain. For Rous was a man of decided and impressive personality. Born in 1579, he became, before he was twenty, one of the earliest imitators of Spenser. In 1598 he published *Thule, Vertue's History*, a long poem

in *ottava rima*, and an avowed imitation of the *Faerie Queene*. Later in life he was active in the rebellion, and being high in the favor of Cromwell, he became speaker of the "Barebones' Parliament"; still later, he was made provost of Eton College. Even in these troublous times of strenuous activity he maintained the character of a retired, studious, and meditative man, celebrated for an intensely mystical sort of piety, which yet had more affinity with the dreaming of the Platonists than with the ecstatic experiences of some of his Roundhead brethren. In 1650 his studies had resulted in the publication of *Mella Patrum*,¹ a thousand-page compilation from the fathers of the Church. To him came Glanvill, a master of arts, fresh from the university, with a leaning toward scientific thought. There can be little doubt that through his influence the young chaplain was led to employ his year of breathing time in reading the work of the Cambridge men, and in writing upon themes kindred to theirs. This is made clear by the Epistle Dedicatory to his friend Joseph Minard

¹ See the Introduction to *Thule*, edited for the Spenser Society by Mr. Grosart.

(or Maynard), written in March, 1660, and prefixed to the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*. There he speaks of two discourses which he already has by him in manuscripts, one on the *Soul's Immortality*, and one a *Corrective of Enthusiasm*. Both of these, Glanvill says, had been rendered less necessary, the one by "the maturer undertakings of the accomplish't Dr. H. More," and the other by "his Majesty's much-desired and seasonable arrival." It is a safe conjecture that these were written at Rous's house, in the year of liberty from university routine which Glanvill enjoyed there. He refers to them as work some months past, but not so remote as they would have been if written in his Oxford days.

Wood has the following account of Glanvill's life at this period: "In 1658 he was made chaplain to old Francis Rous, one of Oliver's Lords, and provost of Eton College, but he dying soon after, Mr. Glanvill returned to Oxford and became a zealous person for a commonwealth. After his Majesty's restoration, by deeply weighing matters he became convinced of his mistaken notions."¹ This ironical fling

¹ *Athenæ Oxoniensis*, III., Col. 1244. Ed. Bliss.

at Glanvill for his facile conforming was not justifiable. Even had he changed his faith suddenly upon the Restoration, it would not argue any considerable defect in his character. He was a very young man, barely twenty-four, and could scarcely be blamed for following the lead of such great divines as Dr. Wilkins, and most of the Cambridge men, who thought that in conforming they were securing the peace of Church and State. But Wood is in error, I think, in implying that the change was wholly *after* the Restoration. The titles of the two early works above mentioned do not sound like the writing of "a zealous person for a commonwealth." Such an one would not have written against "enthusiasm," which was a peculiarly Roundhead virtue. It is true that at this time Glanvill travelled to Kidderminster to hear Baxter preach, and greatly admired him. This however signifies little in the present instance, for that respect and admiration continued undiminished throughout Glanvill's life.

In 1660 Benjamin Glanville, who had become a prosperous tin merchant, bought the living of Wimbish in Essex, and presented it to his brother Joseph. The assured position this afforded

him must have been precisely what he needed to encourage him to write. In the following year 1661, he published his first, his most original, and, in some respects, his most important book: *The Vanity of Dogmatizing or Confidence in Opinions Manifested in a Discourse of the Shortness and Uncertainty of our Knowledge, and Its Causes, with some Reflections on Peripateticism and an Apology for Philosophy*. This compendious title is for the present a sufficient account of the contents of the little book. Soon after its publication Glanvill was charged with scepticism and atheism. The latter charge was manifestly absurd, and the former a little less so. The whole aim of his attack was not against the possibility of science and philosophy, but against the pedantic and futile systems which passed for such and claimed infallibility. In the Epistle Dedicatory he writes: "I hope you'll consider that Scepticism is less reprehensible in inquiring years, and no crime in a juvenile exercitation. But I have no design against Science, and my endeavour is to promote it."

The truth is that Glanvill had a wonderfully clear and synoptic vision of the range and profundity of the problems of science. "We can

really know nothing of the world until we completely ken all Magnetic and Sympathetic energies and their most hidden causes.”¹ A young man with such ideas is not likely to be long content with the dogmatic philosophy of the schools. Like Matthew Arnold in his youth, Glanvill seems to have conceived an intellectual ideal of “quiet and a fearless mind,” and to have held that this is more easily attained through agnosticism than through dogmatism. “If there be a repose naturally attainable this side of the Stars, there is no way we can more hopefully seek to attain it. We can never be at rest while our quiet can be taken from us by every thwarting our Opinions, nor is that Content an Happiness which every one can rob us of. There is no felicity but in a fixed stability.”² It must be remembered that Glanvill’s agnosticism is not theological but philosophical.

The *Vanity of Dogmatizing* made some little stir. Worthington writes of its author as “a young man of much reading and promise; abating some juvenile heat,” and adds, “we may guess what the wine may be, . . . and it will

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 214.

² *Ibid.*, p. 228 seq.

taste better when broached some years hence.”¹ This implicit reproof of the book is quite just, yet we would not wish the youthfulness away. It consists in a confident enthusiasm for his scepticism, a play of imagination, and a very downright manner, which on the whole are charming, though it is not difficult to see why they should have annoyed the rather prosy and sufficient Dr. Worthington.

✓ The argument of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* is not so antipodal as it might at first appear to the teachings of the Cambridge men. It is merely a logical development of Culverwell’s and More’s pleas for reason. More thought he had a mission to reconcile science and religion; Glanvill conceived himself to be equally favored, but where More had made the attempt by evolving mystical and spiritualistic interpretations of scientific discoveries, Glanvill, here at least, tried to effect the desired reconciliation by more carefully defining the respective provinces of science and religion.

✓ Glanvill’s indebtedness at this time to Cambridge thought cannot be doubted, for in the next year, 1662, he published a book on the

¹ *Worthington’s Diary*, Vol. I., p. 300.

preëxistence of souls, which was practically an exposition of the views held on that point by all the Platonists. This was the *Lux Orientalis*, published anonymously with a dedication to Willoughby. In 1682 it was reprinted together with a treatise by Dr. Rust, and a dedication, found among Glanvill's papers, to "*Henrico Moro, . . . Sapientiæ Orientalis Restauratori.*" The title is, *Two Choice and Useful Treatises, the one Lux Orientalis, or an Enquiry into the Opinions of the Eastern Sages concerning the pre-existence of Souls, being a Key to unlock the grand Mysteries of Providence in Relation to Man's Sin and Misery, . . . together with Annotations*, (by Henry More). The publisher, James Collins, has an address to the reader in which he says that the first discourse is by "Mr. Joseph Glanvill, a person reputed one of the most ingenious and florid writers of his age," and "For *Lux Orientalis*, which was printed about twenty years ago, when the book grew scarce it was so much valued by the more eager and curious searchers into the profoundest points of philosophy, that there was given for it some four or five times the price for which it was first sold."

In November of the year of publication of the *Lux Orientalis*, Sir James Thynne installed Glanvill in the living of Frome Selwood, a village on the Frome River, a tributary of the Lower Avon in Somersetshire. It is a reasonable conjecture that by this time Glanvill had married his first wife, Mary Stocker. Maurice, his second son by her, was presented to the living of Wimbish in 1680. This would tend to place the date of our author's marriage as early as 1660, but neither this, the date of the death of the first Mrs. Glanvill, nor the date of Glanvill's marriage to Margaret Selwyn has been exactly determined. The last event must have taken place not far from 1670, for at Glanvill's death in 1680 he left three children by his second wife.

In 1663 Thomas White, an English Catholic priest who wrote under the name of Albius, published his *Scire sive Sceptices et Scepticorum a jure Disputationis Exclusio*, in reply to the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*. Soon after this Glanvill fell sick of a long fever.¹ As soon as he was about he bestirred himself, with the result that in 1665 (imprimatur October 18, 1664) he

¹ See Preface to *Scir^e* in *Scepsis Scientifica*.

published a revised version of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, entitled: *Scepsis Scientifica, or Confest Ignorance the Way to Science in an Essay of the Vanity of Dogmatizing, and Confident Opinion*. Between the same covers were bound: (a) *An Address to the Royal Society*; (b) *Sciri^e tuum nihil est, or the Author's Defence of the Vanity of Dogmatizing*. (c) *A Letter to a Friend Concerning Aristotle*.

The reply to White is remarkable among all Glanvill's controversial writings for its placable and courteous tone. He tries not so much to confute and ridicule his antagonist, as to show their points of agreement, and to prove himself neither a sceptic nor an atheist. The revision of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, as embodied in the *Scepsis*, does not materially affect its meaning or significance. Some chapters and paragraphs are shifted or newly divided, the youthfulness of the style is considerably abated, but that is all. Furthermore, a large part of the impression was destroyed in the great fire; so that the book added little to Glanvill's literary reputation. It did, however, have one effect very momentous to his career. The volume was dedicated to the Royal Society in an

address eulogistic, but sufficiently discriminating: "How providentially you are met together in Dayes wher people of weak heads on the one hand, and of vile affections on the other, have made an unnatural Divorce between being wise and good!" At this the society promptly elected Glanvill a fellow. On December 7, 1665, "the Lord Brereton presented a book written by Joseph Glanvill, M.A., and entitled *Scepsis Scientifica*, dedicated to the Society, the dedication of which was read. Mr. Glanvill was proposed candidate by the Lord Brereton."¹ The following week he was elected and admitted. Willoughby, Cudworth, and More had all been proposed for membership by Dr. Wilkins. It may be significant of Glanvill's popular reputation that his nomination came from a nobleman. However that may be, his admission to the society was an

¹ Birch, *Hist. of the Royal Society*, p. 500.

John Owen, in the introduction to his edition of the *Scepsis*, stated that the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* procured Glanvill his election. The authority of Birch should be sufficient to correct this. Furthermore, in the *Prefatory Answer to Stubbe* (p. 196), Glanvill says concerning the *Scepsis*, "That book was indeed dedicated to the Society, but I was not a member of it." The mistake seems to have arisen from overlooking the date of the imprimatur.

event of great importance to his career. It gave him a recognized standing among men of learning, and it must likewise have given him a wide acquaintance among such men, and unusual opportunities for acquiring the breadth of view and the wide extent of information which distinguished his later works. In the proceedings of the society it is significant to find in the same volume accounts of brilliant experiments by Boyle or Newton, and the naïve remarks by Aubrey and Waller concerning wine-making and the habits of toads.

The year 1665 may be taken as dividing Glanvill's life into two clearly marked periods. In that year he ceases to be a young country clergyman with ambition to write, and becomes a fellow of the Royal Society, and a person of consequence in learned circles ; this is followed by his rapid preferment in the church. In 1666 he became rector of "the Lantern of England," the Abbey Church at Bath. As a wealthy and fashionable watering place this was considered a very desirable living. This he held throughout his life. But the change which came in 1665 was not confined to the outer circumstances of his career. Up to this time

his work, despite his disavowal of scepticism, had been independently theoretical in attitude and destructive in its implication; after this it becomes more synthetic, harmonizing, and constructive. He seems to have become aware that the practical effect of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* had been sceptical quite beyond his intention; now, being a philosopher and clergyman of some position, he sets about correcting the false impression.' He accomplished this partly by amplifying and explaining his youthful writing, and partly by attempting constructive theorizing in the path marked out by the Cambridge men. In this year, too, he begins to take a more active interest in witchcraft and kindred phenomena, an interest which has hitherto discredited his philosophical standing.

In February, 1665, Glanvill was the guest of Lady Conway at Ragley. The other guests were Van Helmont, Henry More, and Valentine Greatrakes (or Greatorex). The main purpose of the gathering was the discussion of the supernatural world. Here undoubtedly Glanvill was encouraged in the prosecution of the design which resulted the following year

in the publication of his famous book on witchcraft.¹

Between September and November, 1665, the loquacious Mr. Pepys and his friend Captain Cocke were several times at Glanvill's house. Though they do not appear to have had much intercourse with the master of the house, yet one or two of the entries in the *Diary* throw some light on the character of the household.

"So he [Cocke] and I to Glanville's, and there he and I sat talking with Mrs. Pennington, whom we found undrest in her smocke and petticoats by the fireside, and there we drank and laughed. We staid late and I came home after one of the clock."²

"To Glanville's, where I knew Sir John Robinson, Sir G. Smith, and Captain Cocke were gone, and there, with the company of Mrs. Pennington, whose father, I hear, was one of the court of justice and died prisoner of the

¹ Greatrakes was an Irish "healer." He was celebrated for many miraculous cures, and for an equally miraculous breath, which, like the breath of saints and other holy persons, savored of violets.

² *Pepys' Diary*, November 13, 1665. Vol. V., p. 208, ed. Bright, New York, 1884.

stone in the tower, I made them against their resolutions, to stay from hour to hour, until it was almost midnight, and a furious, darke and rainy, and windy, stormy night, and which was best I drinking small beer, made them all drunk drinking wine, at which Sir John Robinson made great sport. But they being gone, the lady and I, very civilly, sat an hour by the fire-side observing the folly of this Robinson, that makes it his work to praise himself and all he say and do, like an empty-headed coxcomb.”¹

The presence of this fascinating Mistress Pennington in Glanvill's house is shrouded in mystery. Pepys was correctly informed that she was the daughter of a regicide, but what she was doing so much at home in the “grave Glanvill's” house is not to be ascertained. The point at issue, however, is that all the references in Pepys indicate that Glanvill's house was very hospitable, and frequented by genial company.

Sometime, soon after his removal to Bath, Glanvill acquitted himself of his obligations as a scientist and a fellow of the Royal Society, by reading before that body two papers, the first concerning the medicinal waters at Bath, and

¹ *Pepys' Diary*, November 15, 1665. Vol. V., p. 210.

the second concerning the lead mines near by.¹ These show keen interest in the subjects, and some range of information, but they are not especially remarkable for scientific knowledge and acumen. One sentence in the first paper, taken in connection with the generous lines of Glanvill's lower face, suggests that he was not a stranger to the social pleasures of his time: "A man cannot drink half the quantity of strong drink in this bath that he can out of it; but if he have drunk before to excess it allays much and is a great refreshment to the body." Glanvill's continued interest in science is likewise shown by a letter which Oldenburg wrote to Boyle, October 1, 1667: "Mr. Glanvill has sent me answers to some mineral inquiries. . . . I must now publish some of his answers, else they are apt to say, he fills his books with queries, but we never see an answer to them."²

Despite this active interest taken by Glanvill in experimental science, some of his more scientific and less imaginative friends, while they continued to have the highest respect for him as a writer, regarded his growing Platonism

¹ See *Royal Society Transactions*, Vol. II., pp. 336, 573.

² *Boyle's Works*, Vol. V., p. 367, ed. 1744.

with some disfavor. On October 1, 1666, John Beale wrote to Boyle, "Mr. Glanvill intends something theologically in defence of emergent providences for the season of all ages, and of the gift of God's holy Spirit for inventions to the benefit of the worthy against atheists and scoffers, and he hath a flowing pen, and may do well if we can ballast him from Origenian Platonism and extravagant adventures. To which purpose I have given him the trouble of much scribble and suggestion, both historical and prudential, which he seems to accept of and professes conformity, but his genius is apt for sublime adventures. I do always wish that such juvenile felicities could receive a temperament from some that are seasoned by longer time."¹

Glanvill's chief literary work in the years 1665-1666 was the preparation of his book on

¹ *Boyle's Works*, Vol. V., p. 488. Beale (1603-1683) was philosophical reader at Cambridge, but was more celebrated as a traveller and scientist. He was also famous for his prodigious memory. He acquired a library without expense, by browsing in bookstalls and memorizing the entire contents of a book at a single reading. From the point of view of the book-seller this was doubtless more creditable to his mental powers than to his sense of rectitude.

witchcraft. In these years he was in correspondence concerning it with More and Boyle, and was doubtless busily engaged in collecting and sifting relations of psychic disturbances in all parts of England. Finally, in the latter year, the volume appeared with the usual setting of learned correspondence. The book was revised, enlarged, and reprinted at least seven times; in 1667, 1668, 1681, 1683, 1689, 1700, and 1726. The title-page of the later editions reads: *Saducismus Triumphatus, or Full and Plain Evidence, concerning Witches and Apparitions, in two Parts, the First treating of their Possibility, and the Second of their real Existence.* The publication of this book, with the train of events leading to it, the reasoning which made it possible, and the controversies resulting from it, constitute some of the most interesting and significant details in Glanvill's career; but these will best be treated in a separate chapter.

In 1667 Glanvill's life, which despite his rising ambition had been hitherto cheerfully contented and prosperous, fell upon more troubled ways. On August 31, 1667, Beale wrote to a Mr. Wilkinson that Glanvill was in great danger from the fanatics at Bath, and that the

magistrates would afford him no protection. Two weeks later Glanvill himself wrote to Beale, that he had been preaching twice a day to angry mobs, plainly, affectionately, and extemporaneously, but that he had done little good. He says that he has come to see that "he who will be a minister must be content to be a martyr." ¹ The suspicion of atheism which Glanvill's catholic charity and advanced philosophy drew upon him never quite died away among fanatical and bigoted persons; but the charge seems to have been pushed most strenuously in the four or five years following 1667. In 1668, he wrote that he felt charity toward all diversities of belief, and added, "This is the temper of my genius, and this some warm folks, with more heat than light, are apt to call Scepticism and Neutrality." ²

Fortunately Glanvill's high spirit, which must have brooked ill the rôle of martyr in his daily pastoral care, found an outlet in a series of virulent literary controversies. He says of himself that he is "a person that contemns all wranglings and vehemencies of dispute," for

¹ See *Glanville-Richards*, p. 80 seq.

² *Plus Ultra*, p. 140.

"there is something of Hell in all wars," but this assumed meekness is only a part of his controversial armor. When once he was attacked, his slashing sword-play of argument was a thing to beware of. This was especially true during this period of his life when he was chafed by worries and annoyances.

The first man to experience his skill of fence was Robert Crosse, an old Oxford fellow, and a stanch upholder of Aristotelianism. Glanvill had heard the "Grave Man," as he calls him, — always in black letter, — animadverting upon the Royal Society as a Jesuitical conspiracy, against both society and religion. Glanvill took issue with him, but being unprepared seems to have been content to retreat in good order. But he had aroused the bitter enmity of Crosse, who was not the man to forgive opposition. As Glanvill wrote later: "He told his tales to every country farmer. . . . So for a time was no other subject handled at ale-benches and coffee-houses in all this neighborhood. Beside which practice he pelted me with doggerel rhymes innumerable."¹

¹ *Prefatory Answer to Stubbe*, p. 2, Glanvill gives as a specimen of Crosse's verse: —

In 1668 this controversy resulted in the publication by Glanvill of a most interesting little book : *Plus ultra, or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the days of Aristotle, in account of some of the most remarkable late Improvements of practical, useful Learning, to Encourage Philosophical Endeavours, occasioned by a conference with one of the Notional Way.* Glanvill's scientific writing has been praised for its anticipations of future discoveries and inventions, the Northwest Passage, or the electric telegraph.¹ This is to be explained by his

“ Good Mr. Battin,
 You speak good Latin,
 And so you do English, too ;
 Your neighbor Crosse
 Is taking horse,
 And you must preach at Chue.”

And adds : “ So taken he was himself with his vein, that I have heard he used to vaunt how much he was in a poetical dispensation above *Hudibras*.”

¹ *E.g.*, see *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 204. After explaining the method of communication by sympathetic needles, which was commonly known, he continues, “ Now though this desirable effect possibly may not answer the expectation of inquisitive experiment, yet 'tis no despicable item, that by some other such way of magnetic efficiency, it may hereafter with success be attempted, when Magnetical History shall be enlarged by riper inspections, and 'tis not unlikely but that present discoveries might be improved to the performance.”

intimacy with his fellow-members of the Royal Society, among whom such speculations were doubtless orally current. It takes but a superficial reading of the *Philosophical Transactions* to reveal the source of most of the strange and erudite scientific instances used by him. What is remarkable in his *Plus Ultra* and his other scientific writing is his rational scientific imagination, his constructive idealism, by which he fused his science with his philosophy. He saw something both of the remote and of the intimate processes of nature, from the swing of Pleiades to the "chymic loves of atoms," in their relation to the single divine process. In other words, he has partially blended the results of Baconian research with a little of the theosophic mysticism of More. Thus as from a peak in Darien he had a vision of those strange seas of thought through which Newton was to voyage alone.

The *Plus Ultra* seems greatly to have pleased the Royal Society. Soon after its publication, Evelyn wrote concerning it, "Now let the moon dogs bark 'till their throats are dry." In the same year Worthington, who seems never to have liked Glanvill, wrote a letter to More

which implies that Glanvill had been unable to go all the way with More in some of his later theosophic writings ; it likewise gives a delightful suggestion of the temperament of the former. "That J. G. should seem disturbed at what is in your later writings is no such wonder. There is required a greater measure of humility and judgment to do that which he is displeased at. They were smiling at St. Michael Armyn's (who was at Bath last summer) when they told the story of the preacher at Bath, how spruce and trim he was, with his white gloves, and handkerchief, and periwig (which must now and then be pulled), and how romantick in preaching."¹ There could never, however, have been any serious estrangement between More and Glanvill, for in the same year, 1668, Glanvill wrote to More the friendly open letter entitled, *A Whip for the Droll Fidler to the Atheist*, afterwards printed with the *Saducismus Triumphatus*. The third section of the tract displays something of Glanvill's character and of his pursuits at this time. He relates that he has converted an atheist by the gentle Socratic method of concession and

¹ *Diary*, Vol. II., pt. II., p. 293 seq.

inductive definition of the terms used. "I resolved not to exasperate him by hard words, or damning sentences, but calmly and without seeming emotion, discoursed the business with him."¹ The conversion was effected through the mediation of the Platonic notion of an *anima mundi*.

In 1667, 1659, and 1670 Glanvill published occasional sermons, but the next book, important from the point of view of either literature or philosophy, came in 1670. In that year he had occasion to preach a visitation sermon to the clergy. Taking for his text, "Which is your reasonable service," he made a very sane and timely exposition of the usefulness of reason to religion. It was very well received, and he was urged to print it. This he did, under the title: *Λογου Θρησκεια or a Seasonable Recommendation and Defense of Reason in the Affairs of Religion, against Infidelity, Scepticism, and Fanaticism of all sorts.*²

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 455 seq., ed. 1726.

² The book is paged 147-234. This seems to indicate that it was originally intended for publication with some other treatise. This was probably either the *Way of Happiness* or the *Discourse on Catholick Charity*, which were printed in the same year. They have only been accessible to me in the *Discourses, Sermons, and Remains*, so that the conjecture cannot be verified.

Mr. Leslie Stephen has seen in this treatise the influence of Herbert of Cherbury, or at least a resemblance to his treatment of the reason. It is, however, almost wholly devoid of the deistic implications of Herbert's work. On the other hand, in many points, both verbal and ideal, it bears a close likeness to some of Whichcote's *Aphorisms* and the discussions of reason in Culverwell and Smith.

In the same year Glanvill came into controversy with another foe of the Royal Society. This was Dr. Henry Stubbe, of Warwick, a professional literary bravo, who had been retained by Crosse. He was, on the authority of Wood, a heavy drinker, a carrot-haired person, and one most boisterous in argument. He had violently attacked the Royal Society, and had asserted that "Mr. Glanvill was the most impudent liar in the world, that he would prove him a liar, and so ignorant and illiterate a fellow that he was not fit to come into any learned company or open his mouth among them."¹ Glanvill was not the man to suffer this idly. In 1671, he replied with :

¹ Wood, *Athenæ Oxoniensis*, Vol. III., Col. 1246, ed. Bliss.

A Prefatory Answer to Mr. Henry Stubbe, The Doctor of Warwick, wherein the

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Malignity} \\ \textit{Hypocrisy} \\ \textit{Falsehood} \end{array} \right\}$ of his $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Temper} \\ \textit{Pretenses} \\ \textit{Reports} \end{array} \right\}$ and the Imper-

tinency of his Arguings and Quotations in his Animadversions on Plus Ultra are Discovered.

*A Rod for a Fool's Back.*¹ This reply is a formidable instrument of over two hundred duodecimo pages. It is hastily written and ill revised, but forcible and fluent. Despite Glanvill's assertion in the preface that "there are none of these gentlemen (of the Royal Society) but scorn to be so dirty, impertinent, and so like Mr. Stubbe as to meddle with any passages of his life," his own language is sometimes little less than scurrilous. Yet his reasoning is, in the main, both subtile and sound. Stubbe had asserted that the society was hostile to monarchy, to the church, to the universities, and to all ancient literature. This position was so manifestly wrong-headed and absurd that it was very easy to attack; and

¹ He followed this, a few months later, with *A Further Answer*. This I have been unable to see, but its nature can easily be inferred from the *Prefatory Answer*.

Glanvill neglected no opportunity. In 1676 Dr. Stubbe slipped from his horse into a shallow stream and was drowned. Glanvill preached his funeral sermon, which, unfortunately, is not preserved.

In 1672 two events occurred which tend to show that he was steadily rising in fame and position. The *Letters and Poems in Honour of the Duchess of Newcastle*, published in that year, contained a contribution from him,¹ and he is known to have been a correspondent of the amiable duchess for some time previously.² In this year, too, he was made one of the chaplains in ordinary to Charles II. He published at this time his *Philosophia Pia, or the Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion*. This was clearly intended as a supplement to the *Λογου Θρησκεία*. Whereas the latter had striven to show the agreement between revealed religion

¹ This has not been accessible to me; fortunately in his Dictionary, art. "Festival," Johnson quotes a stanza of Glanvill's poem:—

"Follow ye nymphs and shepherds all,
Come celebrate this festival;
And merrily sing and sport and play,
'Tis Oriana's wedding day."

² See *Life of the Duke of Newcastle, by his Duchess*, ed. Frith. Pref., p. xxxiv.

and our faculty of reason, the former was intended to show the service which the Anglican religion might derive from the particular line of reasoning followed by the Royal Society.

In the following year Glanvill was again embroiled. Andrew Marvell had taken occasion of the popularity of the *Rehearsal* to publish a prose satire, entitled *The Rehearsal Transposed*, in which he animadverted upon several clergymen for their conformity and abandonment of Puritan principles. Chief among these was Dr. Samuel Parker, who as a very clever and ambitious wearer of the cloth was peculiarly liable to attack. Glanvill was too much of a Platonist not to be quick to resent an affront to a friend. Under the date, November 3, 1673, Marvell received a letter, signed J. G., and closing with the sentence: "If thou darest publish any lie or libel against Dr. Parker, by the Eternal God, I will cut thy throat." Marvell, however, was not greatly terrified, for before the end of the year he published a second part of the *Rehearsal Transposed*, with the above sentence on the title-page.¹

¹ In the back of Glanvill's *Essays* (1676), among the books by him there advertised is one: *An Apology for Some of the*

From 1670 to 1676 Glanvill published occasional tracts and discourses : *The Way to Happiness* (1670); *A Fast Sermon on the King's Martyrdom* (?); *An Earnest Invitation to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper* (1673); and *Seasonable Reflections and Discourses in order to the Cure of the Scoffing and Infidelity of a Degenerate Age* (1676). Toward the close of this period he turned his attention to the publication of a book which should be a plain, forcible, systematic, and complete presentation of his views in philosophy and theology. He revised and rewrote the best of his old essays, added two new ones, and published the whole in 1676 (imprimatur, March 27, 1675), under the title, *Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion*. The essays, seven in number, are the following : —

- I. Against Confidence in Philosophy.
- II. Of Scepticism and Certainty.

Clergy who suffer under false and scandalous Reports on the Occasion of the Rehearsal Transposed. This I have not been able to see. It is omitted from the otherwise complete list of Glanvill's writings, in the article upon him in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. It is not mentioned by Wood, and is not in the British Museum Catalogue.

- III. Of the Modern Improvements of Useful Knowledge.
- IV. The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion.
- V. The Agreement of Reason and Religion.
- VI. Against Modern Sadducism in the matter of Witches and Apparitions.
- VII. Anti-fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy.

Of these II. and VII. are new; IV., V., and VI. are reprinted with little change from the *Philosophia Pia*, Δογμῶν Θρησκευτικῶν, and *Saducismus Triumphatus*; I. and III. are revised and condensed versions of the *Scepsis*, and the *Plus Ultra*.

The last essay, of which a partial abstract has already been given, is the most valuable and interesting in the book. It is at once an account of the Cambridge latitudinarians, a summary of Glanvill's own work, and a continuation of the Baconian tradition. It is evidently an extract from a larger work in supplement to the *New Atlantis*.¹

As we shall see in a later chapter, the style

¹ Such a work existed in Ms., in the library of James Crossley, but I have been unable to trace it to its present location. See *Worthington's Diary*, Vol. I., p. 300, note.

and method of the *Essays* mark them as the summit of Glanvill's career as a writer. With the publication of this book, his distinctively philosophical and literary activity came to an end. Henceforth his work grew more homiletic and ecclesiastical, until, in 1680, it came to an abrupt end at his untimely death. There is little to record in these last years. Doubtless Glanvill was too busy with the daily duties of his parish to give time to writing. Furthermore, it is not impossible that he had, about this time, some bitter domestic trouble. Anthony Horneck seems to intend this in a passage quoted below ; and in the posthumous volume of 1681 there is a picture of human unrest and sorrow which impresses the reader as more than the mere rhetorical, homiletic pessimism which cheapens the world to make heaven richer. "In whatever condition we look on this poor thing we call man there is nothing but misery before us. . . . Our enjoyments stale and weary us, and disappointments are smart afflictions ; so that we want both when we have and when we have not. . . . Like men in a Fever, we toss from side to side, and find rest nowhere but in the Grave. . . . We

carry all the beasts of prey within us. There's a fire in our breasts that consumes us, and we die by the same flame by which we live."¹

In 1678 Glanvill took occasion of the disturbances arising from the popish plot to write a wise, moderate, and cool-headed tract : *The Zealous and Impartial Protestant, Showing some great but less heeded Dangers of Popery in order to Thorough and Effectual Security against it, in a Letter to a Member of Parliament*. This, however, was not published until 1681. Early in 1678 he had published, *An Essay Concerning Preaching, together with A Seasonable Defense of Preaching, and the Plain Way of it*. For sound sense and quiet humor, these, despite their didactic character, are among the best of his writings. Later in the year, "by the endeavours of Henry Marquis of Worcester, related to Mrs. Glanvill, he became one of the prebendaries of Worcester."²

This is all that can be certainly learned of Glanvill's active life. In 1680 he had a fever ; he had partially recovered, but a re-

¹ *Discourses, Sermons, and Remains*, p. 272.

² *Saducismus Triumphatus*. Introductory Account of the Author's Life (1726).

lapse came, and he died November 4, 1680, in the forty-fifth year of his age. He was buried in the Abbey Church at Bath, with an epitaph which tells, truly, that he passed his life *in studio et contemplatione verbi et operum Dei*.

His second wife, Margaret Selwyn, together with his three children by her, Sophia, Henry, and Mary, are all remembered in his will. This document contains little other biographical information of importance. Maurice, his eldest surviving son, is not among the legatees. He had just become rector of Wimbish, and was therefore provided for. To his brother John, Glanvill willed his "black nagg."¹

This somewhat meagre outline of the events and circumstances of our author's life should have revealed the dominant traits of his character. The more intimate study of his mind, as expressed in his work, will perhaps give to the outline detail and shading. For the present it will suffice to give two of the more notable characters of him, left by contemporaries.

Anthony à Wood, always a somewhat ill-natured person, disliked Glanvill for his facile

¹ See the abstract of the will in Glanville-Richards, p. 162.

conformity, as we have seen, and also for what he esteemed his conceit. There is, indeed, a downrightness in Glanvill's manner which might easily pass for conceit, but a more sympathetic reader feels that it is but the natural self-respect of a mind conscious of its own readiness and power, quite compatible with deep, underlying charity and humility. In spite of this dislike, Wood is constrained to respect Glanvill's ability. "He was a person of more than ordinary parts, of a quick, warm, spruce, and gay fancy ; and was more lucky, at least in his own judgment, in his first hints and thoughts of things, than in his after notions, examined and digested by longer and more mature deliberation. He had a very tenacious memory, and was a great master of the English tongue, expressing himself therein with easy fluency, and in a manly, yet withal a clear, style."¹

A more personal and friendly character is given by Anthony Horneck,² in the preface to

¹ *Athenæ Oxoniensis*, Vol. III., Col. 1245.

² Anthony Horneck was a German by birth and a Master of Arts from Wittenberg. In 1661 he was admitted *ad eundem* at Oxford. He received rapid preferment in the English church, and became a popular and "florid" London preacher. He appears to have been an old-time friend to Glanvill.

the posthumous volume of sermons. "Though he met sometimes with disappointments, yet he remembered that he was a Christian, and as he was not without his crosses, so he carried himself under them like a true philosopher. His mind seemed to be serene when things went most contrary to his wishes, and whatever storm the inconstancy and fickleness of sublunary objects threw upon him, within still he felt a calm beyond that of Socrates, when the ungrateful Athenians sent him the fatal draught to drink his death and ruine."

CHAPTER IV

GLANVILL'S PHILOSOPHY

THE systematic presentation of Glanvill's scheme of thought is a difficult and dangerous matter. In the first place, he had no complete and consistent system of ideas, in the sense that Descartes or Spinoza had. His sympathetic and harmonizing intention sometimes led him into capricious eclecticism. His philosophy, like a chameleon, took some shades of color from the ground it was upon; now sceptical with Sextus Empiricus, anon Pythagorean with More, rationalistic with Descartes, or experimental with Bacon, it finally culminated in a reasonable and broad-minded Platonism. In the second place, he never sharply defined the province of metaphysics from the domains of science, ethics, and theology. It is clear, however, that these traits which make formulation difficult add greatly to the interest of our author's work. It is by virtue of these that

he becomes a mirror of the complex tendencies of his time. The aim of the present chapter will be threefold: to explain the animating force of Glanvill's work; to show the origin, development, and character of his scepticism; and to give some account of his positive metaphysical theories.

I

Glanvill vs. Aristotle

The first and most important animating force in Glanvill's philosophical work was opposition to Aristotle. As we have already seen, Bacon had revolted against the Aristotelian cosmology, and against what he conceived to be the Aristotelian logic. In the field of pure metaphysics the influence of the European free-thinkers had operated to undermine the scholastic stronghold; yet at the time of the Restoration the metaphysic of Aristotle was, officially, as strong as ever. It was taught at the universities, and it was held by all the great religious parties; the Calvinists were, of course, friendly to the way of syllogism, the Catholics clung to the old cosmology, and within the establishment there

seems to have been a High-church revival of dogmatic theology grounded in part on scholastic theories of the universe.

In the *Plus Ultra*¹ Glanvill tells the story of his early relations with Peripateticism. He had been trained in the scholastic philosophy at the university, and as a young man had taken delight in the subtleties and niceties of syllogistic dispute; but with maturing age, he came to ask himself *cui bono?* What would these notional studies avail him in the daily walks of men? Or what account could they give him of the works of God? Unable to answer these questions in a way favorable to the systems of the schools, he turned for a time to a partial scepticism. The expression and result of this reaction was the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*.

The dogmatizing here discredited does not include all metaphysical theorizing; it is nearly coextensive with the dogmas of the schools. This is made clear by the whole tenor of the

¹ Page 122 *seq.* The most important passages in which Glanvill arraigns Aristotle are the following: *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, Chs. XVI.-XIX.; *Letter to a Friend Concerning Aristotle*. In *Scepsis Scientifica, Plus Ultra*, Chs. XV.-XVII.

book, and particularly by four chapters of reflections upon the Peripatetick Philosophy. Glanvill does not concern himself with any very exhaustive or profound analysis of Aristotle's thought, but here, like Bacon, attacks it on the ground of its practical tendencies. *Materia prima*, the fundamental postulate of scholasticism, as Glanvill sees it, he holds to be but a bare abstraction, differing no whit from empty space. "If we would conceive this imaginary matter, we must deny all things of it that we can conceive, and what remains is the thing we look for."¹ He finds it equally difficult to obtain any realized conception of *form* and *potentia materiæ*. This is the sum of the metaphysical discussion. He then proceeds to devote several pages of lively and forceful writing to showing that the philosophy of Aristotle is litigious, impious, impertinent, inept for discoveries, and, save for its use in training the mind of youth, altogether void of practical good. He cites Bacon and Gassendi, and follows the line of attack marked out by them. The conclusion of the matter is that Aristotelianism fails, because it takes insufficient account of particular

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 153.

phenomena. That this is but superficial criticism of a great philosophical system no one would deny; but this does not lessen the importance of the attempt. It is only within the present century that Aristotle's contributions to psychology, physics, and æsthetics have been recognized at their true value. The vitiated, misunderstood Peripateticism common in Glanvill's time was pestiferous in precisely the directions pointed out by him.

In the *Letter to a Friend* the argument opens with an attack upon the canon of Aristotle's work, and upon his character both as a man and philosopher. The first charge, which is made upon the authority of Pico Mirandola and Gassendi, arrives at no positive conclusion, save that Theophrastus and other disciples of Aristotle may have written some of the many books which bear his name.

The second charge takes the ground that he was an envious detractor of his greater predecessors in philosophy, — Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. This leads to the central argument of the tract: that Aristotle's philosophy is hostile to revealed Christianity, Plato's most friendly. To prove this, a series of specific dog-

mas are cited from Patricius. For example : "Plato affirms God to be one ; Aristotle makes one first mover, but 56 (*sic*) other Gods movers of the orbs," . . . "Plato that God is free from all body, Aristotle that he is tied to the first orb." This rather unconvincing reasoning is very suggestive and significant, for it shows how the scholastic vice of abstract quibble over dogma had so permeated all the thinking of the time, that even one who had visions of better things could not free himself altogether from the old habit.

In the *Plus Ultra* the argument against Aristotle resumes the line begun in the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*. Its purpose is to give an outline of the immense increase in human knowledge since the time of Aristotle, and so to minimize his importance. After a comprehensive sketch of the improvements in mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, geography, and all the branches of useful learning, Glanvill concludes that "the advantages of mankind in a succession of two thousand years are greater than those of a single person who lived but sixty-three." This encourages him to hope that the philosophers of the Royal Society may eventu-

ally put thought upon an impregnable foundation by their study of "God's great book, universal nature." He strives to show by many instances that observation of to-day is worth more than ancient theory. Thus he vindicates "optick glasses against a disputing man who is afraid to believe his eyes against Aristotle," by comparing him with the uxorious person asked by his spouse, "Will you believe your own eyes before your own dear wife?" But it was not until 1665 that Glanvill's opposition to Aristotelianism took this curious form of an active faith in experimental science. In its earliest manifestation it appeared as a semi-Pyrrhonic scepticism. To this we now turn.

II

Glanvill's Scepticism

It will be remembered that in an earlier chapter mention was made of a strain of scepticism appearing in English thought as a branch of the Hobbesian atomic materialism, in opposition to scholastic dogmatism. This sort of scepticism flourished exceedingly at the gay and careless court of Charles II. It took little pains to in-

quire into the causes and results of the imperfection of our knowledge. We can imagine the genial king, or one of his clever dramatists, repeating Montaigne's *Que sais-je*, light-heartedly, between a kiss and a jest. To some of his contemporary adversaries Glanvill's scepticism seemed one with this. White traced this materialistic scepticism from Gassendi, and made Glanvill its chief exponent.¹ This is not, however, accurate, for Glanvill is rather to be connected with one of those carefully rational Pyrrhonic revivals which arise periodically, to clear the air of philosophy, from the mists of abstract speculation.

In 1569 Henry Stephens brought out an edition of the classical treatise of formal scepticism, the *Hypotyposes* of Sextus Empiricus. Traces of the influences of this are to be seen in Hakewill, and Herbert of Cherbury. Sir Walter Raleigh's *Sceptick* (pr. 1651) is clearly suggested by it. The main ground of his scepticism is the same; the mystery and depth of nature, the variation of sense perception, and the equivocation of argument. But Raleigh's essay is short and tentative; it is in Glanvill's

¹ See *Of Scepticism and Certainty*, p. 39. (*Essays.*)

Vanity of Dogmatizing that the Pyrrhonism of Sextus comes to fullest expression. That Glanvill knew and followed the *Hypotyposes* can be proved beyond doubt. He cites it as authority for the history of scepticism; and outlines its course as there given;¹ he uses the ten sceptical tropes, continually, throughout the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*; and finally, like Sextus, he makes the end of scepticism the attainment of *ataraxia*. In his account of the desirableness of this consummation he follows Sextus closely.² As we proceed to take up the argument in detail we shall find more precise points of connection.

Glanvill's chief sceptical treatise appeared, as we have seen, in three forms: The *Vanity of*

¹ See *Of Scepticism and Certainty*, p. 41.

² Cf. *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 228 *seq.* (*supra*, p. 59), *Plus Ultra*, p. 147, and *Scepticism and Certainty*, *passim*, with *Hypotyposes*, Chs. IV., VI., and XII. The similarity of title might suggest that in his earliest work Glanvill was indebted to Cornelius Agrippa, *De Incertitudine et Vanitate omnium Scientiarum*. Such, however, was not the case. Glanvill occasionally refers to Agrippa with respect and admiration, but he has little to do with his general plan and argument. Agrippa had written not so much of the vanity of science and philosophy in general, as of the ineptitude of the particular arts.

Dogmatizing (1661), *Scepsis Scientifica* (1665), and *Against Confidence in Philosophy* (1676). In all, the division of the argument is the same; he first gives evidences of human ignorance, then in the body of the work he discusses the causes of that ignorance, and finally concludes with some general strictures upon dogmatizing. We come now to consider these in order.

To the proof of our ignorance he adduces instances of mysteries hitherto unexplained. These are of two kinds: of the soul and of the body. The former are seven in number: the nature of the soul, its origin, the mode of its union with the body, how it moves in the body, how it directs the "animal spirits," the relation between sense and perception, and the nature of memory. Then follow three material mysteries; the origin of bodies, the mode of the union of the parts of matter and the composition of bodies, whether or not infinitely divisible. It will be observed that the mysteries of the soul fall into two classes, ultimate metaphysical mysteries, and mysteries which have now come to be some of the subtlest and most difficult problems of physiological psychology. Of the former class Glanvill concludes that the

real nature of the soul can never be known on earth; but that it can only be seen in the mirror of its effects and attributes; "and though a pure intellectual eye may have a sight of it in reflux discoveries; yet if we affect a grosser touch, like Ixion we shall embrace a cloud." ¹

In his consideration of the difficulties arising from the union of the soul with the body, Glanvill raises many acute and searching questions. For example: how does the soul infer the size and distance of objects, when the vault of the heavens gives an image no larger than a walnut shell? How does the soul direct the movements of the body, which are the result of some volition, but which give us no consciousness of the way and means of their direction? The eye, which follows these words back and forth across the page, how is it guided? Modern optics, neurology, and psychology have given some of us a vague, but ever present, sub-consciousness of the manner of these phenomena, even while they are appearing as phenomena, but in Glanvill's time they must have caused a sense of dark, subjective mystery hard for us to realize.

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 18.

Yet even for us, perhaps, the mystery is but pushed a step further back.

He states the Peripatetic, Cartesian, Digbæan, and Hobbesian theories of memory fairly, criticises them acutely, but finds no certainty in any of them. A specimen of the cleverness of his criticism may not be out of place. Descartes had held that memory depends on the existence of an all but infinite number of pores in the brain, through which perceptions enter. "How, then," asks Glanvill, "do we recall the distance of objects lying from us in a straight line?"

But Glanvill has not proceeded very far in his proof of human ignorance, before he is so impressed by the immensity of his subject that he is content to rest his case: "And now when I look back upon the main subject of these papers, it appears so vast in my thoughts that me-thinks I have drawn but a Cockle-shell of water from the Ocean. Whichever way I look upon, within the amplitude of Heaven and Earth, is evidence of Humane Ignorance: For all things are great darkness to us, and we are so to ourselves. The plainest things are as obscure as the most confessedly mysterious; and the plants we tread on are as much above

us as the Stars and Heavens. The things that touch us are as distant as the Poles, and we are as much strangers to ourselves as to the people of the Indies.”¹

The causes of our ignorance are twofold: the difficulty and depth of science, and the present temper of our faculties. The first has been proved, by implication, in what has gone before. The general principle is that all things in nature are connected, and to know one thing perfectly, we should have to know all. The discussion of the second cause is more important. It is that which contains Glanvill's theory of knowledge and his criticism of causation. These are the points of his work which have the greatest significance in philosophy.

In the process of knowledge Glanvill distinguishes three stages:—

(1) Simple intellection or apprehension, grounded on sensitive perception, or if the object is absent, on imagination.

(2) Forming of propositions through the principles of identity and distinction, *i.e.* judgment. Here if the objects are material the

¹ *Against Confidence in Philosophy*, p. 32.

judgment is grounded on imagination, if immaterial on understanding.

(3) Discourse or reason; the faculty common to all men, of joining propositions in a chain of inferential reasoning.¹

This is in the main the epistemological scheme of the schools, in which no doubt Glanville had been trained at Oxford. The importance which he attaches to the part played by the imagination may perhaps be connected with the Cambridge thought. The function of the imagination in knowledge was a favorite theme with all the Platonists. Now in each of these three steps, says Glanvill, there is a seed of error; in the first it is sense; in the second, imagination; in the third, affection and inclination. In the act of sense there are two "considerables": the motion made upon the brain, and the soul's act consequent thereupon. In the latter, Glanvill, like all truly philosophical sceptics from Pyrrho to Hume, holds that there is imperfection, variation, and relativity. Imperfection, for the "animadversion" of the soul cannot perceive the spokes of a swiftly turning

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 96 seq.

wheel, or the movement of the shadow on the dial; variation, for to the jaundiced eye all things are yellow; and relativity, for the heat is not in the fire but in our perception of it.¹ In the second step to knowledge the imagination may lead us astray. It may become disordered through religious excitement or some other cause, and make us connect ideas which have no identity.² In taking the third step the reason is often beguiled and misled by prejudice, passion, and interest. Here Glanvill is seemingly influenced by Hobbes' rational treatment of the cause of our ignorance. Certain of his opinions have the stamp of the philosopher of Malmsbury. "The woman in us still prosecutes a deceit like that begun in the garden, and we are wedded to an Eve as fatal as the mother of our miseries. The Deceiver soon found this soft place in Adam, and Innocency itself did not secure him from this way of seduction. We now scarce see anything but through our passions, that are wholly blind and incapable."³

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, pp. 70, 79, 93, 94, 218.

² Henry More had written exhaustively of this in his various works on "enthusiasm."

³ *Against Confidence in Philosophy*, p. 22 seq.

Occasionally in this connection comes a sentence like the following, which has more the ring of the Platonic Socrates, "It is no good fishing for verity in troubled waters."

But while we are often betrayed into mistakes by these causes, such error is not normal but rather occasional and adventitious. There is, however, one fundamental disparity between the world of phenomena and the *ego* which should serve as a constant warning against confidence in opinions. This, thinks Glanvill, is the uncertainty of our concept of causation.

From the beginnings of philosophy to the time of Hume, the reality, universality, and necessity of causation were generally assumed without proof. Aristotle and the scholastic dogmatists postulated a hierarchy of causes as the ground of their cosmology. The atomists from Epicurus down, though they had difficulties about the first cause, never thought of questioning the fact of causation in the phenomenal world. The experimental and unattached philosophers, like Bacon, made it the end of their work *rerum cognoscere causas*. But to Glanvill the doctrine of cause and effect did not appear axiomatic. "All knowledge of causes is

deductive: for we know none by simple intuition; but through the mediation of its effects. Now we cannot conclude anything to be the cause of another but from its continual accompanying it: for the causality itself is insensible. . . . But now to argue from a concomitancy to a causality is not infallibly conclusive; yea, in this way lies notorious delusion. . . . Let us suppose the day had always broke with a wind, and proportionably varied as that did: Had not he been a notorious Sceptick, that should question the causality?"¹

Whether this argument was original with Glanvill is hard to say. Sextus Empiricus had exploited the Pyrrhonic criticism of ætiology; but Ænesidemus, whom he chiefly quotes, had grounded his attack upon the logical contradictions involved in the concept of causation, and had not attempted to explain its origin out of the idea of sequence.² Lord Brook had approached the idea when he asserted that our notion of second causes consists in the distinc-

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 189 seq. Cf. *Scepsis Scientifica*, p. 142 seq., and *Against Confidence in Philosophy*, p. 14.

² See *Hypotyposes*, Ch. XVII.; *Adversus Mathematicos*, Ch. IX.

tion which we make between two things of which the one precedes and the other follows.¹ But there is no positive proof that Glanvill knew *The Nature of Truth*. Whatever the source, the form of the criticism is a clear anticipation of the question which presented itself to Hume and Kant. It is a significant proof that philosophy, like nature, and as a part of nature, *nihil facit per saltum*. But Glanvill used his doubt of causation merely as a corrective to undue confidence, not as an excuse for complete agnosticism. In all his other writing he reasons as if the reality of causation were unquestioned. His practical attitude toward the principle is that of reasoning men always and everywhere. It differs little from that taken by most scientists and philosophers since Kant; that our concept of causation is synthetic, hence extra-logical in the ordinary sense, but practically certain, since it is constantly being verified by the cumulative weight of our experience.²

Before taking leave of this part of the subject Glanvill hits upon the fundamental principle of all scepticism. This, which has preserved

¹ Cf. Remusat, *Hist. Phil. en Angleterre*, Vol. I., p. 242.

² Cf. Huxley's *Hume*, p. 121.

much the same form from *Ænesidemus* to Kant, is simply that from the sensitive perception of an object we have no right to postulate anything whatever concerning the nature of the thing in itself.¹

“Now ’tis no doubt with the considerate but that the rudiments of nature are very unlike the grosser appearances. . . . The Egge is not like the oviparous production ; nor the corrupted mack like the creature that creeps from it. . . . So then since there is so much dissimilitude between Cause and Effect in the more palpable Phenomena, we can expect no less between them and their invisible selves [*i.e.* noumena]. . . . And though the Grand Secretary of Nature, the miraculous Des Cartes, have here infinitely out-done all the philosophers went before him, in giving a particular and Analytical account of the Universal Fabrick ; yet he intends his Principles but for Hypotheses, and never pretends that things are really and necessarily as he hath supposed them ; but that they may be admitted pertinently to solve the Phenomena,

¹ See *Hypotyposes*, Ch. XVII., and *Critique of the Pure Reason*, “Of the ground of the distinction of all objects into phenomena and noumena.”

and are convenient Supposals for the use of life.”¹

We have now come far enough with the reasoning of this early manifesto to attempt a summary characterization of Glanvill's scepticism at this period of his life. It is evident that the chief grounds of his argument are the considerations of all Pyrrhonism whether sensationalistic, or idealistic ; that is, the subjectivity of perception and consequent relativity of knowledge. This opinion was reënforced by his consciousness of the scientific discoveries still to be made. “ We must know what light is, and light being effected by a motion on the organs of sense, 'twill be a necessary requisite to understand the nature of our sensitive faculties, and to them the essence of the Soul and other spiritual substances.”² Here is Berkeley's problem ready to his hand. It is this feeling of the possibilities of the advance of practical knowledge which makes Glanvill so ready to take up with marvellous hypotheses. In the chapter which begins with the critique of causation, he tells with apparent belief the incredible

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 210 seq.

² *Ibid.*, p. 217.

stories of the clairvoyant Scholar Gypsy, and of the man with the "sympathized" hand, which shrivelled when his friend died; and these relations are used to enforce his sceptical position.

While admitting that the reason may be led astray, he holds with Plato and with Descartes that the thing which the reason can conceive clearly and distinctly is true. Of the dialectic use of pure reason pointed out by Kant he has of course no conception. Like Locke he keeps *reflection* or *animadversion* in his theory of knowledge as a means of preventing an absolute break with revealed religion. He concludes the body of his argument for scepticism by saying that he has "only imitated the practice of bending a crooked stick as much the other way to straighten it."¹ Although the earlier position of his argument should have led him to agree with Montaigne that "*la philosophie n'est qu'une poesie sophistique*," he contrives to avoid this conclusion by adducing ethical considerations. In his final chapter he makes an extended apology for philosophy and finally justifies it on the ground that "Those raised contempla-

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 223.

tions of God and nature wherewith Philosophy doth acquaint us, inlarge and innoble the Spirit and infinitely advance it above an ordinary level.”¹

In the *Essays* (1676) is a treatise of *Scepticism and Certainty*. In this Glanvill tries so to soften and explain his earlier scepticism that there shall be no inconsistency between it and his later positive theorizing. He insists that he is no sceptic in the Pyrrhonic sense, since he believes in faith and the possibilities of science. Certainty, he says, is of two kinds, infallible and indubitable. Infallible certainty which is the absolute assurance that things are as we conceive and affirm, is not within the range of the human mind. Indubitable certainty exists where there is no reason to doubt. This is the basis of the Cartesian system. *Cogito ergo sum* is not a syllogism, but the expression of an indubitable certainty. It cannot be proved, but *must* be believed. But therefore says Glanvill, agreeing herein with Cudworth and modern criticism, Descartes argues in a circle when from our ideas he proves God, and from his excellence the truth of our faculties.

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 239.

Besides this fundamental certainty, there are two other classes of indubitable certainty, the one arising from the evidence of sense such as matter and motion, the other coming from historical testimony.

Here we see Glanvill's scepticism has served his turn in discrediting Aristotelian dogmatism. He still keeps something of its spirit by him as a help, alike to Socratic reserve of judgment, and to Baconian care in the examination of particulars. But he has so qualified it and explained it that it cannot longer stand duenna-like in the way between himself and a beloved hypothesis.

III

Glanvill's Constructive Theorizing

Glanvill's positive thinking pursues two directions not altogether consistent: scientific cosmology, and rational psychology. In the first he writes as a fellow of the Royal Society, in the second as a Cambridge Platonist. It is in the *Plus Ultra* that Glanvill has become the spokesman of the experimental philosophy. In this treatise he writes quite in the manner of

Bacon concerning the methods and aim of the advancement of learning. "The philosophy that must signifie either for light or for use must not be the work of the mind turned in upon itself, and only conversing with its own ideas; but it must be raised from the observations and applications of sense, and take its accounts from things as they are in the sensible world.¹ . . . That so the improvable and luciferous phenomena that lie scattered up and down in the vast champaign of nature might be aggregated and brought into a common store."²

The opposers of the society "consider not that the design is laid as low as the profound depths of nature, and reacheth as high as the uppermost story of the universe, that it extends to all the varieties of the great world and aims at the benefit of universal mankind."²

This is clearly the precursor of modern positive philosophy. Here in its beginnings it has something of the pontifical afflatus which came to Comte at the end of his life, and which now distinguishes the variety of Positivism known as the cosmic philosophy. But as it is

¹ *Plus Ultra*, p. 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 88 seq.

maintained in the *Plus Ultra*, it is a sane and moderate kind of thinking. It is the thinking of which Cowley wrote : —

“ Philosophy I say, and call it he
For whatsoe’er the painter’s fancy be,
It a male virtue seems to me.”¹

A true positive philosophy must be grounded upon an organization of the sciences. Such an organization had been suggested by Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning*, and this is presupposed by Glanvill in the *Plus Ultra*. Mathematics, physics, chemistry, physiology, and astronomy he considers as coördinate tributaries to the great stream of luciferous yet useful learning. The purpose of the *Plus Ultra* is to summarize the progress made in each of these sciences and to presage still further advancement. But of the five, astronomy appealed most strongly to Glanvill’s imagination. He doubtless knew enough of the Cartesian celestial mathematics to feel the attractiveness of the problems which Newton was soon to attempt. He frequently sees the inadequacy of existing systems and forecasts later theories.

¹ “ Ode to Royal Society.”

Thus in the following sentence there is a vague premonition of the nebular hypothesis, "And perhaps the newly discovered ring about Saturn, to mention no more, will scarcely be accounted for by any systeme of things the World hath yet been acquainted with."¹

Sometimes the outlying fields of astronomy were so vividly present to his imagination that he strayed widely from his chosen sublunary path of careful scepticism. In the *Lux Orientalis* he becomes enraptured with the idealist's dream of the former state of man. Like Socrates in the *Phædo*, he even attempts to refer this ethereal life to a definite locality: "Some philosophers have ventured to pronounce that place to be the Sun, that vast orb of splendour and brightness; though it is more probable, that those immense tracts of pure and quiet æther that are above Saturn, are the joyous place of our ancient celestial abode."² This, however, is the voice of the man of letters rather than of the philosopher. In Glanvill the two characters were never quite at harmony.

Glanvill's general theory of the world was a

¹ *Scepsis Scientifica*, "Address to Royal Society," p. lxiii.

² *Lux Orientalis*, p. 114 seq.

modified atomism.¹ He believes that "the operations of nature are performed by subtle streams of minute bodies"; but he does not believe that the world was made by a "fortuitous concourse of atoms." This opinion, which "those of Epicurus, his elder school, taught," is "impious and vile." He believes that God created atomic matter and is the "supreme orderer of its motions." Like More and Cudworth he believes in a mind of the world, subtly interfused throughout the atomic structure of the universe, which acts as a medium between God and nature. "'Tis more likely that those strange effects (of memory) are not mechanical but vital, effected by the continuity of the great Spirit of nature which is diffused through all things."² When Glanvill leaves the broad way of cosmological speculation for the devious coverts of psychical research, this *anima mundi* becomes fairly equivalent to what Professor James has recently called "floating mind stuff."

This half-scientific, half-theological theory of

¹ *Philosophia Pia (Essays)*, p. 30 seq.

² *Of Scepticism and Certainty*, p. 60. Cf. *Prefatory Answer to Stubbe*, pp. 153-159.

the world is neither very systematic nor very consistent. It is, nevertheless, characteristic of Glanvill's receptive mind, and of the complex and transitional aspect of his century. It is an imperfect fusion of experiment and dreaming. In the end his attitude of mind toward the world and its science is not very different from that common nowadays. Witness Lord Tennyson, in whose works within a page we find "The Higher Pantheism" and "Flower in the Crannied Wall."

Glanvill's rational psychology was drawn almost wholly from the writings of the Cambridge men. As such its general character is already clear, but inasmuch as it occupies either with deduction or corollaries fully two-thirds of the bulk of his writing, it must be considered a little more in detail. This subject is closely involved with the questions of theology and psychical research ; for the purpose of the present discussion we may abstract, and confine our attention to, the philosophical theory of the soul, and the metaphysical argument for immortality.

In the *Lux Orientalis* Glanvill affirms that he does not believe "the old enthusiastick con-

ceit that the soul is a particle of the Divine Essence."¹ This of course distinguishes his work from the general neo-Platonic trend of the Cambridge thinking. He is, nevertheless, in harmony with it in considering the soul to be an indiscerptible substance. The fact that the soul is a substance apart from matter is proved, he thinks, by all the arguments ordinarily used to establish its immaterial nature. Perception, "perception of spirituals," universals, "congenit notions," all prove the soul to be a substance. All are in some way concerned with motion in matter: how then can they affect the soul unless that be a substance capable of receiving impressions?²

In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, where Glanvill is still much under Cartesian influence, he is what More called a "nullubist"; that is to say, he does not grant extension to the soul-substance.³ But in the revised form of this treatise, printed in 1676, this passage is omitted. And in all his later work, especially after he has become involved in the study of witchcraft,

¹ Page 22.

² See *Of Scepticism and Certainty*, p. 57 seq.

³ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 100 seq.

Glanvill's treatment of the soul is in entire agreement with More. He conceives of the soul of a man as a more ethereal body, but shaped and moulded by the form and pressure of the natural body. From this point the question passes over into the realm of theology.

His discussion of the attributes of the soul-substance is blended strangely from Platonism, Cartesian, and dogmatic theology. The interest in this part must be curious and antiquarian, rather than humanistic. Perhaps a single example of his quaint inconsistency will be sufficient. In the *Scir^e* he asserts that the will is free, not always moved by some precedent passion, but sometimes by the soul itself, directly and immediately. In the *Saducismus*, published but a year later, he practically denies the freedom of the will by asserting that each man is accompanied by a good and a bad angel who control the ends of his life.

Despite the generally arbitrary and occasionally fantastic character of Glanvill's psychology, it had in it the germ of better things. It was grounded, like Culverwell's, upon the notion of the common human reason. Hence it was the logical precursor of the common-sense phi-

losophy, and, when joined to a more careful analysis, of the more broadly human, monistic idealism which is now coming into favor.

In his earlier writings our author attempts the metaphysical proof of immortality. In the *Lux Orientalis* he connects it with the hypothesis of præexistence, and tries to prove both by considerations upon the goodness of God, the variety of the inclinations of men, and the geometrical justice which prevails everywhere in the universe. He adduces the old argument of the soul's indiscerptibility; he answers the seeming objection from the stupor and decay of old age by asserting that the decay is only of the sensitive and plastic faculties of the material body. He soon came to see, however, that the problem of the immortality of the soul cannot be solved by any course of metaphysical deduction, unless it is possible to establish premises sufficiently solid to admit of extended inference. To this end he took up two lines of reasoning. In his sermons he examined the ethical and doctrinal grounds for a belief in a future life. But his greatest hope was to justify rationally a belief in witches and ghosts, and to prove empirically their existence. This he thought

would give him the desired premises. The discussion of the use which he made of these premises must be deferred to a later chapter of this essay.

Now that we have come safely through the maze of Glanvill's positive thinking, it may be worth while to attempt to see his relation to contemporary systems of thought. No one who has read the whole of Glanvill's work can doubt, I think, that his intention was to harmonize the best of the thought of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and the Platonists. It is needless to say that such an attempt was Quixotic and vain. It is true that modern philosophy owes something to each of these men, and is therefore so far a synthesis. But to combine specific doctrines, as we have seen Glanvill trying to do, could only result in heterogeneity.

For Descartes Glanvill had the greatest admiration. The "Apology for Philosophy" at the end of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* relates, he says, chiefly to the Cartesian system. But as we have seen, Glanvill regarded the Cartesian postulates as hypotheses only. His chief admiration was for the incomparable precision

and clearness of the Cartesian method, of which he says, "Pedants no more can vex it than can the howling wolves pluck Cynthia from her orb, who, regardless of their noise, securely glides through the undisturbed æther."¹ In short, Glanvill's attitude toward Descartes may be compared profitably with that of Malebranche. Both were inspired by the method, yet both reacted from the conclusions, and both passed over into theology and held to a belief in personal communication with God as the final means of attaining truth. Descartes held that the mind is quite distinct from the brain, merely occupying it as a seat. Glanvill forsakes this position when he enters the field of physiological psychology. It is here that he cries a truce with the materialists by adopting their experimental methods.

The relation of Glanvill to Bacon and Hobbes has already been made sufficiently clear, so that all that remains is to show his connection with Platonic thought. His direct debt to Cambridge Platonism other than that of More is rather in the matter of doctrinal and pastoral theology than of pure metaphysics. As a clergyman,

¹*Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 250.

however, these necessarily absorb the greater part of his active life. This is the reason for the extended account of the latitudinarians and their views, given earlier in this essay. This relation will become more clear with the following chapter. To Platonism in general Glanvill owed much. He is full of allusions, both literary and philosophical, to all the great Platonists: Plato, Plotin, Cicero, St. Augustine, Pico Mirandola, and Henry More. He has the love of intellectual adventure common to all true lovers of the academic philosophy. He has something alike of the genial urbanity and of the visionary poetry of the *Phædrus* and the *Symposium*. But apart from his belief in soul-substance there is little specifically Platonic doctrine to be found in his writings. Despite his belief in the preëxistence of the soul he nowhere makes use of the allied doctrine, most characteristic of the academic philosophy. The theory of ideas, *universalia ante rem*, does not occur to him. Perhaps, after all, the most essentially characteristic trait in Glanvill, and in the Cambridge men as he conceived them, was not Platonic so much as Socratic. It was his passion for clear, simple, and essential forms

of truth, and the wish to do away with quibbles, senseless phrases, and needless terms of art.¹ In the case of Socrates this was a reaction from the Sophists; so in Glanvill it sprang out of an opposition to sophisticated scholasticism.

In this opposition to Aristotle, as well as in the peculiar relation to Cartesianism, Glanvill may be profitably compared with John Locke. But, despite the fact that they proceeded M.A. from Oxford on the same day, it is impossible to establish any connection either personal or philosophic between them. Viewed in the large, Glanvill, because of the heterogeneity already noted, must be connected with Continental dogmatism, as well as with English scepticism.

¹ *Anti-fanatical Religion and Free-Philosophy*, p. 31.

CHAPTER V

LATITUDINARIAN THEOLOGY

FOR a layman to attempt an exhaustive analysis and criticism of Glanvill's theology would be indeed an unwarranted presumption. This, however, is not the intention of the present chapter. Our author spent his active life as a diligent and devoted clergyman; hence any adequate account of him must consider this branch of his work. But it is not important to undertake a discussion of the niceties of dogmatic theology. It will be sufficient to call attention to a few salient points, closely connected with phases of his philosophy, in which he is significant of the trend of religious thought.

In the years immediately following the restoration, the religious life of England was broken and heterogeneous. At one extreme were careless sceptics, at the other zealous, intriguing Catholics. Between these extremes, both within

the confines of the established church and in the nonconformist communions, all manner of fanaticisms and heresies had sprung up. These were the logical outcome of Protestantism, for they were all grounded upon the plea of a personal interpretation of Scripture, as against any authority. The Cambridge latitudinarians had striven to correct this by setting up a new authority, the general human reason. They sought to bring a centripetal tendency into religious thought, by insisting rather upon the agreements of creeds than upon their differences, and especially by attaching the utmost importance to practical morality. The exceedingly sympathetic account of the latitudinarian divines given by Glanvill in the *Anti-fanatick Religion* implies that he considers himself one of their number. As a matter of fact, he was so esteemed by his contemporaries ; and nearly all of his doctrines are those of the Cambridge school.

In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, as we have seen, Glanvill attempted, like Pascal, to make philosophical scepticism the bulwark of religious faith. But as he grew older he tried to supplant "the faith that lives in honest doubt,"

by positive theorizing, just as he had done in the case of philosophy. Like the Platonists he laid the foundation of this upon a very few essential articles, and reared the structure in conformity with the work of the early Christian fathers : “But contenting myself with a firm assent to the few practical Fundamentals of Faith, and having fix’d that end of the Compass, I desire to preserve my Liberty as to the rest, holding the other in such posture as may be ready to draw those lines my Judgement, informed by the Holy Oracles, the Articles of our Church, the apprehensions of wise Antiquity, and my particular Reason, shall direct me to describe !”¹

Conscious as he was of the great diversity of belief, Glanvill was led to lay for a time more emphasis upon theism than upon the doctrines of revealed Christianity. To this end, he takes a very moderate view of Scriptural revelation. On the Continent Spinoza and Le Clerc had already conceived grave doubts of the historic and scientific truth of the Pentateuch, and in 1676 Thomas Burnet was to publish his *Archæologia Philosophica*, with the same intention.

¹ *Plus Ultra*, p. 139 seq.

In 1662 Glanvill had fallen in with this view as a means toward discrediting the philosophizing of the fanatic sects. "Those that look for a system of opinions in those otherways designed writings [*i.e.* the Scriptures] do like him that should seek for a body of natural philosophy in Epictetus, his morals, or Seneca's Epistles."¹

With this may be coupled Glanvill's rather Platonic notion of prophetic inspiration, which was that with the prophets "God did much apply himself to the imagination," not to the reason, as in the case of Moses. This is to be connected with the place of the imagination in Glanvill's epistemology, as a significant attempt at rationalizing theology. These beliefs were the cause of many noisy outcries of atheism against him.² This was of course very unjust and caused him much pain. It is true that he thought of the purity and clarity of revelation as being somewhat darkened by the human agency for its transmission; but his final conclusion was, "The wiser, freer, better, and more reasonable any man is, the greater still is his

¹ *Lux Orientalis*, p. 39 *seq.*, and cf. p. 88.

² *Plus Ultra*, Preface.

reverence of the Holy Records.”¹ But this, reverential as it is, really begs the question. From this it is not very far to the religious scepticism of the eighteenth century.

Like all the latitudinarians, Glanvill had much to say of the use of reason to religion. Nor was the conception confined to the Cambridge school. It had been touched by Hobbes, by Herbert of Cherbury, the first English Deist, by Cowley, and by Whitlock. So common, indeed, was the subject that even Suckling had written a rather superficial *Account of Religion by Reason*. But in the work of the Platonists and in that of Wilkins, Boyle, and Glanvill, the problem took a more definite form. They tried to formulate a reasonable system of natural religion, and then to make this accord with revealed Christianity.

In the *Λογου Θρησκεία*, afterward reprinted as *The Agreement of Reason and Religion*, Glanvill lays the foundation of his structure. The argument is taken and elaborated from More’s discussion of the subject, to which reference has already been made, but our worthy introduces some definitions and distinctions which will

¹ *Plus Ultra*, p. 141 seq. Cf. *Philosophia Pia*, p. 34 seq.

repay consideration. He first defines his terms, religion and reason. Religion is the sum of the duties we owe to God. We are directed in the performance by the knowledge of two sorts of principles, fundamental and accessory. The fundamentals are a belief in God (theism), in His providence, and in moral good and evil. The accessory principles are those practical concerns which assist us to daily virtue. Reason, on the other hand, is natural truth, determined by the nature of our faculties and senses. Now reason befriends religion by giving rational ground for a belief in the essential principles, and by adducing historic testimony in confirmation thereof. He then deduces a set of corollaries, which agree with Whichcote, Culverwell, and More, but which come rather strangely from the erstwhile sceptic of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*:—

- (1) Reason is certain and infallible.
- (2) Reason is the word of God.
- (3) The belief of our reason is an exercise of faith, and faith is an act of our reason.
- (4) No principle of reason contradicts any essential article of faith.

(5) When reason contradicts, seemingly, any article of faith, do not deny reason, but reason it out.

(6) Make sure of the authority of what seems to contradict reason.

(7) What God has revealed, He has revealed clearly.

(8) A man may misunderstand Scripture and yet not err in faith.

(9) In searching the sense of Scripture use reason as another Scripture.

(10) The essentials of religion are so plainly revealed that no man can fail to understand who has not some bias of will or affections.¹

These corollaries might have come of course from almost any reasonable and broad-minded clergyman of the seventeenth century ; but in the third and fifth, seeds of Deism seem to lurk. In the *Philosophia Pia* Glanvill explains at length how the philosophical use of the reason assists Religion against her four chief enemies, "the humour of disputing," Sadducism, Enthusiasm, and Superstition. His discussion of the first three has been already indicated

¹ *The Agreement of Reason and Religion*, p. 20 seq.

in connection with his philosophy. His treatment of the fourth is interesting, important, and significant. Superstition is of two kinds : it consists either in valuing things of no worth, or in fearing things of no hurt. Philosophy and reason correct the first by producing a sane and judicial temper of mind ; and they correct the second by showing the organic causes of many apparently supernatural phenomena, such as comets, eclipses, and thunderstorms : superstition of any sort, whether the overvaluing of trifling matters of observance and dogma, or the overtimorous fear of the Deity, is more dangerous to true religion than downright atheism.¹

The chief purpose of *Philosophia Pia*, however, was to supplement the *Agreement of Reason and Religion*, by pointing out the possibility of harmonizing science and religion ; and so, as in the *Plus Ultra*, to defend the work of the Royal Society. In Glanvill's time the warfare between science and religion had been on for some two hundred years. So far the result

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 13 seq. Cf. *Sermons, Discourses, and Remains*, p. 196. Glanvill's discussion of superstition bears a close resemblance both verbal and ideal to two rather dissimilar authors. Cf. Bacon, *Of Superstition (Essays)*, and John Smith, *Of Atheism (in Discourses)*.

had been equivocal. Galileo, Bruno, and other leaders of the scientific movement had laid down their lives, but their cause was slowly gaining ground. The Copernican theory of the universe had been the death-blow to the mediæval, transcendental notion of a Deity dwelling apart from the universe. If space were infinite, then the infinite God must needs be immanent therein, else there would be two infinities. In the seventeenth century many minds had failed to discriminate between this notion of immanency, and atheistically inclined pantheism. Hence, as we have seen, the cry of atheism was loudly raised against Glanvill, the Royal Society, and science in general. Every discovery in any way contradicting received opinions and doctrines, was disbelieved and its author called unsavory names. Glanvill combats this point of view with great skill. He avoids discussing the implication of specific doctrines, and gives his whole energy to a practical consideration of the effect of scientific study in general.

At the outset he asserts that fear and dislike of science "are reliques of that barbarism that made magick of mathematics, and heresie of

Greek and Hebrew.”¹ He then proposes four heads : —

- (1) That God is to be praised for His works.
- (2) That His works are to be studied by those who would praise Him for them.
- (3) That the study of nature and God’s works is very serviceable to religion.
- (4) That the ministers and professors of religion ought not to discourage but to promote the knowledge of nature and the works of its author.

The argument for the first two Glanvill grounds upon Scriptural authority, thus disarming opposition. He then proceeds to write of the third and fourth heads in a way curiously blended, as in More, of poetic nature-love and scientific knowledge. “The knowledge of God’s works promotes the end of religion ; and it disposeth us to it by keeping the soul under a continual sense of God. He that converseth with his works finds in all things the clear stamp of infinite Benignity and Wisdom ; he perceives Divine Art in all the Turnings and Varie-

¹ *Philosophia Pia, as the Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion*, in *Essays*, p. 1.

ties of Nature and Divine Goodness in that. He observes God in the colour of every Flower, in every fibre of a Plant, in every particle of an Insect, in every drop of Dew.”¹ This rather Wordsworthian attitude toward nature was common in the work of Glanvill, as it was in that of the Platonists, especially in John Smith, More, and Vaughn. But the reader is already aware from what has been said of the *Plus Ultra*, that in the case of Glanvill it was associated with a rather extensive range of scientific information. But it was this growing scientific information of the seventeenth century which led to the dogmatic deism and materialism of the eighteenth. Newton’s theory of universal gravitation seemed to Voltaire and many others to afford a satisfactory materialistic explanation of the universe. How then, it may be asked, did Glanvill, living and thinking in the Newtonian atmosphere, although not aware of his greatest discoveries, contrive to keep a lively faith in the unseen? The answer is twofold. In the first place he was helped, Pascal-like, by his very scepticism. He

¹ *Philosophia Pia*, as the *Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion*, in *Essays*, p. 5.

never lost consciousness of the great mystery of things, of the elusiveness of subjective and the depth and complexity of objective phenomena. In religion, as in art and life, this vague, indefinable background of feeling is a matter of the utmost moment. In the second place he was helped by the theological interpretation which he put upon the machinery of nature.

Teleology, or the theistic argument from design, is an ancient thing in religious thought, but it has flourished most since the scientific advances of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Even Bacon, who had rather contemptuously put religion apart from philosophy, made teleology the ground of his opposition to atheism.¹ In England throughout the seventeenth century, it was exploited by writers of much variety of opinion. It occurs commonly in the writings of the Platonists. On the other hand, the avowed Deists made it the ground of their positive beliefs.² But the doctrine came to its final form, before Paley, in the writings of a group of theological thinkers, all connected

¹ *Essays*, "Of Atheisme."

² Herbert of Cherbury, *De. Rel. Gent.*, XIII.

with the Royal Society, — Ray, Boyle, Wilkins, and Glanvill.¹ The form of the argument in all these writers may be sufficiently indicated in a passage from the last : —

“For the works of God are not like the compositions of Fancy or the Tricks of Juglers [*sic*], that will not bear a clear light, or strict scrutiny ; but their exactness receives advantage from the severest inspection ; and he admires most that knows most ; since the insides and remotest recesses of things have the clearest stamps of inimitable Wisdom on them, and the Artifice is more in the Wheel-work, than in the Case. For if we look upon any of the Works of Nature through a Magnifying Glass, that makes deep discoveries, we find still more Beauty, and more Uniformity of contrivance ; whereas if we survey the most curious piece of humane ingenuity by that Glass, it will discover to us numerous Flaws, Deformities, and Imperfections in our most elegant Mechanicks. . . . Thus though the obvious firmament, and the motions of the Sun and

¹ See Ray, *Wisdom of God in the Creation* ; Boyle, “Reason and Religion,” *Works*, Vol. V. ; Wilkins, *The Principles and Duties of Natural Religion*.

Stars, the ordinary vicissitudes of Seasons, and productions of things, the visible beauty of the great World, and the appearing variety and fitness of those parts that make up the little one in man, could scarce secure Galen from the danger of being an Atheist: Yet when he pried further by Anatomical Enquiries, and saw the wonderful diversity, aptness, and order of the minutest Strings, Pipes, and Passages that are in the inward Fabrick; He could not abstain from the devoutness of an Anthem of acknowledgment.”¹

The watch simile implied in the earlier portion of this passage will of course, at once carry the mind of the reader to the opening chapter of Paley’s *Evidences*. This alone is not enough to prove that the most famous of the arguments from design was at all influenced by our author; for the same simile occurs in the passage already cited from Herbert of Cherbury, and therefore may have been common property in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There is, however, a general

¹ *The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion*, p. 6 seq. Cf. *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 42 seq., and *Against Confidence in Philosophy*, p. 10 seq.

similarity of treatment which makes the supposition that Paley knew Glanvill exceedingly probable. It must be admitted that in both there is the same complacency and temperamental optimism which eventually brought discredit upon all teleology. It is suggestive, however, to note that the most recent thought seems inclined to swing back toward Glanvill's position. Kant's discrimination of the teleological judgment from the faculty of theoretical reason, and his assignment of practical validity to the former, at least in the sphere of organic life, has helped this reaction. Glanvill, Ray, Wilkins, and even Paley had not attempted to show design in the constitution of inorganic matter, but had confined the argument wholly to anatomy and physiology. And now evolutionists have come forward, even from the ranks of pure science, to maintain that Darwin and Huxley have not disproved design in this field. They assert, even as Glanvill did, that the extension of the chain of second causes in no wise minimizes the original design, but simply makes the execution less labored.¹

¹ *E.g.* see Le Conte, *Evolution*, p. 339 *seq.*, and cf. *Against Confidence in Philosophy*, p. 10.

In the field of pastoral theology and homiletics, Glanvill's practice was quite in harmony with his theory, in the *Essay Concerning Preaching*. His sermons are, as he said sermons should be, "plain, practical, methodical, and affectionate." The material for them is drawn in about equal parts from the Scriptures, from his own philosophy, and from the actual observations of the passions and humors of men. The nature of the first two is obvious from the preceding discussion; of the third an instance may be given. In the collection of *Sermons, Discourses, and Remains*, the first sermon, "The Way of Happiness," is a summary of Glanvill's religious views as opposed to those of the fanatics of his time. Throughout this discourse the argument is grounded upon direct observation rather than upon the abstract doctrinal theorizing which was the vice of his century. Thus, for example, he makes some concessions to the doctrine of original sin, but adds: "There are kinds of vices which our natures almost universally rise against; . . . And all men, except Monsters in Humane form, are disposed to some virtues, such as Love to Children, and Kindness to Friends and Benefactors. All

this I must confess and say, because Experience constrains me; and I do not know why Systematic Notions should sway more than that.”¹ Similarly he proposes a rational explanation of the Puritan doctrine of “Christian perfection,” through the final solidification of habit.² Equally significant, as a proof of Glanvill’s power of analyzing the results of observation, is his theory that in some men the most potent cause of religion is a certain inbred curiosity, and a desire to be wiser than their neighbors.³ In short, these sermons are of the school of the Platonists, and of Tillotson, Barrow, and South. They differ from the three last named only in a less eloquent rhetoric, and in a little more philosophical information and subtlety.

It would be perfectly possible by special pleading to prove Glanvill either an implicit Deist or a mystic. If we fix our attention only on the rational side of his work, we must connect him with the general movement which resulted variously in the following century in English Deism, German Rationalism, and French Scepticism. On the other hand, if we think chiefly of that strain in his work seen

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 7. ² *Ibid.*, p. 29. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 35.

most clearly in the *Lux Orientalis*, he comes to seem one of those seers of mystical Eastern light, who arise periodically to counteract the logical, Roman element in Christian theology. But to present either of these views exclusively would be to distort the truth and abdicate all pretension to the historic and biographic sense. The truth is that Glanvill was simply an unusually broad-minded and far-sighted churchman, who took the best means at hand to combat the nearest evils. We cannot do better, in conclusion, than to let him state his own case:—

“The certain way to be esteemed an Atheist by fierce and ignorant Devotos is to study to lay the foundations of Religion sure, and to be able to speak groundedly and to purpose against the desperate cause of the black conspirators against Heaven. This, I confess, hath been one of the chief Employments of my time and thoughts; and on this account I reckon I must be content in my share in the abuse, when greater, and better, and deeper men have been pelted with this dirt while they have been labouring in the Trenches and endeavouring to secure the Foundations of the Holy Fabrick.”¹

¹ *Plus Ultra*, p. 137 seq.

“The philosophers were the Priests among the Ægyptians, and several other Nations in Ancient Times ; and there was never more need that the Priests should be Philosophers than in ours ; For we are liable every day to be called out to make good our Foundations against the Atheist, the Sadducee, and Enthusiast ; And 'tis the Knowledge of God in his Works, that must furnish us with some of the most proper Weapons of Defence. Hard names and damning Sentences ; the Arrows of bitter words and raging passions, will not defeat those Sons of Anak, these are not fit weapons for our Warfare. No, they must be met by a Reason instructed in the knowledge of Things, and sought in their own Quarters, and their arms must be turned upon themselves ; This may be done, and the advantage is all ours. We have Steel and Brass for our Defence, and they have little else than Twigs and Bull-rushes for the Assault ; we have Light and Firm Ground, and they are lost in Smoak and Mists ; They tread among Bogs and dangerous Fens, and reel near the Rocks and Steeps. And shall we despise our Advantage, and forsake them ? Shall we relinquish our Ground and our Light, and muffle our-

selves up in Darkness? Shall we give our Enemies the Weapons and all the odds, and so endeavour to insure their Triumphs over us? This is sottishly to betray Religion and ourselves.”¹

¹ *The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion*, p. 42.

CHAPTER VI

GHOST STORIES AND WITCHCRAFT

It is the strange fortune of some men to be immortalized by their follies rather than by their virtues. So it has been in the case of Joseph Glanvill. He is scarce remembered for his literary style, his philosophical acumen, or his practical piety, but his ardent advocacy of a dying superstition has kept his fame still fresh in the annals of thought. In the sceptical eighteenth century this fame was not enviable;¹ but now at the end of the nineteenth, the Society for Psychical Research has a little Renaissance of mysticism, and claims our worthy as one of its forebears.² In the meantime by virtue of this superstition he had been a well-known character to curious antiquarians and collectors. The *Saducismus* was the most

¹ See especially Hutchinson, *An Historical Essay of Witchcraft* (1718), *passim*.

² Gurney and Myers, *Phantasms of the Living*, Vol. I., *passim*, and Lang, *Cock Lane and Common Sense*, pp. 84-126.

popular of his works, among his contemporaries, and the most frequently mentioned by later scholars.

To one who has first known Glanvill in the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, the *Plus Ultra*, and the *Essays*, the *Saducismus* will cause a shock of surprise. How is a belief in witches and ghosts—for to Glanvill these were kindred phenomena—to be reconciled to his careful scepticism, and to his sympathy with the scientific pursuits of the Royal Society? How can a man who has discoursed so reasonably of the powerful effects of the imagination in old women,¹ and of the credulity which ascribes a supernatural origin to the phenomena of nature,² fail to see the possibility of similar rational explanations in the case of witchcraft? To these questions it is possible to oppose certain considerations which make this peculiar adumbration of his faculties less dark and unintelligible. In all ages the subtlest philosophical minds have had a keen interest in “occult” or unexplained phenomena. Socrates had his dæmon, and modern psychology has its mediums. As we have already seen, despite his Pyrrhonism,

¹ *Essays*, IV., p. 19.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15 seq.

Glanvill had this type of restless, adventurous intellect, eager to dwell in haunted places, and to embrace fair immaterial forms. His imagination, having pried into natural phenomena beyond the point reached by most men of his time, and yet having found no bottom, was the more ready to believe, hypothetically at least, in deeper things beyond. That the idealizing, objectifying mind is prone to supernaturalism has been seen in a multitude of instances, — Plato, Coleridge, and Shelley, to mention no more. But these general apologetic considerations fade into insignificance when we place Glanvill in his proper historical setting.

In the masterly first chapter of his *Rise of Rationalism in Europe*, Mr. Lecky has given a conspectus of the history of witchcraft and kindred superstitions, which is almost precisely what we need to give to Glanvill his proper perspective.¹ The purpose of that chapter is to show that a belief in the supernatural does not die out because of argument or proof, but

¹ Besides Lecky, the following have been especially helpful in studying the subject: Ennemoser, *History of Magic*, tr. Howitt; Michelet, *La Sorcière*; Regnault, *La Sorcellerie, ses Rapports avec les Sciences biologiques*.

only through the rise of rationalism, through the growth and spread of the sentiment that the unusual, the abnormal, and self-styled occult are to be distrusted. In the England of Glanvill's day this temper was only just beginning to appear. In France, despite the pleading of Bodin, the scepticism toward witches of Wier and Montaigne, together with the rapid spread of Cartesian rationalism, and of the ideas of *les libertins* and *les rieurs*, had checked the superstition altogether. But in Germany and England the case was very different. Since the days of those prodigious enchanters, Merlin, Michael Scot, and Thomas of Erceldoune, the British Isles had been the natural home of witch, warlock, and magician. Ireland had, and still has, her troops of little people, Wales lay nearest to the confines of Elf-land, but Scotland and England were the favored residence of —

“Auld Hornie, Satan, Nick, or Clootie,”

and of all his following of hags.

This sad history of the witch persecution is one of the most familiar pages in the annals of criminal law. The use of Scripture texts to prove the existence of the sin of witchcraft and

its enormity, caused the superstition to become an integral part of the body of orthodox Christian doctrine, and, like all superstitions considered orthodox, it died hard. The first systematic doubt of witchcraft came in 1584 with the publication of Reginald Scot's *Discovery of Witchcraft*. This was a sensible and fearless book, pushing much further the attack begun by Wier, in his *De Præstigiis Dæmonum* (1564) ; but it produced little immediate effect. It was answered in 1591 by Holland with *A Treatise Against Witchcraft*. Indeed, in the age of Elizabeth, witchcraft and apparitions were universally acknowledged as fact. The Witches in *Macbeth* or the Ghost in *Hamlet* were to playwright and audience as real persons of the drama as Jack Falstaff or Mistress Quickly. Even Bacon, despite his scientific ideals, was a firm believer in the truth of witchcraft and the efficacy of persecution therefor. In the first half of the seventeenth century the publications in defence of a belief in such supernatural occurrences were almost innumerable.¹

¹ Burr, "The Literature of Witchcraft," in *Papers of the American Historical Association*, Vol. IV., Part 2, pp. 37-66.

King James' well-known and infamous tract on *Demonology* (1597) and George Gifford's *Dialogue Concerning Witches and Witchcraft* are the classic examples. Sir Thomas Browne, though he was a curious physician and could write a *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*, never thought of doubting the reality of occult occurrences.¹ In exposing other vulgar errors and superstitions he thinks he is doing God service, for the most prolific source of error is the machination of the devil. In the famous Suffolk trials, before Sir Matthew Hale, he even gave witness against some poor bodies accused of nefarious transactions with the devil.² In short, Browne is significant for the trait which Mr. Pater noted as "that impressibility toward what we might call the thaumaturgic elements in nature which has often made men dupes, and which is certainly an element in the somewhat

¹ *Religio Medici*, Sect. 30.

² See the rare tract, *A Trial of Witches—Taken by a Person attending the Court* (1664): "Dr. Browne of Norwich, a person of great knowledge," said "he conceived that these swooning fits were natural and nothing else but what they call the mother, but only heightened to a great excess by the subtlety of the Devil coöperating with the malice of those which we term witches, at whose instance he doth these villanies." Page 41 *seq.*

atrabilious mental complexion of that age in England.”¹

The “atrabilious mental complexion” is, perhaps, nowhere better exhibited than in the strange and wonderful treatise by John Gaule, fantastically entitled *Πῶς Μαντρία, The Magastromancer or the Magicall-Astrological Diviner Posed and Puzzled* (1652). Gaule clearly sets out with the intention of disproving witches and magic; but he soon becomes so bemuddled with superstitions and so ensnarled in the intricacies of his own style that he never gets anywhere. He ends, apparently, in all the credulity of his age.

Furthermore, the rise of Puritanism under the Commonwealth lent itself very readily to the belief of the supernatural, and materially increased the persecution. There was a natural affinity between such a belief and the idealistic yet gloomily dualistic preaching of the Presbyterians. Baxter’s *Certainty of the World of Spirits* is the great work of this school. In the dark and dangerous forests of America the animistic instinct, the original source of the superstition, operated so powerfully in Puritan minds that

¹ *Appreciations*, p. 142.

Cotton Mather's *Wonders of the Invisible World* and the Salem persecution surpassed in credulity and malignity anything the mother country could show. Majestic and eloquent though he was, the Satan of *Paradise Lost* was probably as real a person to Milton as the more grotesque devil was to Luther.

Almost the only distinguished man of his time who avowedly disbelieved in the devil and his doings with old women was Hobbes.¹ But he was suspected of atheism as well, so that his blustering opposition, like the wind in the fable, only made the orthodox person hug the cloak of superstition more closely about him. Besides, it was currently reported that Mr. Hobbes was afraid in the dark. That Hobbes had a considerable following among courtiers and men about town is true, but they were chiefly of the light-minded class that Glanvill later called "droll fiddlers to the atheist."

The bearing of all this upon Glanvill is obvious. The belief in witch and ghost being so plainly involved in religion and in piety, and the opposite so characteristic of, and apparently

¹ See *Of Human Nature*, Ch. III.

conducive to, atheism, it would have been indeed a marvel had he disbelieved. From the point of view of theology his belief in demonology was friendly to his argument from design. If God made the world, and is Himself all good, how explain evil? Either it is merely relative, a dark phase of the good, or it is brought about by some evil agency quite external to the Deity, that is, Satan and his people.

Furthermore, there is one final consideration which serves to explain both the ground and the form of Glanvill's credulity. This is seen in his friendship with Van Helmont and More, who were deeply read in, and influenced by, the cabbalistic philosophy.¹ This system on its esoteric side was adopted by the mystical Rosicrucian fraternity, and so had a great influence

¹ Franck, *La Kabbale, ou la Philosophie Religieuse des Hébreux*; Plancy, *Dictionnaire Infernale*, art. "Cabale," p. 114 seq.; *Voyages Imaginaires* (Amsterdam, 1788); *Troisième Classe, Romans Cabalistiques*, Vols. XXXIII.-XXXVI. *Le Comte de Gabalis*, Vol. XXXIV., is the most succinct account of the hierarchy of spirits, and Henry More, *Conjectura Cabbalistica, or a Conjectural Essay of Interpreting the mind of Moses according to the Three-fold Cabbala*, viz., *Literal, Philosophical, Mystical, or Divinely Moral* (1653). Reprinted in *Several Philosophical Writings* (1712).

through many centuries ; but it flourished most in the seventeenth. Historically the system has always had a close affinity with the more imaginative types of Platonism. Pico Mirandola, as we have seen, referred the origin of it to Moses, and made it the source of the academic philosophy through the intervention of Pythagoras. Planey and Franck trace it from early Hebrew times through the rabbinical writers to the Alexandrine neo-Platonism of the third century ; thence down through the Renaissance, in Faustus, Paracelsus, Cornelius Agrippa, and Pico himself, to Swedenborg ; and, Franck adds, Hegel. The characteristic belief of the cultus is in the soul as a substance, and in a hierarchy of spirits dwelling throughout the universe. In the seventeenth century the chief English exponents of these beliefs were Robert Fludd, the two Vaughns, More, and Van Helmont. With the last two Glanvill was on terms of close intimacy. It will be remembered that both More and Glanvill quote cabbalistic writers as freely and trustingly as they quote Plato, Bacon, or Descartes. In Paracelsus and Agrippa there was the same strange union of scepticism, rationalism, cosmic speculation, and

credulity as in Glanvill. It must not be supposed that the last named believed in demons and ghosts because the cabbalists believed in gnomes, sylphs, sprites, and salamanders; in fact none of the English cabbalists seems to have held to this scheme; but the point is that minds at home in this sort of literature and thinking came to have a standard of probability which would not compel them to boggle or hesitate at the most incredible relation concerning witches and apparitions.

In the matter of witchcraft, Glanvill and More always hunted in couples. In nothing else did the powerful, subtile, but wayward mind of More exert such an influence over the thoughts of the younger man. Samuel Parker seems to have disbelieved in witches and ghosts and to have tried to convert Glanvill to his thinking.¹ But with that exception, all our author's friends were with him in his attacks upon "Sadducism." The object of all was to foster a belief in the supernatural, lest, as More writes, "drunken people sing in greater security that mad catch, —

"‘Hey, ho; the Devil is dead.’"²

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 80 (1681 ed.). ² *Ibid.*, p. 11 (1681).

Glanvill's actual investigation of haunted houses, and of persons accused of witchcraft, seems to have begun in 1661. In March of that year, Mr. John Mompesson, of Tedworth, in the County of Wilts, incurred the displeasure of an idle, wandering drummer, whom he had punished as a vagrant. But the gentleman soon had cause to rue his action. The drummer, one John Drury, of Uscut, Wilts,¹ had recourse for revenge to Satan, his master. For two years thereafter Mr. Mompesson's household was sorely troubled by invisible drummings, explosions, scrapings, scratchings, rappings, and all manner of nocturnal noises. These things became known, and made a great stir in that part of England. Glanvill was at that time living in Frome Selwood, not far away. Sometime in the winter of 1662-1663 he went to visit Mr. Mompesson to investigate. By this time the evil spirits had learned more vexatious tricks. "On Christmas Eve, a little before day, one of the little Boys, arising out of his Bed, was hit on a sore place upon his Heel, with the Latch of the Door; the Pin that it

¹ *Mercurius Publicus*, April 16-23, 1663, cited in *Pepys' Diary* (ed. Bright), Vol. III., p. 143, note.

was fastened with was so small that it was a difficult matter to pick it out. The night after Christmas Day, it threw the Old Gentlewoman's cloaths about the Room, and hid her Bible in the Ashes. In such silly tricks it was frequent."¹

"The Night after it came panting like a Dog out of breath, upon which one took a Bed-staff to knock, which was caught out of her hand and thrown away, and company coming up, the room was presently filled with a bloomy, noisome smell, and was very hot, though without fire, in a very sharp and severe winter. It continued in the bed, panting and scratching an hour and a half, and then went into the next chamber, where it knocked a little and seemed to rattle a Chain; and this it did for two or three nights together."² The expectations which these things aroused in Glanvill's breast were somewhat disappointed in the event. Before he arrived at Tedworth, the ruder mani-

¹ "The Demon of Tedworth," in *The Collections of Relations* affixed to *Saducismus*, pp. 95, 96 (1681 ed.).

This relation furnished the plot of Addison's comedy, *The Drummer*, and that in turn of Destouches' *Le Tambour Nocturne*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

festations had ceased. His visit, however, was not wholly vain. About eight o'clock in the evening, word came down that there was a spirit in the children's department. Glanvill ascended to a chamber where "there were two little modest Girls in the Bed, between Seven and Eleven years old, as I gues't." Scratching was heard under the bolster. Glanvill thrust his hand to where it seemed to be, and it ceased altogether; he drew his hand back, and it began again; he scratched seven times upon the sheet, and the thing answered with seven, five, and the answer was five. All this time the little modest girls had their hands above the coverlet. There was a strange movement in a bag hanging on the wall; our worthy manfully seized it, and found it empty. In the night he was awakened by a violent knocking; he called out, "In the Name of God who is it; and what would you have?" A voice replied, "Nothing with you," and the knocking stopped. In the morning, he found his horse in the stable covered with sweat as if from a night of hard riding; and within a mile the beast went lame.

These personal observations seem to have

finally confirmed Glanvill in his belief in the supernatural. He published an account of these happenings shortly after, and throughout the rest of his life he devoted a considerable portion of his time to collecting proof of such events. Both Mr. Mompesson and Glanvill were accused, by some people of credulity, and even of imposture ; but the latter they strenuously denied. The king sent two gentlemen to Mr. Mompesson's house, and while they were there nothing happened. This caused the Sadducees to exult, but to exult as groundlessly, Glanvill replied, as that Spaniard reasoned who said "that there was no Sun in England, because he had been six Weeks here and never saw it." The drummer was eventually tried for witchcraft, and sentenced to transportation. But he stirred up a storm at sea, the sailors had to put back to port, and so he escaped.

In 1665, as we have seen, Glanvill became associated with the Ragley Society for Psychical Research. Here he could be encouraged by Lady Conway, aided and advised by More and Van Helmont, and initiated into new occult paths by Valentine Greatorex, who was not only a thaumaturgic healer, but a famous virtuoso and ama-

teur of witches and apparitions.¹ The following year appeared the *Philosophical Considerations in Defense of Witchcraft*, which Mr. Lecky has called the ablest book ever written in defence of that belief ; this was so popular in its time, that soon "there was not a copy . . . to be had in all London and Cambridge."²

Whether it be from the remoteness of the subject to our thoughts, from the peculiar character of the evidence involved, or from some subtle, adumbrating, unsettling cause innate in the idea of the supernatural, Glanvill, in writing of witches, is not quite himself. That his reasoning should not be clear and convincing as in his other work is doubtless the effect of the first two causes. But there is likewise a strange dulness of his literary sense and faculty, which it seems to me is best referred to the last. In the *Saducismus* there are occasional lapses from good taste through grossness of the imagination which are not paralleled elsewhere in his writings. Here, too, there is much less charm of

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 90 seq. (1681 ed.) ; *Royal Society Transactions*, Vol. III., p. 11 (1732) ; *Worthington's Diary*, Vol. III., pp. 215-217.

² *Ibid.*, Publisher to the Reader (1726 ed.).

style, less precision and care of form, than in his other treatises. This might be accounted for in part by the controversial character of the subject ; but when all is said, there is still an unexplained residuum of variation from the normal Glanvill, — the inherent bias of the witchcraft epidemic. Nevertheless the course of argument is clever, subtile, and all but convincing. In the whole matter of the supernatural Glanvill is inclined to attach more weight to evidence than to discussion. “ Briefly, then, matters of fact well-proved ought not to be denied because we cannot conceive how they can be performed. Nor is it a reasonable method of inference, first to presume the thing impossible, and thence to conclude that the fact cannot be proved. On the contrary we should judge of the action by the evidence, and not of the evidence by the measures of our fancies about the action.”¹ But the method of discrediting testimony because of the inherent improbability of the fact alleged was precisely the method followed by the rationalizing Sadducees of Glanvill’s time. He therefore inverts what seems to him the natural order of inference,

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 12 (1681).

and in the *Saducismus* adduces metaphysical considerations to prove the possibility of witches and spirits, before he brings forward the testimony to their real existence.

The method he employs in the first part is that of proposing all possible objections to a belief in the supernatural and answering each one by itself. It may be worth while to present an abstract of these, as they give a very complete presentation of both points of view, in the seventeenth century.

(1) *The notion of a spirit is impossible and contradictory, and consequently so is that of witches.*¹

Then, replies Glanvill, convincingly to himself, but really begging the question, so are our ideas of God and of our own souls absurd. Or if there be no real evil spirits, why may there not be beings in the air, like our souls? For, as the cabbalists assert, every part of nature has some form of life in and upon it.

(2) *Most of the actions related of witches are absurd and trivial, such as flying out of windows, or being transformed into a cat.*²

The more unlikely such accounts are, the less likely are they to be fiction which aims to

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

imitate truth. Furthermore, the witches are helped by familiar spirits whose actions and motives we cannot possibly comprehend. Finally, the actions cited above are possible and probable if we accept the philosophical doctrine of the separability of soul and body.

(3) *'Tis very improbable that the devil who is a wise and mighty spirit should be at the back of a poor hag, and have so little to do as to attend the errands and impotent lusts of a silly old woman.*¹

'Tis more strange that the whole world should be deceived in matters of fact, than that the devil being wicked should also be unwise. Perhaps he is assisted by the spirits of men who led evil lives.

(4) *A belief in witches is a reproach to Providence, since they practise most upon children who most need the divine care.*²

Providence is unfathomable; it has not secured children against other evils; Calvinists, at any rate, should be the last to offer this objection. Perhaps the power of the witches can only affect frail and tender bodies: *Nescio quis teneros oculus.*

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

(5) *Why do not the evil spirits continually vex and harass us?*¹

The customs of the demon world are unknown to us; but we may fairly assume that in their plots against us, the spirits must take time and be "sly and cautelous." Perhaps they can only hurt us at the command of the sorceress, for by thus encouraging her in malice, Satan makes her ultimate damnation more certain.

(6) *Cannot all the phenomena of witchcraft be ascribed to melancholy and imagination?*²

There are too many well-attested physical facts. Pins have actually been found in a bewitched person's body. To deny this is to discredit all human testimony.

(7) *The accused persons are usually crazy or imaginative old women, and the victims children or very weak people.*³

Nothing can be concluded from this, save that the ways of darkness are unknown to us; perhaps this is an artifice or ambushade, to give stronger people a disrespect for supernatural power and a consequent feeling of security. Moreover a strong imagination is

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 25. ² *Ibid.*, p. 27. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

essential to such performances. Glanvill illustrates this by a passage interesting as showing his recognition of the mysterious power of personality, of which so much has been written by latter-day spiritualists. "And I am very apt to believe that there are as real communications and intercourses between our Spirits, as there are between material Agents; which secret influences, though they are unknown in their nature and ways of acting, yet they are sufficiently felt in their effects: for experience attests, that some by the very majesty and greatness of their Spirits, discovered by nothing but a certain noble air that accompanies them, will bear down others less great and generous, and make them sneak before them; and some by I know not what stupefying vertue, will tie up the tongue and confine the spirits of those who are otherwise brisk and voluble. Which thing supposed, the influences of a Spirit possess'd of an active, and enormous imagination, may be malign and fatal, where they cannot be resisted."¹ From this to modern theories of hypnotism and secondary personality is not a long step.

¹ *Saducismus*, pp. 30, 31.

(8) *The number of known impostures discredits all such relations.*¹

It is not fair to infer that because some men are cheats none are honest. One true case is tenable against a thousand false.

(9) *Why should the devil make such solemn compacts? Such debauched persons are already sealed his.*²

The ways of Satan are unknown to us. Furthermore "The Devil" is but a name for a body politic, the members whereof may wish to own slaves.

(10) *Why do the evil spirits practise upon so few?*³

Because most of us are protected by our good angels. Besides, it may be no easy matter for the bad genii to practise upon mankind at large, since the subtlety and tenuity of their bodies must make the necessary compression and application very painful.

(11) *If there is intercourse with the familiar evil spirits, why is there none with good spirits?*⁴

There is. Socrates had his dæmon, and others, even in our own days, says Glanvill,

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

have had such intercourse ; but it is less necessary now, for we have Moses and the prophets.

(12) *Belief in witchcraft is an enemy to faith, since it affords a means of explaining miracles.*¹

The character of the great worker of miracles is such as to exclude all possibility of a league with the powers of darkness. The infinite goodness which rules the world would not have given over man to such deception.²

Glanvill then proceeds to the specific refutation of Reginald Scot and Episcopus ; which need not be given, inasmuch as the argument is all implied in the preceding discussion. Then, after a long account of the miraculous doings of the Greatorex, he concludes the first part with a restatement of his first position ; Sadducism is but a stepping stone to atheism, and must be refuted if religion is to stand.

In the light of the historical introduction to this chapter the above abstract needs little comment. Together with the line of reasoning common to the spiritualists and spiritists of

¹ *Saducismus*, p. 51.

² Note that here Glanvill falls into the same *circulus probando* which he criticised in Descartes' theistical argument.

all times, it shows its affiliation, alike with Protestant theology, and cabbalistic mysticism. It should also have made clear the points both of contact and of opposition between the *Saducismus* and the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*; and it should have shown that the discrepancies are best explained by emphasizing the agreements and insisting upon the historical considerations above mentioned.

The first opponent to appear against Glanvill was John Wagstaffe.¹ He was a poor Oxford scholar, a deformed and ill-natured person.² In 1669 he published *The Question of Witchcraft debated, Or a Discourse against their opinion that affirm witches*. Wagstaffe, however, was not a writer of great parts; he died shortly after; and the attack amounted to

¹ *Athenæ Oxoniensis*, Vol. III., Col. 1113.

² John Wagstaffe was a kinsman of William Wagstaffe, who satirized witchcraft in the following century. See his "Story of St. A-n's Ghost." A witch being in the neighborhood, "the pigs grunted and the screech owls hooted, more than usual, a horse was found dead one morning with hay in his mouth, and a large over-grown pike was caught in a fish-pond thereabouts with a silver tobacco box in his belly, several women were brought to bed of two children, and some miscarried, and old folks died very frequently." *Miscellaneous Works of William Wagstaffe*, p. 63. London, 1726.

little. It seems, however, to have moved Dr. Meric Causabon to write in defence of Glanvill and his beliefs in the second part of his *Of Credulity and Incredulity* (1670).¹

In the meantime, Glanvill had twice reprinted his treatise together with a second part consisting of relations. In the Introduction to this part he makes seven concessions:—

(1) Many learned men do not believe in witches;

(2) And some of these are not hostile to religion.

(3) The credulity of the people makes them believe in some things which are manifestly impossible.

(4) Melancholy and imagination account for many otherwise unexplainable phenomena.

(5) Certain natural diseases have strange symptoms and wonderful effects.

(6) Many witch-finders have burned innocent persons.

(7) The transactions of witches with evil spirits are very strange and cannot be explained.²

¹ The first part (1668) was "Of things natural and civil," the second, "Of things divine and spiritual."

² *Ibid.*, p. 7, Part 2. This Introduction contains a refer-

The collection of relations is the most frequently quoted part of Glanvill's writing. The account of the drummer, already given, should be a sufficient specimen. The stories are of the usual type, rappings, levitations, the spiritual whistle, miraculous cures, all the standard phenomena of witchcraft, and a few apparitions. With the exception of the dæmon of Tedworth, Glanvill saw none of the manifestations in person. He has no real measure of the value of testimony, and for a man who had written earlier of the possibilities of sensory illusion, he was strangely credulous.

There is none of the marvellous phenomena related which cannot be satisfactorily explained to the modern reader by some one of Glanvill's seven concessions. They all suggest imposture, illusion, or disease. For example: one of the best-attested cases is the miraculous cure of Jesch Claes, a Dutch woman of Amsterdam, proved by a friend for Cudworth, and investigated by More, Lady Conway, and Van Helence to Webster's book (*vide infra*); hence I am inclined to think that it was not printed in its present form in Glanvill's lifetime, but was found among his papers and printed by Henry More in the 1681, 1683, and 1726 editions of the *Saducismus*.

mont. This woman, it seemed, had been lame of both legs and bedridden for fourteen years. Finally, on a night, she heard a rushing sound in her head, saw the apparition of a beautiful youth, and heard a voice promising that she should soon be well. Three days later she heard and felt the rushing in her head again, and thereupon rose up and walked, to the amazement of family and friends. Here the symptom of the rushing in the head is suggestive of purely natural and physiological explanations of the occurrence — perhaps the quickening of a sluggish circulation, which might very well cause the hallucination of the youth and the voice, either in the present imagination or in memory. There is also a story of an apparition that appeared to a miller and informed him that it was the ghost of an unfortunate girl, mysteriously murdered sometime previously. It further informed him that two men of the neighborhood were the murderers. Upon this flimsy evidence, and a partially established motive, the two men were hanged. Is it not a reasonable conjecture that the miller himself was the guilty person, or, at least, had some means of information quite

other than supernatural? So it is possible to go through the relations and assign a rational explanation to each marvel. At the end there will still be a slight unexplained residuum, which we can refer to hypnotism, or to a more occult cause, as we prefer.

In 1676 John Webster published his *Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft*. He was a physician, and something of a scientist; he attacked the "Platonical whimsies" of the "Witchmongers" from the ground of reason and humanity. His argument, although for the most part very courteous, and, from the modern point of view, very sane, lacks the wiliness and force of presentation of Glanvill's. Webster weakens his position by admitting the existence of fairies and satyrs, and by absurdly accusing Glanvill of a leaning toward popish doctrines.

"Dr. Causabon and Mr. Glanvill have afresh espoused so bad a cause, and taken the quarrel upon them; and to that purpose have furbished up the old weapons, and raked up the old arguments forth of the popish sinks and dunghills."¹

Webster's most important contributions to the negative argument were the suggestions,

¹ *Op. cit.*, Introduction.

that the Witch of Endor was a cheat, that the demoniacs of Scripture were only persons subject to fits, and that the force of imagination can explain almost all miraculous occurrences. Of this last he gives many instances which have come under his professional observation, notably one of "a plebeian, . . . abounding in melancholy blood, who did imagine that his nose was grown to that greatness that he durst not go abroad for fear that it should be hurt or jostled upon by those he met."¹

The book seems to have had considerable success. Thereupon Glanvill and More prepared to answer this defender of old women, whom More, reminiscent of Spenser, courteously dubbed "a Squire of Hags." They made ready a new and expanded edition of the *Saducismus*, but Glanvill dying in 1680, it was seen through the press by More alone in 1681. It contains besides the matter in the previous editions, Henry More's *The True Notion of a Spirit* (from his *Encheiridion Metaphysicum*); a new Essay by Glanvill, *The Proof of Apparitions from Holy Scripture*; various new relations; and an account of the famous witchcraft at

¹ *Op. Cit.*, p. 34.

Mohra in Sweden, translated by Anthony Horneck. The second of these additions is in direct reply to Webster's contention in regard to the Witch of Endor and the demoniacs. The argument is painfully minute, verbal, and textual. But from testimony of Sinclair and Hutchinson, it seems to have been regarded as convincing.

Glanvill doubtless died with the thankful conviction that he had triumphed over Sadducism, but had he lived to the allotted age of man, he would have seen the witchcraft superstition almost wholly swept away by the rising tide of rationalism. At least thirteen books in the defence of the belief were published between 1680 and 1718, but they were powerless to check the sceptical tendency. Among these writers Glanvill was regarded as the great authority on their subject.¹

It is true that among the more ignorant

¹ *E.g.*, see Sinclair, *Satan's Invisible World Discovered*, 1685. Sinclair uses Glanvill's relations (pp. 19 *seq.*, 55 *seq.*) and follows his arguments, — with credit therefor. It is significant, however, that he controverts what he calls Glanvill's Cartesian tenets, and asserts that they are inconsistent with his views on witchcraft (p. 56 *seq.*). But he speaks of the *Saducismus* as "that exalted book" (Pref.).

classes belief in witchcraft has never wholly died out, and that even well past the middle of the eighteenth century such distinguished men as John Wesley and Samuel Johnson avowed belief in the visible supernatural ; but as a national superstition it came to an end by 1718. In that year appeared *An Historical Essay Concerning Witchcraft, with Observations upon matter of fact, tending to clear the texts of the Sacred Scriptures, and confute the vulgar errors upon that point*, by Francis Hutchinson, D.D. Hutchinson, as is well known, attempted both a history and a rational explanation of the witchcraft mania. In his preface he gives a list of all the works printed in defence of witchcraft from the Restoration to his own time, and attempts to refute their arguments. Glanvill, however, as the most famous of the company, receives most of his attention. He shows the inconsistency and unreasonableness of his metaphysical discussion ; and ridicules his relations by showing how easily they may be explained without resort to supernatural hypothesis. He considers the rise of the Royal Society to have been the most potent cause of the decline of superstition, and no-

tices the inconsistency and anomalousness of Glanvill's position therein.¹ He proves, to his own satisfaction, that Sadducism in the matter of witches does not necessarily lead to atheism, and that a belief in the miracles of Christianity does not stand or fall with a belief in Satanic miracles, grounded only upon "the confessions of brain-sick people, after superstition and ill-usage hath made them mad." Hutchinson did not kill the witchcraft persecution single-handed. His eloquent denunciation of the bitter pathos and shame of the thousands of executions of innocent people was but the expression of the temper fast spreading among the more cultured people of his time. In 1726 Defoe published his immensely popular, satiric *History of the Devil*, and henceforth the witches were mainly subjects of English wit and Scotch poetry.

The temptation is strong to insert another apologetic paragraph concerning Glanvill's attitude toward this question. The charm and good sense of his other writing make this particular element seem to his admirers all the more deplorable. But at least it may be urged

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 133 seq.

that, unlike many of his clerical brethren, he never took an active part in the witch trials. It is said that all men are born either Platonists or Aristotelians. If of the former, one may regard Glanvill as a man who, in this matter, laid hold of a great truth, though shrouded in earthly error ; if of the latter, he may profitably meditate upon the question, How far are all our opinions only the products of the convention and fashion of our age ?

CHAPTER VII

GLANVILL AS A MAN OF LETTERS

IN writing of Glanvill as a man of letters we are not concerned primarily with the content of his work ; that has been considered in the earlier chapters upon his philosophy, his theology, and his investigations of witchcraft. The important thing here is his literary manner, the form of his work. The study of this, however, cannot be wholly external ; for it must be remembered that while form in the strict sense is the diction, structure, and rhythm of a man's style, these include the color and flavor of his writing ; they are, therefore, the sum of all the many traits of expression which give to any piece of literature its individuality and distinctive charm. The first impression Glanvill makes upon his reader is that of a remarkably clever, well-informed, and receptive mind. *A priori*, then, we should expect to find him not an innovator in form, nor yet

regardless of it, but an exponent of the stylistic ideals of his age. If this were the case his work would be of unusual interest, for the time of his literary life, 1660–1680, was precisely the most momentous period in the history of our English prose. The aim of this chapter, then, will be to study Glanvill's form with a view to determining how far this assumption can be justified. To this end we shall first sketch in outline the course of English prose in the seventeenth century; then, after gathering from many incidental passages his ideals of style and of himself as a man of letters, we shall attempt a more intimate analysis of his writing, to see how far it fulfils the conditions set for it by himself and by his century.

I

Sketch of English Prose in the Seventeenth Century

The nature of the change in English prose writing in the seventeen century has been discussed at length and with unusual agreement in all the histories of our literature. It is the change from the old, magnificent, but sometimes cumbrous style of Taylor, Milton, and

Browne, to the homelier, but workmanlike and effective writing of Tillotson, Temple, and Dryden. The distinguishing characteristics of the old style were three: highly Latinized diction, with liberal coining of new words from Latin roots; slow-evolving, magnificent structure, carried sometimes to great lengths by the excessive use of the Latin relative construction; and, thirdly, richly imaginative similitudes, used not so much to give clearness and point as to lend dignity and suggestive beauty. These traits do not, of course, appear equally in the three men usually selected as exponents of the style. Taylor is most free with Latin coinings and the most copious of poetical imagery; Milton is the most vigorous, yet the most uneven in sentence structure; and in Browne the sentences are more elaborate, and never so loose as some we can find in either of the other two. In his writing we do not find Milton's vituperation or Taylor's rhapsody, but only a solemn, quaintly adorned grandeur of grave meditation. But despite these differences there is such likeness in the fundamental traits that the three may fairly be taken together. Their style is a survival of the Renaissance, of humanistic

scholarship, and the Elizabethan poetic temper, tinged with something of the refined quaintness and the more curious scholarship of the seventeenth century.

The characteristic style of the Cambridge Platonists was the style of Taylor and Browne. It was formed upon the same kind of scholarship, and dealt with similar subjects in a like temper. But owing to the more formal and theoretical character of their work, their writing, considered as literature, was more uneven. Moreover, all, save Culverwell, carried the habit of quotation from remote authors to a greater length than any other men of the century, with the possible exception of Burton. It is uncritical, however, to regard this as mere scholastic pedantry. Their scholarship was not scholastic but humanistic. They made citations from the classics or the learned mediæval writers, not so much to enforce their own ideas by a bulwark of authority as to enlarge them and give them setting, by showing the solidarity and the organic growth of human thought. It is a mistake to assume that they saw life and truth much less clearly for seeing them, as Dryden said Milton saw nature, "through the spectacles

of books." In other words, they saw, as modern scholars see, that the literary record of the reaction of the mind of the race upon life is itself a part of life.

The "grand style" written by the Platonists, by learned doctors and florid preachers, did very well whenever the content was sufficient to fill out the form. When the thought was full and wise, and the mood elevated or impassioned, the effect was magnificent, and unapproached in any other period of English literature. But when the thought and mood became commonplace, as sometimes needs must be, the effect was ludicrously grotesque, like some worthy burgher masquerading in the royal purple. In minor writers like John Gaule or Pryme, and sometimes even in the greater men, we find a crazy English, full of eccentricities and absurdities. Hence in seventeenth century prose, as in poetry, came an inevitable reaction toward greater accuracy and precision of form, and toward writing more in accord with the essential nature and genius of our speech. By 1680 the untrammelled grace of Elizabethan lyric measures, and the flexible melody of dramatic blank verse had given place

to the clear metallic ring and mechanical precision of the pentameter couplet. So in prose solemn elocution and splendid imagery had given way before a crisper, plainer, and more balanced style.

The beginnings of this reaction must be sought far back in the Elizabethan period. The "transverse alliteration" and "parisonic antithesis" of euphuism were intended to correct the somewhat clumsy sentence structure of Ascham and his contemporaries. Bacon's *Essays*, with their balanced, concrete, and analogical style, are more modern than Milton, despite their occasional archaism of diction. The earnestness of Hales and Chillingworth, together with their love of "reason" and their study of the incomparable English of the King James Bible, led them to write a plain and vigorous prose in advance of the prevalent style of their time. In various ways and degrees we find traces of growing plainness and precision of style throughout the first half of the seventeenth century; in the writing, for example, of Overbury, Earle, Fuller, Walton, and Hobbes; chiefly, that is, among the men writing upon everyday themes.

About the middle of the century, the new Cartesian influence was thrown into the scale. This helped the reformation of prose both by precept and example. Its method and results tended to exalt the reason over the imagination, and moderate, reasonable prose over poetry and the poetic style. Furthermore, Descartes himself had written a plain, idiomatic, and lively French prose, which might well serve as a model to English writers.

Finally, there was another influence at work of which enough has not yet been said. This is to be seen in the stylistic ideals of the Royal Society. Partly from Cartesian influence, partly from emulation of Bacon, but more, I think, from the linguistic realism resulting from their concrete scientific studies, the members of that body conceived an ideal of a new, concrete, and real style. When we remember that Glanvill and Dryden, the classic exponent of the new style, were among the early members of the society, the importance of the subject to the present essay becomes at once apparent.

From the beginning of his *History of the Royal Society*, Dr. Sprat continually insists

that, like Bacon, the fellows thereof prefer works to words. He tells us that the society will eschew figures and involutions of speech, and will foster reason and simplicity; that they “exacted from all members a close, naked, natural way of speaking, positive expressions, a native easiness, bringing all things as near the mathematick plainness as they can,” and that they passed a resolution to reject “all amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style.”¹ Their attitude in general toward the style of the Platonists is clearly shown in a passage written by Samuel Parker, in a very fair-minded and, on the whole, sympathetic critique of the Platonic philosophy:—

“I remember I had not conversed long with Platonick Authors when I took occasion to set it down as a note to myself that though a huge, lushious style may relish sweet to childish and liquorish fancies, yet it rather loathes and nauseates a discreet understanding than informs and nourishes it.”²

Cowley, though not a member of the society,

¹ *History of the Royal Society*, p. 112 seq.

² *A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophy*, p. 77.

yet closely connected with its work, is an excellent illustration of its ideals of form. In his *Essays* we hear, almost for the first time, the personal note, that "native easiness" which the society so much admired. In his prose writing, easy, graceful sentences, constructed of apt, well-chosen words, are combined with variety of rhythm and flexibility of movement, until the effect of the whole is not unlike that of the best prose of the present century. This easy naturalness and careful finishing is carried on with, perhaps, a little more formal balance by Dryden, Tillotson, and Temple. From them it is but a step to Addison, and so to the classic prose of the eighteenth century.

II

Glanvill's Critical Theories

We notice first that Glanvill, unlike More, was not impressed by his sacred and apostolic character as a man of letters, but wrote for the pleasure of reasonable self-expression. In the preface to the *Essays* he says that men should not complain of the making of many books, for they are not compelled to read them; and then continues: —

“For my part, I have as little leisure to write books as other men, for I have that to do which may be reckoned an employment; but every man hath some vacancies, and I love now and then in this manner to employ mine. ’Tis an innocent way of entertaining a man’s self to paint the image of his thoughts, and no better a writer than myself may happen to divert, if not to instruct, some others by it.” With the exception of his controversial writing and his sermons, all of Glanvill’s work has something of the seemingly careless lightness of touch of the “gentlemen who write with ease.”

Connected with this healthy attitude of mind toward his writing is the fact that Glanvill’s work never takes the form of a systematic treatise, but always appears in the lighter and more flexible form of the essay. This, indeed, by the example of Plato,¹ Montaigne, and Emerson, has been shown to be a form

¹ As opposed to the systematic treatises of Aristotle, Spinoza, or Hegel, the dialogue, as Mr. Pater has pointed out, is one with the essay. The characters who reason together in the former are but the artistic idealization of the voices of enthusiasm and doubt, inquiry and reason, which hold parley in a good philosophical essay.

peculiarly suited to a mind not resting dogmatically on truth ascertained, but beating about, here and there, for new trails. It seems, too, as if Glanvill's somewhat restless cleverness made him a little impatient of the pains of a systematic presentation. "To me a *cursus philosophicus* is but an impertinency in folio, and the study of it a laborious idleness."¹

Equally active, at least in his theory, is Glanvill's opposition to the pedantic use of literary authority.

"'Twas this vain idolizing of authors which gave birth to that silly vanity of impertinent citations, and inducing authority in things neither requiring or deserving it. . . . 'Tis an inglorious acquist to have our heads or volumes laden as were Cardinal Campeius his mules, with old or useless luggage."²

"Nor is any man's reading any farther to be valued than as it improves and assists his reason; where it doth not this 'tis either a feather in a fool's cap, or a sword in a madman's hand."³

"The affectations of words and metaphors,

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 152.

² *Ibid.*, p. 142 *seq.*

³ *Prefatory Answer to Stubbes*, Preface.

and cadencies, and ends of Greek and Latin, are now the scorn of the judicious, and as much despised, and (almost) as generally as they deserve. They are banished from conversation and are not endured in common matters.”¹

But Glanvill was not at all bigoted in his dislike of using other men’s words. In the preface to the *Lux Orientalis* he answers the hypothetical charge that he has conveyed his words and phrases, by admitting that most of his significant terms are taken from Henry More, “the judicious and elegant contriver of them, the profound restorer and refiner of almost extinct Platonism.”

The *a priori* assumption of the influence of the Royal Society upon Glanvill’s style can be justified by his expressed admiration of their literary canons: “And ’tis none of the least considerable expectations that may reasonably be had of your Society that ’twill discredit the toyishness of wanton fancy; and pluck the misapplied name of Wits from those conceited Humourists that have assumed it, to bestow it upon the more manly spirit and genius that

¹ *Sermons*, p. 258.

playes not tricks with words, nor frolicks with the Caprices of frothy imagination : But employs a sure reason in inquiries about the momentous concernments of the Universe.”¹

Beside this may be put a passage concerning Sprat’s *History of the Royal Society* which shows the points of form Glanvill most admired : “The Style of that Book hath all the properties that can recommend anything to an ingenious relish : For ’tis manly, and yet plain ; natural, and yet not careless : The Epithets are genuine, the Words proper and familiar, the Periods smooth and of middle proportion : It is not broken with ends of Latin, nor impertinent Quotations ; nor made harsh by hard words or needless terms of Art : Not rendered intricate by long Parentheses, nor gaudy by flanting [*sic*] Metaphors ; not tedious by wide fetches and circumferences of Speech, nor dark by too much curtness of expression : ’Tis not loose and unjointed, rugged and uneven ; but as polite and fast as marble ; and briefly, avoids all notorious defects, and wants none of the proper ornaments of Language. I say, proper ;

¹ *Scepsis Scientifica*, “Address to the Royal Society,” p. lxv.

for Styles are Cloathes and must be fitted to the Subjects they are upon, and altered according to the kind of things they describe and express.”¹ We should have far to seek to find a wiser or more precise description of the new style, and, by implication, of the old.

In short, this finish, moderation, and clearness of form is Glanvill’s own ideal. As he said, writing in 1678, “This should be the end of a wise man’s pains, to conceive things clearly and express them plainly.”² Here again we can plainly see the working of that Socratic, fundamental principle of the Cartesian method.

It is very fortunate that it is possible to round out the present section with a passage stating clearly and succinctly Glanvill’s notion of the proper mean to be observed between native and foreign elements in prose diction.

¹ *Plus Ultra*, p. 84 seq. Cf. Cowley, *Ode to Royal Society*.

“His candid Style like a clear Stream does slide,
And his bright Fancy all the way
Does like the Sunshine in it play.”

Cf. Johnson’s dictum concerning Sprat, that he had “pregnancy of imagination” (in the opening paragraph of the *Life of Cowley*).

² *Dialogue Concerning Preaching*, p. 107.

In the *Essay Concerning Preaching*¹ he has told the young friend to whom he is writing, not to use "hard words," and then continues: "If you ask me what I mean by hard words? I will presume that you cannot think I intend to condemn all that are borrowed from the Greek, Latin, or other more modern languages; no, the English is a mix't speech, made up of divers tongues, and we cannot speak without using foreign words: So that those who talk of pure English, if they mean unmix't by it, dream of Chimæras: our language hath in all ages been enlarging by the introduction of borrowed words; which when once they are brought into common use, they may be spoken without blame of affectation: Yea, there is sometimes

¹ It may be well to state that from the point of view of form, Glanvill's *Sermons* are literature, and can be studied as such. The details of style and structure make them an integral part of his literary work. If they do not repay the reader so well as the sermons of Donne and Taylor, or even of Tillotson and South, it is only because the style is made to serve the homiletic end, and not allowed to gather flowers by the way.

"Read Glanvill, South, Dove, Culverwell, and Scot,
Whose matchless sermons ne'er will be forgot."

(John Dunton, in Nichol's *Lit. Anecdotes of the 18th Century*, Vol. V., p. 82, note.)

vanity and affectation in avoiding them : you know a great instance of this in a late writer, who to shun the Latinisms of immensity, eternity and penetrability etc. useth these, all-placeness, all-timeness, thorow-fareness, and abundant such like. This English is far more unintelligible than that Latin which custom of speech hath made easy and familiar.”¹

This concludes all that Glanvill as a man of letters had to say concerning his art. It is enough to prove that, although his work was finished before the full and final establishment of the English classic style, yet his criticism of style and diction might, so far as content is concerned, have come from the pen of Addison or Johnson. It remains to be seen how well his practice kept pace with his theory.

III

The Elements and Qualities of Glanvill's Style

If we read Glanvill's writings in chronological order with a view to determining the

¹ *Essay Concerning Preaching*, p. 13 seq. (I have been unable to identify the "late writer" referred to. I take him to be Nathaniel Fairfax. But I have not yet found the words specified.)

answer to the question propounded at the end of the last section, we shall at once observe that his earliest writings do not conform to his theories so well as his latest. To the better understanding of this, consider two characteristic passages from the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*:

“The knowledge I teach is ignorance, and methinks the theory of our own nature should be enough to learn it to us. We came into the world and we know not how ; we live in it in a self-nescience, and go hence again and are as ignorant of our recess. . . . We are enlarg’d from the prison of the womb, we live, we grow, and give being to our like : we see we hear, and outward objects affect our other senses ; we understand, we will, we imagine and remember : and yet know no more of the immediate reasons of most of these common functions than those little Embryo Anchorites : . . . The Dogmatist knows not how he moves his finger ; nor by what art or method he turns his tongue in his vocal expressions. . . . We love, we hate, we joy, we grieve : passions annoy us, and our minds are disturbed by those corporal æstuations. Nor yet can we tell how these should reach our unbodyed selves. . . . We

lay us down to sleep away our diurnal cares ; night shuts up the Senses' windows, the mind contracts to the Brain's centre. . . . The soul is awake, and solicited by external motions, for some of them reach the perceptive region in the most silent repose and obscurity of the night. What is it, then, that prevents our Sensations ; or if we do perceive, how is't that we know it not ? But we Dream, see Visions, converse with Chimæras, the one half of our lives is a Romance, a Fiction. We retain a catch of these pretty stories and our awakened imagination smiles at the recollection. Nor yet can our most severe inquiries finde what did so abuse us, or show the nature and manner of these nocturnal illusions." ¹

"He that seeks perfection must seek it above the Empyreum ; it is reserved for Glory. It is that alone which needs not the advantage of a foyl ! Defects seem as necessary to our now-happiness as their Opposites. The most refulgent colours are the result of light and shadow and Venus was never the less beautiful for her Mole. And 'tis for the majesty of Nature, like the

¹*Vanity of Dogmatizing*, Preface. Most of this passage is incorporated in *Scepsis Scientifica*, Ch. III., p. 9 seq.

Persian Kings, sometimes to cover and not always to prostrate her beauties to the naked view: yea, they contract a kind of splendour from the seemingly observing veil, which adds to the enravishments of her transported admirers.”¹

The first thing which arrests the attention here is a characteristic all Glanvill's own, a certain clear and vigorous speed. This, although we can refer it specifically to a liberal use of asyndeton, is quite what we should expect from a clever young man who wrote with *verve*. If we further analyze the style, we shall notice a likeness to Bacon in the concrete imagery and balanced brevity of sentence structure, and a likeness to Browne in the quaint turn of such words as “æstuation” or “recess.” Now if we compare these passages with the later ones among those cited in the previous section, we shall feel the difference at once. A careful computation of the percentage of all the Græco-Latin elements in Glanvill's early and late work reveals little material difference.² The cause

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

² The examination of carefully chosen representative passages, five hundred words in length, yields the following result: —

of that difference must, therefore, be assigned to some slight change in the structure and cadence of the sentence, or to a decrease in the number of unusual coinings from the Latin and Greek. In Glanvill's latest work there is a little less tripping cadence than in the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, but in fundamental sentence structure there is little change. On the other hand, there is a very marked decrease in the number of coinings, which, whether they

Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), Preface, Græco-Latin derivatives, 24 %.

Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), Ch. XII., Græco-Latin derivatives, 23 %.

Lux Orientalis (1662), Ch. III., Græco-Latin derivatives, 26 %.

Essays (VII.), (1676), p. 21 *seq.*, Græco-Latin derivatives, 23 %.

Essay Concerning Preaching (1678), p. 22 *seq.*, Græco-Latin derivatives, 21 %.

Sermons (1681), p. 116 *seq.*, Græco-Latin derivatives, 16½ %.

Sermons (1681), p. 174 *seq.*, Græco-Latin derivatives, 19 %.

The comparatively low percentage of Græco-Latin derivatives in the *Sermons* is doubtless due to their hortatory and familiar character. The greater number in the *Lux Orientalis* is explained by the fact that it contains more formal philosophical terms. The stability of percentage in the others is striking. The average, 23 %, is lower than Bacon's, and about equal to that of present day writers on similar subjects.

were original with Glanvill, or only uncommon, give an effect of quaintness to his style. In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* they are on every page.¹

¹ The most striking Græco-Latin derivatives used by Glanvill in his *Vanity of Dogmatizing* are : acquist, p. 143 ; admixtion, 11 ; æquipondious, 228 ; alliency, 171 ; amphibologies, 158 ; antiperistasis, 135 ; archidoxis, 214 ; arietations, 48 ; conamen, 191 ; concinnious, 193 ; crasis, 124 ; crepusculous, 187 ; cryptick, 170 ; depurate, 65 ; dictamen, 103 ; digladiations, 161 ; dijudications, 125 ; evanid, 186 ; hegemonical, 227 ; intellectuals, 62 ; metempsychosis, 138, monoculous, 129 ; parvitute, 59 ; perspicill (= telescope), 140 ; phrenetick, 186 ; piaculous, 139 ; prolepsis, 130 ; quinq-articular, 102 ; vitiosity, 103. It is significant that nearly all of these words are given in Johnson's Dictionary, and referred to Glanvill. By good luck, in every case of omission by Johnson, the word has been found in the completed portion of Murray. Assuming, then, with a fair degree of probability, that when, in one or both of these dictionaries, Glanvill is the earliest authority cited for a word, that either that word was not in common use before Glanvill, or else he coined it himself, we get the following result. Of the 29 words given above 14 appear for the first time in Glanvill, 7 occur in the writings of Sir Thomas Browne, which he undoubtedly knew well, and the remaining 8 in authors whom he may or may not have known. The words in Browne are : alliciency, amphibologies (also in Chaucer, *Troilus*, IV., 1406), archidoxis, crepusculous, evanid, metempsychosis, and piaculous. The scattering words are as follows : æquipondious, Fuller ; antiperistasis, Cowley ; arietations, Bacon ; crasis, Evelyn ; dijudications, II. More ; perspicill, Crashaw ; and quinq-articular, Sander-son. The remaining words are apparently Glanvill's own.

After that we find but one or two to a volume. In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* one of the chief pleasures to the reader is the recognition of old friends from the Latin lexicon masquerading in a strange English dress.

In short, in his earliest literary venture Glanvill is like Bacon in the concreteness of his writing, only more sprightly and vivacious; he is like Browne in his occasional quaintness, only more balanced, crisp, and nervous in his sentence structure. That he wrote in conscious imitation, or at least under the influence of these two, is a ready inference, but one not to be pushed too far.

The *Lux Orientalis* is not very interesting in point of style. In it Glanvill is following in the track of More, and goes a little beyond his depth. As a result, the style is labored and heavy, with nothing of the crisp vigor of the

It is possible that they were in oral circulation among learned men as part of the fourth stage, or late Renaissance Latin element in our English speech; but this does not seem at all likely. At any rate, it is such words as these that give to Glanvill's early style its peculiar Browne-like quaintness. And, almost certainly, this is one of the traits that both Worthington and Glanvill himself had in mind in speaking of the youthfulness of the style of the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*.

Vanity of Dogmatizing. Indeed, there is nothing characteristic about it. Merely from internal evidence we could never tell whether it were by More or by Glanvill.

The reissue in 1665 of a revised version of *Vanity of Dogmatizing* as the *Scepsis Scientifica* marks the end of Glanvill's earlier manner. In the Epistle Dedicatory prefixed to the latter, he says of the style of the former, "For I must confess that the way of writing to be less agreeable to my present relish and genius, which is more gratified with manly sense flowing in natural and unaffected eloquence, than in the music and curiosity of fine metaphors and dancing periods."¹ This, of course, is the customary feeling of any maturing writer toward the early work of his youth, when striving for effect is so natural and common. But in the present case, when we consider that this statement was addressed to the Royal Society, it seems to show a receptivity to the changing ideals of his time.

The changes in the *Scepsis* are unimportant. As Glanvill himself states in the Epistle Dedicatory, he has forborne any attempt to lessen the

¹ Page lxix.

youthfulness of the style. A few of the unusual coinings from the Latin and Greek are omitted, a few Latinate forms are Anglicized, and other changes of a similar character are made.¹ All show growing scholarship, and increased desire for directness and simplicity.

¹ A collation reveals the following changes. Two Latin quotations on p. 121, *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, are omitted altogether in the corresponding passage, *Scepsis Scientifica*, p. 88 *seq.* The adverbial phrase *nemine contradicente*, *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 134, is changed to "with universal suffrage," *Scepsis Scientifica*, p. 98. The marvellous stories of *The Scholar Gypsy* and of "the man with the sympathized hand" are omitted, and the following verbal changes are made: —

| <i>Van. of Dogmatizing</i> , p. | becomes | <i>Scepsis Scientifica</i> , p. |
|----------------------------------|---------|------------------------------------|
| touching . . . (<i>passim</i>) | " | concerning . . . (<i>passim</i>) |
| anomie 11 | " | defailance 5 |
| abstrusities 27 | " | difficulties 24 |
| indicate 42 | " | shew 32 |
| embryo thoughts . 43 | " | thoughts of our cradle 33 |
| ingenuous 52 | " | ingenious 39 |
| diagnostick 62 | " | evidence 55 |
| graduate 70 | " | advanc't 53 |
| annual circle . . . 78 | " | year 59 |
| dictamens 103 | " | suggestions 75 |
| vitiosity 103 | " | immoralities . . . 76 |
| indubiate 104 | " | unsuspected . . . 76 |
| sublimate 124 | " | sublimed 92 |
| education-propos- | | |
| sions 126 | " | first reflections . . 93 |

After 1665 Glanvill's style was practically formed, and underwent little change. As he acquired power over his medium, the sentences tended to become a little longer, but this may be disregarded, and his work as a whole may be studied as a finished product without considering further its chronological sequence and development.

It would be possible to divide the whole body of Glanvill's work into four classes: controversial, hortatory, expository, and narrative. The first three, however, show little difference in style and structure. We may, therefore, divide his work for our convenience into two general classes, typified respectively in the philosophic essay and the "relation" of witchcraft.

In diction, the most noteworthy fact in the work of the first class is the remarkable stability of the Romance, or Græco-Latin elements in his vocabulary. As we have already seen, in his early and late work the average of such

| | | |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------|
| <i>Van. of Dogmatizing</i> , p. | becomes | <i>Scepsis Scientifica</i> , p. |
| ingenious perspicill . 140 | " | telescope . . . 104 |
| phrentick . . . 186 | " | crasie . . . 139 |
| hegemonical . . . 227 | " | leading . . . 167 |
| terraqueous magnet 244 | " | earth . . . 179 |

words is twenty-three per cent. Selected passages¹ from the *Plus Ultra* (1663) and the *Philosophia Pia* (1671) reveal respectively twenty-two per cent and twenty-four per cent. This stability of the various elements in diction seems to be characteristic of a good writer, for it shows that all the resources of his vocabulary are constantly available to him. It is to be noted, however, that in Glanvill's work after 1665 original or unusual derivatives from the Latin or Greek are comparatively rare. In the *Plus Ultra* the art of the alchemist is termed "chrysopoetick"; the schoolmen are the "sectators" of Aristotle;² and "jejune" and "luciferous" are common adjectives of reproach and commendation. Of these only the first seems to be of Glanvill's own mintage, the second had been used by Raleigh, the third by both Bacon and Browne, and the fourth by Boyle. Other quaint words occasionally occur in the *Essays*, but, in every case that I have examined, they had been employed by earlier writers whom Glanvill is likely to have known, and in a sense similar to that intended by him. Thus "spinose" is but

¹ *Plus Ultra*, p. 122 seq. *Phil. Pia*, p. 18 seq. (in *Essays*).

² *Plus Ultra*, pp. 11, 12, and *passim*.

a more Latinate spelling of Bacon's "spinous," and "scrupulosities" had been used by Hooker. A few words of this sort, together with the use of words like "obnoxious" in their strict radical sense, are the only marks which distinguish the Latin elements in Glanvill's vocabulary from the similar elements in the diction of the classic writers of the eighteenth century.

The native element in our author's diction calls for little remark. It is in the main the native English of the King James Bible, and as such is at once dignified and picturesque. The occasional introduction of older forms and colloquialisms like "swinge," "boggle," and "chaffy" gives a vivid touch of nature to his style.

Glanvill's spelling, like that of most writers before Johnson, was disorderly and inconsistent. Final *e* is sometimes written, sometimes clipped off, with, as far as I can discern, no guiding principle whatever. *y* and *i* are used indiscriminately. In the prefix, *in* is usually written for *en*, without regard to the derivation of the word. *It is* is regularly abbreviated '*Tis*. Apart from this, the spelling both of verbs and substantives seems to have been left almost altogether

to the discretion of the printer. The numerous errata are almost never concerned with matters of spelling.

The narrative writing seen in the "Relations of Witchcraft" affixed to the *Saducismus Triumphatus* differs considerably in diction from the philosophical writings. As is to be expected, the style is more familiar and direct, and contains a smaller percentage of borrowed words; indeed, in the story of the "Dæmon of Tedworth" the words of that class aggregate but twelve per cent of the whole number.

The very concrete and explicit character of Glanvill's own mind, together with his study of Bacon, and the expository aim of his writing, determined his prevailing type of sentence structure. He sometimes writes a long, involute sentence full of relative constructions, but where he does so, the reader feels that it is done in passing carelessness, and not in emulation of the contrapuntal harmonies of Taylor, or the elaborate and conscious arabesque of Browne. Glanvill's most characteristic sentence is short, balanced, often appositive, or even antithetical. A casual glance at his page may seem to indicate quite the contrary; but a

closer examination will reveal that this is the result of the frequent rhetorical use of *and* with no connective sense whatever, and of the excessive use of the colon and semicolon in positions where we should now employ the period.

A passage taken almost at random will perhaps illustrate all these specifications : —

“Thus have our Modern Prophets been inspired by Temper and Imagination, and not by design only ; For we may not think that they are all Hypocrites and knowing Impostors ; No, they generally believe themselves, and the strength of their highly invigorated Fancies shuts out the sober Light of Reason which should disabuse them, as sleep does that of our external Sense in our Dreams. And the silly people that understand not Nature, but are apt to take everything which is vehement to be sacred, are easily deceived into the belief of those Pretensions ; and thus Diseases have been worship'd for Religion. This account the Philosophy of Humane Nature gives of that by which the World hath been so miserably abused.

“And when we cast our eyes abroad, we may

plainly see that those glorious things are no more, than what hath been done by the Extatic Priests of the Heathen Oracles, and the Madmen of all Religions ; by Sybils, Lunaticks, Poets, Dreamers and transported Persons of all sorts : And it may be observed daily to what degrees of elevation excess of drinking will heighten the Brain, making some witty, nimble, and eloquent much beyond the ordinary proportion of their Parts and Ingenuity ; and inclining others to be hugely devout who usually have no great sense of Religion ; As I knew one who would pray rapturously when he was drunk, but at other times was a moping Sot and could scarce speak sense.”¹

In both paragraphs we have instances of the rhetorical use of *and*, and of the misleading use of colon and semicolon. The first sentence is a type of the crisp, antithetical structure much affected by the author. The first sentence of the second paragraph is a kind of balanced, yet cumulative apposition, little less common than the preceding type. The second sentence is not long enough to be taken as a fair specimen of Glanvill's involute struc-

¹ *Essays*, IV., p. 18 *seq.*

ture; but if we fix our attention on the relative and the two participial constructions, it may serve to indicate the form that structure usually takes. Otherwise the passage illustrates all the significant traits of his habitual structure. It will be noticed that the final rhythmic effect is that of speed, joined to a certain easy regularity of cadence.

In the "Relations of Witchcraft" the structure is still shorter and simpler. There are almost no involutions, few cumulative appositions, and not many formal antitheses.

Glanvill's paragraphs serve to mark the logical and orderly development of his thought. They usually begin with the adversative *but*, the sequential *thus*, or the rhetorical *and*. Most of them contain but a single general thought, kept within proper limits of length. Many of them, as in the examples cited above, end with a concise summary sentence or with a striking illustration or analogy. In the *Essays* the paragraph scheme is helped out by the fact that each paragraph is numbered and carefully articulated to the skeleton of the whole, which is outlined at the beginning. But it is evident that to Glanvill the paragraph

was merely a means to clear exposition. While he was at some pains always to find the apt, suggestive word, and was careful of his sentences, that they might ever be pointed and bright, he seems to have given little heed to the internal, organic structure of his paragraphs. Indeed, it would be too much to expect that he should so far outrun his age as to exhibit in this respect the massive architecture of Johnson and Burke, or the skilful artifice of Macaulay.

The striking feature of Glanvill's mature style is directness. Its one aim is lucid, convincing exposition. Where the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* began slowly and uncertainly with a long chapter on the manner and extent of Adam's knowledge, his later writings plunge *in medias* with a suggestive question or the statement of some fundamental proposition.

If we are to summarize the result of the examination thus far, we can say, that in the diction and structure of his sentences Glanvill has justified our primary assumption. He has proved himself to be a representative of the transition to the new style in English prose. It remains to make a more general study of his

writing to discover the range of his allusions to his reading, the turn of his imagination, the quality of his humor, and the general temper of his genius. By this means we shall see how far he fulfilled his ideal of himself as a man of letters, and how clearly he reflected the subtler and less technical influences in the literature of his age.

In the matter of literary allusion Glanvill's practice is fairly consistent with his theory. He quotes freely to illustrate or enforce his own position, but rarely, like so many men of his time, grounds an argument upon authority. Bacon, Descartes, and Henry More are the most frequent source of his references; but he likewise quotes philosophical and theological opinions from Pythagoras, Epicurus, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, the Cabbala, the Church Fathers and the Sceptics and Platonists of the later Renaissance, especially Pico Mirandola, Campanella, and Gassendi. In the *Plus Ultra*, where he is giving the history of the modern improvements of useful knowledge, he makes an immense display of erudition in the obscure philosophers and scientists of the Renaissance; but it is not likely that he knew many of these

at first hand.¹ Glanvill's philosophy was, as we have seen, largely and comprehensively eclectic ; hence the above array of names is not at all surprising.

The distinctively scholarly and literary allusions are more rare. In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* there are such well-worn classical allusions as Apelles, Ixion, Narcissus, Artemisia, and Gyges' ring. Allusions of this character, however, do not appear in his more mature work.² Sometimes, but not very often, Glanvill makes a scholar's use of classical quotation to lend to his argument the grace of poetry rather than the weight of authority. In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* (p. 82), speaking of the deceptions of apparent motion, he quotes Virgil "*littus compique recedunt.*" In the *Scir^e*, speaking of the substantiality of the soul and its existence after death, he cites Theocritus and Virgil : —

¹ Hakewill had given a similar summary of modern learning in the third book of his *An Apology of the Power and Providence of God*. Oxford, 1627.

² Who was "the King of Arabs, who ran away from the smoaking mince-py, apprehending some dangerous plot in the harmless steam" ? *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 132. He has thus far defied my search, in the traveller's tales in which we should expect to find him.

*“ Aliis sub gugite vasto
Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.”*

And once, in the *Fast Sermon on the Kings Martyrdom*, he even quotes Homer in the original: —

“ Λαῶν ἐσσι̃ ἄναξ καὶ τοὶ Ζεὺς ἐγγυάλιζε
Σκῆπτρον τ’ ἠδὲ θέμιστας — ”

It is likely, however, that this was a stock quotation on such occasions.¹

Of contemporary English literature other than philosophical he makes little use. Browne he seems to have known well; but he draws on him more for words than quotations. He sometimes refers to Cowley and Butler,² but beyond this there is almost nothing in his writing taken from contemporary writers. In fact he expressly disclaims much knowledge of such writers: “The divining man indeed affirms

¹ *Sermons*, p. 155. (*Iliad*, IX., 98, 99.)

² *E.g. Concerning Preaching*, p. 65, “Rather than all be wit let none be there” (Cowley). This is of course a misquotation. The line should go, “Rather than all *things* wit, let none be there.” *Plus Ultra*, p. 120, “In the words of the incomparable Droll;

“ ‘He knows what’s what, and that’s as high
As Metaphysick Wit can fly.’ ”

—Butler, *Hudibras*, I., 150.

that I have no books in my study but plays and romances . . . and as luck would have it, I have not one (in English) of either sort.”¹

The parenthetical reservation “in English” is important; for Glanvill makes frequent reference to the romances which were so popular among the middle classes in the seventeenth century. He mentions casually, as if well known to himself and his readers, *Amadis de Gaule*, *The Knight of the Sun*, *Don Guzman*, and *Don Quixote*. There had been, of course, English translations of all these works before Glanvill’s time. He may have read them in English, or possibly even in Spanish; but it is more likely that he read them in the French versions which were easily accessible. He does, indeed, mention Oviedo, but not as if he were at all familiar with his work. That he had a tolerable knowledge of French is made clear, both by his constant use of Descartes, who had not at that time been translated, and by occasional citations in the original from Montaigne.²

¹ *A Prefatory Answer to Stubbe*, p. 121.

² *E.g. Scep̄sis Scientifica*, p. 114 (not in *Vanity of Dogmatizing*). Here he quotes from Montaigne, “*Qu’est-il plus vain que de faire l’inanite mesme, cause la production des choses ?*” etc. (*Essais*, II., Ch. XII.). This gives evi-

Glanvill's imagination seems always to have been active and vivid, but it underwent a significant change in character as he grew older. In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* the similitudes often came like Taylor's, "trailing clouds of glory," with a flash of poetic insight, or a setting of luminous beauty. In the later work, on the other hand, they are introduced as Bacon might have used them, to make the meaning, the content of thought, more clear and forcible.

Thus in the *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, writing of the duality of soul and body, the race of men is likened to "a falling torch, though the grosser materials hasten to their element, yet the flame aspires." Here by the skilful use of the words "falling" and "aspires" with their poetic connotation and subtile suggestion of the ends of human life, the image is saved from being a mere Donne-like intellectual conceit, and affects the imagination more profoundly, like a line of imaginative poetry. The same remark is true of passages like the following: "Thus the sly shadow steals away on Time's Account-Book

dence either of Glanvill's lack of accurate knowledge of French or of careless revision, for *cause* should of course be followed by *de*.

the Dyal; and the quickest eye can tell no more but that it's gone."¹

Perhaps the best example of this more ambitious type of simile is this: "And as the primordial light, which at first was diffused over the face of the unfashioned chaos, was afterwards contracted into the Fountain Lumina-ryes, so those scattered perfections which were divided among the several ranks of inferior natures were summed up and constellated in ours."² This notion of the primitive light, which we have seen already in Culverwell and Milton, seems to have powerfully attracted the imagination of the seventeenth century. Grounded upon the dictum *lux umbra Dei*, and advanced by the study of the Platonic visions of colored light, in the *Phædo* and the *Republic*, it had apparently received a scientific justification from the Cartesian theory of light as inherent in the atoms of the cosmos.³

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 81. Dr. Johnson quoted this in his Dictionary, Art. "Dial." The idea seems to have so wrought upon his imagination that he planned to write an essay around it. v. Boswell's *Johnson* (ed. Hill, Oxford, 1887), Vol. I., p. 205. ² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³ See the beautiful passage in Sir Thomas Browne's *Garden of Cyrus*, p. 66 (ed. 1658).

Beside the above passage to illustrate Glanvill's power of visualization and his sensibility to color as well as to light, we may set the description of the governor's garden at Bensalem. The walks are of "blue stone, naturally streak't with green," there are pillars of "a speckled stone, very clear and shining," and the cloisters are paved with "red and green marble." The governor is attired in a robe and turban of purple silk, with a "star of gold wrought on it, worn just before." The traveller is "led into a handsome square Chamber, wainscotted with Cedar, which filled the Room with a very grateful odor. It was richly painted, gilt, and full of Inscriptions in Letters of Gold. He sat him down on a Couch of Green Velvet."¹

This poetical kind of imagery, however, is not common in the body of Glanvill's work. There the imagery is that of the prose writer striving to make his ideas lucid and impressive. This kind of imagery is not to be confounded with the conceits of the school of Donne. Like these, it appeals to the intellect rather than to

¹ *Anti-fanatical Religion and Free Philosophy*, p. 3, in *Essays*.

the feeling; but in the case of Donne, the intellectual pleasure involved is usually surprise at the far-fetched ingenuity of the conceit, whereas here, as in Pope, the pleasure is a delight at the marvellous aptness of the analogy.

In the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* there is one striking concatenation of such figures: "The intellect that can feed on this air is a Chameleon, and a meer inflated skin. From this stock grew School-Divinity which is but Peripateticism in a Theological Livery. A Schoolman is but the Stagirite in a Body of condensed air, and Thomas but Aristotle Sainted."¹

There are, indeed, so many beautifully exact analogies scattered throughout Glanvill's work that a selection is difficult. Perhaps one may serve as a type of all:—

"He is a wonderful man that can thread a needle when he is at cudgels in a crowd; and yet this is as easy as to find Truth in the hurry of disputation."²

To conclude, we see that the character of this imagery was a clear reflection of the temper of the age, which, slightly influenced by the

¹ *Vanity of Dogmatizing*, p. 152. ² *Essays*, IV., p. 28.

fanciful conceptions of the Marinists, was yet coming more and more to admire the precise reasonableness which distinguished the age of Pope.

Anthony à Wood is authority for the statement that Glanvill in his day was famous for his great wit. What form this took in his familiar conversation we have no means of knowing. In his writing it is nearly always *wit* in the strict seventeenth-century meaning of that word. It consists in clever readiness of mind, and in vivid analogical play of the imagination. His wit is inseparable from the clever vigor of his expository style. As such it has already been sufficiently illustrated in the examples of his similitudes. But while Glanvill is essentially a witty writer, he is not often humorous. Of the broad Elizabethan humor he has almost nothing. Neither does he play about an idea whimsically and half sadly, as the great humorists are wont to do. He has not the power of mordant satire that we see in Butler or Swift; nor has he the grave playfulness of Addison. His humor, in the narrower sense, is seen in the rather broadly ironical temper in which he writes of

those he considered unreasonable, "the sectators of Aristotle," "the household Lunatics," "the enthusiastick persons," and "the warm people with more heat than light." It was this irony, among other things, which differentiated him from the Cambridge men. He had the Socratic rather than the Platonic temper.

Of the pathos which is so near akin to real humor, Glanvill has very little. In his earlier work he is too clever and downright for that. He is sometimes saddened by the blindness of our faculties, and the little range of human science, but this mood does not continue long, or find very full expression. In his later work, as we have seen, he occasionally writes of the wretchedness of life, but despite this, and despite the reports of his troubles, one feels that his temperament was essentially buoyant and cheerful.

It must be remembered that Glanvill was a speaker as well as a writer. Indeed, his genius was perhaps more oratorical than literary. Even in his writing his aim was always to persuade as well as to convince. This should help to explain and make significant the elements and qualities which we have seen in his style.

To conclude: In his early work Glanvill wrote in the manner of Bacon, not uninfluenced by Browne. In his later work, in the greater simplicity of his sentences, and in the increased plainness, urbanity, and reasonableness of his temper, he is representative of the new manner. There is no evidence that he exerted any considerable influence upon the form of other and later writers, but he is interesting and significant as showing so clearly the nature and extent of the influences which were working themselves out in English prose. But quite apart from all such matters, he is worth reading for his own sake. Such clear, forcible, and pleasant expression of sound sense and right reason is not so common in our literature that we can afford to let it lie in total neglect. Total neglect, however, he has not had. If we can credit the autobiographic elements in *The Scholar Gypsy*, when young Matthew Arnold took a half holiday, Glanvill lay beside him on the grass. Poe, moreover, has a few striking lines from Glanvill as the text of his *Ligeia*, and a little below he tells us that this remote English moralist has never failed to inspire him. Commendatory verses are not to be

taken too seriously, and those by H. Darsy prefixed to the *Vanity of Dogmatizing* are not remarkable for critical coolness and moderation. They serve, however, to show something of Glanvill's reputation in his own time; and the closing eulogy is not altogether hyperbole : —

“ You have removed the old antipathy
’Tween Rhetorick and Philosophy,
And in your book have clothed Socratic sense
In Demosthenian eloquence.”

Now, like our author upon the completion of his *Philosophia Pia*, “ I feel that I have drawn but a cockle-shell of water from the ocean.” Glanvill's mind is so many-sided, with such a play of ingenious ideas, that in reading him one enjoys a broadcast light upon the life and letters of his old-time England. To present to the reader the full extent of the circle thus illumined from out the indeterminate throng of grave, periwigged worthies, would be to reprint his twenty volumes. This essay will have served its less ambitious purpose if it has shown that Glanvill, with his curious yet erratic scholarship, with his ready absorption of literary influences, with his mind

divided between scepticism, rationalism, and mysticism, with his moderate and charitable theology, was a mirror of the intellectual life of his time. By this means, perhaps, it may add a little to the knowledge of that century, so teeming with the seeds of future growth.

APPENDIX

(a) CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF GLANVILL'S PUBLICATIONS¹

1661. The Vanity of Dogmatizing or Confidence in Opinions manifested in a Discourse of the Shortness and Uncertainty of our Knowledge, and its causes with some Reflexions on Peripateticism, and an apology for Philosophy. 8°. xxx + 250 pp. London, pr. by E. C. for Henry Eversden.
- 1662.* Lux Orientalis; or an enquiry into the Opinion of the Eastern Sages concerning the Præ-Existence of Souls, . . . 8°. (Reprinted in 1682; *vide infra*.)
1665. Sceptis Scientifica, or Confest Ignorance the way of Science; in an Essay of the Vanity of Dogmatizing and confident Opinion, with a Reply to the Exceptions of the learned Thomas Albius. (Entitled) Scirtuum nihil est; Or the Author's defense of the Vanity of Dogmatizing . . . (Also) A letter to a friend concerning Aristotle. 4°. xl + 92 + 184 pp. London, pr. by E. Cotes for Henry Eversden.
- 1666.* Philosophical considerations Concerning Witchcraft. (The impression was almost wholly destroyed in the great fire. It was reprinted in 1667 and again in 1668 [*vide infra*].) London. 4°.

¹ The starred editions I have not seen, but have collected from a collation of the British Museum Catalogue, Anthony à Wood, and the article in the *Biographia Britannica*.

1668. A Blow at Modern Sadducism in some philosophical Considerations about Witchcraft. And the relation of the famed disturbance at the house of M. Mompesson. With reflections on Drollery and Atheism. 12°. (Reprinted with additions as Saducismus; *vide infra*.) London.
1668. Plus Ultra, or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle. In an account of some of the most Remarkable late improvements of Practical, useful learning, to Encourage Philosophical Endeavours, occasioned by a conference with one of the Notional Way. 8°. xxxi + 149 pp. London, pr. for James Collins.
- 1667-1670.* Glanvill published three Sermons separately in these years. These I have not been able to trace. They are not in the British Museum. The titles given by Wood are those of Sermons II., III., and IV. in the 1681 volume.
1670. Λογου Θρησκεια or a Seasonable Recommendation and Defence of Reason in the Affairs of Religion against Infidelity. 8°. ii + 147 + 234 pp. London, J. Collins.
- 1670.* The Way of Happiness, represented in its Difficulties and Incouragements; and cleared from many Popular and Dangerous Mistakes. 8°. London. (Reprinted in Sermons, Discourses and Remains, 1681.)
1671. A Prefatory Answer to Mr. Henry Stubbe. . In his animadversions on Plus Ultra. 8°. xiv + 212 pp. London, J. Collins.
1671. Philosophia Pia or a Discourse of the Religious temper and tendencies of the experimental Philosophy which is profest by the Royal Society. 8°. London, J. Collins. vi + 234 pp.

- 1671.* A Further Discovery of M. Stubbe in a brief reply to his last Pamphlet against J. G. 4°. London.
- 1573.* An Earnest Invitation to the Lord's Supper. (Reprinted ten times before 1720.)
- 1676.* Seasonable Reflections and Discourses to the Conviction and Cure of the Scoffing and Infidelity of a Degenerate age. 8°. London. (Four sermons, reprinted in the 1681 volume.)
- (?) An Apology for Some of the Clergy who Suffer under false and scandalous Reports on the occasion of the Rehearsal Transposed. (This is advertised for sale at the back of the Essays (1676); but it is mentioned nowhere else.)
1676. Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion. 4°. (Separate pagination) xii + 66 + 56 + 43 + 28 + 61 + 58 pp. London, pr. by J. D. for John Baker.
1678. An Essay concerning Preaching: Written for the Direction of a young Divine; and useful also for the people in order to Profitable Hearing. (Bound with) A Seasonable Defence of Preaching and the Plain Way of it. 16°. 100 + 112 pp. London, pr. by A. C. for H. Brome.
1681. Some Discourses, Sermons and Remains of the Reverend Mr. Joseph Glanvill, late Rector of Bathe, and Chaplain in Ordinary to his Majesty. Collected into one volume and published by Ant. Horneck, Preacher at the Savoy, together with a Sermon Preached at his funeral by Joseph Pleydell, arch. Deacon of Chichester. 4°. iv + 25 + 422 pp. London, pr. for Henry Mortlock.
1681. Saducismus Triumphatus, or Full and Plain Evidence Concerning Witches and Apparitions. In two Parts. The First treating of their Possibility, the

Second of their Real Existence, By Joseph Glanvill, late Chaplin in Ordinary to his Majesty and Fellow of the Royal Society. 8°. London, pr. for J. Collins. (Reprinted 1683, 1689, 1700, and 1726.) iv + 58 + xii + 180 + xiv + 328 pp.

1681. The Zealous and Impartial Protestant, shewing some great but less heeded Dangers of Popery, in Order to Thorough and Effectual Security against it in a Letter to a Member of Parliament. 4°. 60 pp. London, pr. by M. C. for Henry Brome.

T 1682. *Lux Orientalis* (reprinted in Two Choice and Useful Treatises The one *Lux Orientalis*. . The other a Discourse of Truth . . by Dr. Rust. 8°. xlv + 195 + 276 pp.

APPENDIX

(b) PRINCIPAL CRITICAL PASSAGES CONCERNING GLANVILL

- HALLAM: Literature of Europe. Vol. IV., 117-120. New York, 1864. (Hallam knew only the *Scepsis*, Plus Ultra, and Saducismus. His attitude is very admiring.)
- Retrospective Review: 1853, I., pp. 105-118. Art. "Pyrrhonism of Joseph Glanvill" (by W. Barnes). This is an abstract of the *Scepsis*; it contains little criticism.
- Temple Bar Magazine: Vol. 98, p. 250 *seq.* (fragmentary remarks).
- LECKY: Rise of Rationalism in Europe. Vol. I., pp. 120-128. New York, 1866. (Perhaps the best general criticism.)
- TULLOCH: Rational Theology in the 17th Century. Vol. II., pp. 443-455, and *passim*. Edinburgh, 1874. (These pages are interesting but unsympathetic.)
- OWEN: Preface to Reprint of *Scepsis Scientifica*. London, 1885. (This account is interesting, but, as has already been pointed out, inaccurate in points of detail. The criticism is somewhat biassed by Mr. Owen's well-known interest in things "skeptical.")
- ROBERTSON: Hobbes, p. 217. Edinburgh, 1886.
- LEWES: History of Philosophy. Vol. II., p. 46. London, 1851.

- REMUSAT: Hist. Phil. en Angleterre. II., pp. 184-201. Paris, 1878. (Excellent criticism, but chiefly confined to the Sceptis and Saducismus.)
- MORELL: An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 19th Century. Vol. I., pp. 330-332. London, 1847.
- Dictionary of National Biography. Art. "Joseph Glanvill." Vol. XXI., p. 408-409.
- WOOD: Athenæ Oxonenses. (Ed. Bliss.) Art. "Joseph Glanvill." III., 1244.
- Biographia Britannica: Art. "Joseph Glanvill." Vol. IV., p. 2203-2215.
- Encyclopædia Britannica. 9th ed. Art. "Glanvill."

For more fragmentary literary and philosophical criticism see :

- Saturday Review: Vol. 60, p. 417. (Review of Owen's edition of the Sceptis.)
- Academy: Vol. 28, p. 143. (Ditto, by J. G. Dow.)
- BUHLE: Gesch. der Phil. Vol. VI., pp. 605-608. Göttingen, 1804.
- ERDMANN: Gesch. der Phil. Vol. II., p. 277, notes 2, 3. Berlin, 1896.
- GARNETT: The Age of Dryden. pp. 164-166. London, 1897.
- HÖFFDING: Gesch. der neuen Phil. Vol. I., p. 276 *seq.* Leipzig, 1896.
- STÖCHL: Gesch. der neuen Phil. Vol. I., p. 198. 1883.
- UEBERWEG: History of Philosophy. Vol. II., pp. 15, 35, 41, 360. Tr. Morris. New York, 1885.
- WINDELBAND: Gesch. der neuen Phil. Vol. I., p. 325, Leipzig, 1899.

(In every case the criticism in the above is grounded

on the Scepsis or on the earlier critics. The Platonic side of Glanvill's work is wholly overlooked. His scepticism is noticed, but no one I believe has shown its relation to Sextus Empiricus. His critique of causation is barely mentioned, not discussed.)

APPENDIX

(c) PRINCIPAL WRITINGS OF THE CAM- BRIDGE PLATONISTS

CUDWORTH: *The True Intellectual System of the Universe.* (With Life by Birch.) London, 1820.

CULVERWELL: *The Light of Nature.* (Ed. John Brown, with Critical Essay by Cairns.) Edinburgh, 1857.

HENRY MORE: *Psychodia, or Platonical Song of the Soul.* Cambridge, 1642. A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings. 4th ed.; revised and much enlarged. London, 1712.

JOHN SMITH: *Select Discourses.* (With Life by J. Worthington and the funeral sermon upon the author by Simon Patrick.) 2d ed. London, 1673.

J. WORTHINGTON: *Diary.* (Ed. by James Crossley for the Chetham Society.) 3 vols. 1847, 1855, and 1886. 3d vol., ed. Christie.

(The following works may be added. They were written by men affiliated with the Royal Society, and bearing relations more or less close to the Platonists. As has been noted in the text, these writers have a point of view very similar to that of Glanvill.)

BOYLE: *Some considerations touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy* (1663 and 1671). *Some Considerations about the Reconcilableness of Reason and Religion* (1675). Both in *Collected Works of Robert Boyle.* London, 1744.

PARKER: *A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick*

Philosophy. 2d ed. Oxford, 1667. An account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion and Goodness, especially as they refer to the Originian hypothesis Concerning the Pre-existence of Souls. Oxford, 1667.

J. RAY: Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation. London, 1691.

WILKINS; On the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion. 2 books. 1678.

INDEX

- Abelard, 9.
 Addison, Joseph, 85.
 Ænesidemus, 105.
 Agrippa, Cornelius, 97, note, 153.
 Amadis de Gaule, 212.
 Aristotle, 90-95, and *passim*.
 Armyn, St. Michael, 76.
 Arnold, Matthew, 1, 59, 219.
 Ascham, Roger, 10, 182.
 Aubrey, John, 65.
 Bacon, Francis, 5 *seq.*, 83, 148, 182.
 Baxter, Richard, 57, 150.
 Beale, John, 70, and note.
 Beaumont, Francis, 12.
 Beaumont, Joseph, 13.
 Benivieni, 10.
 Berkeley, Bishop, 49, 108.
 Bodin, Jean, 147.
 Böhme, Jacob, 46.
 Boyle, Robert, 7, 65, 69, 136.
 Brereton, Lord, 64.
 Browne, Sir Thomas, 149, 179 *seq.*
 Bruno, Giordano, 4.
 Burke, Edmund, 208.
 Burnet, Bishop, 37, 38.
 Burnet, Thomas, 126.
 Burton, Robert, 180.
 Butler, Samuel, 211.
 Cabbala, 152 *seq.*, 209.
 Cardan, Jerome, 5.
 Cartwright, William, 12.
 Causabon, Meric, 168, 171.
 Chillingworth, William, 22, 182.
 Cicero, 9, 21.
 Claes, Jesch, 169.
 Cocke, Captain, 67 *seq.*
 Coleridge, Samuel T., 49.
 Collins, James, 61.
 Comte, Auguste, 112.
 Conant, John, 53.
 Conant, Samuel, 54.
 Conway, Lady, 44, 66, 158, 169.
 Copernicus, 3.
 Cowley, Abraham, 7, 128, 190, note, 211.
 Crashaw, Richard, 28.
 Crosse, Robert, 73 *seq.*
 Cudworth, Ralph, 37 *seq.*, 169.
 Culverwell, Nathaniel, 25 *seq.*, 118, 129, 180.
 Darsy, H[enry?], 220.
 Darwin, Charles, 138.
 Davies, Sir John, 11.
 Defoe, Daniel, 175.
 Descartes, René, 14 *seq.*, 36, 42, 107, 129 *seq.*, 183, 209.
 Digby, Sir Kenelm, 8, 27.
 Don Guzman, 212.
 Donne, Dr. John, 213.
 Don Quixote, 212.
 Drury, John, 155.
 Dryden, John, 179 *seq.*
 Dunton, John, 191, note.
 Earle, John, 182.
 Elyot, Sir Thomas, 10.

- Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 43, 186.
 Epicurus, 209.
 Episcopus, Simon, 166.
 Evelyn, John, 75.
- Falkland, Lord, 22.
 Fuller, Thomas, 182.
- Galileo, 3.
 Gassendi, 209.
 Gaule, John, 150, 181.
 Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 5.
 Glanvill, John, 86.
 Glanvill, Joseph, *passim*.
 Glanville, Benjamin, 57.
 Glanville family, 51 *seq.*
 Greatrakes, Valentine, 46, 67,
 note, 158, 166.
 Greville, Sir Fulke, 10.
 Greville, Robert, 14, 26.
 Gurney and Myers, 144, note.
- Habington, William, 12.
 Hakewill, George, 96, 210, note.
 Hales, John, 22, 182.
 Herbert of Cherbury, 8, 26, 128.
 Hobbes, Thomas, 8, 103, 128, 151,
 182.
 Holland, Henry, 148.
 Homer, 211.
 Horace, 41.
 Horneck, Anthony, 87, note, 173.
 Hume, David, 102, 105.
 Hutchinson, Francis, 144, 173.
 Huxley, Thomas, 106, note, 138.
- James I., King, 149.
 James, William, 115.
 Johnson, Samuel, 174, 190, note.
 Jonson, Ben, 11.
- Kant, Emmanuel, 49, 106.
 Kepler, 3.
- Lecky, W. E. H., 146, 159.
 Locke, John, 2, 38, 109, 123.
- Macaulay, Lord, 6.
 Magellan, 3.
 Marsilius, Ficinus, 3.
 Marvell, Andrew, 81.
 Masham, Lady, 38.
 Merlin, 147.
 Milton, John, 13, 27, 179, 181.
 Minard, Joseph, 55.
 Mompesson, John, 155 *seq.*
 Montaigne, Michael de, 109, 186,
 212.
 More, Henry, 40 *seq.*, 60, 61, 66,
 75, 115, 129, 133 *seq.*, 152, 154,
 169, 172, 185, 189.
 More, Sir Thomas, 10.
- Newcastle, Duchess of, 80.
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 14, 134.
 Nichols, John, 191, note.
 Norris, John, of Bemerton, 49.
 North, Sir Thomas, 10.
- Oldenburg, Henry, 69.
 Overbury, Sir Thomas, 12, 182.
- Paley, William, 135 *seq.*
 Paracelsus, 46.
 Parker, Samuel, 54, 81, 184.
 Pascal, Blaise, 134.
 Pater, Walter, 146, 186, note.
 Pennington, Mrs., 67 *seq.*
 Pepys, Samuel, 67 *seq.*
 Pico della Mirandola, 3, 42, 209.
 Plato, 9 *seq.*, 121-122, 186.
 Pletho, 3.
 Plotinus, 9, 32, 209.
 Poe, Edgar Allan, 219.
 Pope, Alexander, 216.
 Prynne, William, 181.
 Pythagoras, 209.

- Raleigh, Sir Walter, 96.
 Ramus, 3.
 Ray, John, 136.
 Rous, Francis, 54 *seq.*
 Royal Society, 7, 63, 131, 183.

 Sainte-Beuve, Charles Augustin, 14.
 Scot, Michael, 147.
 Scot, Reginald, 166.
 Selwyn, Margaret, 62.
 Sextus Empiricus, 89, 96-97.
 Shaftesbury, third Earl, 49.
 Shakespeare, William, 10.
 Sidney, Sir Philip, 10.
 Sinclair, George, 173.
 Socrates, 114, 165.
 Smith, John, 29 *seq.*
 Spenser, Edmund, 10, 23, 41, 172.
 Spinoza, Baruch de, 89, 126.
 Sprat, Dr. Thomas, 183, 189.
 Stephen, Leslie, 78.
 Stephens, Henry, 96.
 Stocker, Mary, 62.
 Stubbe, Dr. Henry, 78 *seq.*
 Suckling, Sir John, 22, 128.

 Taylor, Jeremy, 22, 179 *seq.*
 Telesio, Bernard, 5.

 Temple, Sir William, 38, 179.
 Teunyson, Lord, 116.
 Theocritus, 210.
 Thomas of Erceldoune, 147.
 Thynne, Sir James, 62.
 Tillotson, John, 179.

 Wagstaffe, John, 167.
 Wagstaffe, William, 167.
 Waller, Edmund, 64.
 Wallis, John, 54.
 Walton, Izaak, 13, 182.
 Webster, John, 171.
 Wesley, John, 174.
 Whichcote, Samuel, 23 *seq.*, 129.
 White, Thomas, 62 *seq.*
 Whitlock, Richard, 128.
 Wier, John, 147.
 Wilkins, Bishop, 54, 64, 128, 136.
 Willoughby, Francis, 54, 61.
 Wood, Anthony à, 56, 86.
 Worthington, John, 29, 59, 60, 75.

 Van Helmont, Baron, 46, 66, 152, 158, 169.
 Vaughn, Henry, 13, 134.
 Vaughn, Thomas, 13.
 Virgil, 41, 210.

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